OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE

THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE

UNITED STATES

CAPTION: STEVEN DEWAYNE BOND, Petitioner v. UNITED

STATES

- CASE NO: 98-9349 C-2
- PLACE: Washington, D.C.
- DATE: Tuesday, February 29, 2000
- PAGES: 1-60

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
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Supreme Court U.S



1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
2	X
3	STEVEN DEWAYNE BOND, :
4	Petitioner :
5	v. : No. 98-9349
6	UNITED STATES :
7	X
8	Washington, D.C.
9	Tuesday, February 29, 2000
10	The above-entitled matter came on for oral
11	argument before the Supreme Court of the United States at
12	10:05 a.m.
13	APPEARANCES :
14	M. CAROLYN FUENTES, ESQ., Assistant Federal Public
15	Defender, San Antonio, Texas; on behalf of the
16	Petitioner.
17	JEFFREY A. LAMKEN, ESQ., Assistant to the Solicitor
18	General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on
19	behalf of the Respondent.
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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(10:05 a.m.)
3	CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: We'll hear argument
4	first this morning in Number 98-9349, Steven Dewayne Bond
5	v. The United States.
6	Ms. Fuentes.
7	ORAL ARGUMENT OF M. CAROLYN FUENTES
8	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
9	MS. FUENTES: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
10	please the Court:
11	Mr. Bond's case presents the question whether a
12	search occurs for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when a
13	law enforcement officer manipulates a bus passenger's
14	carry-on luggage to determine its contents. If
15	manipulation of luggage is not a search, then law officers
16	will be able to squeeze and feel carry-on luggage, as
17	Agent Cantu did in Mr. Bond's case, free from judicial
18	scrutiny in criminal cases and without any Fourth
19	Amendment requirement that their actions be reasonable.
20	Over 30 years ago, in Terry v. Ohio, this Court
21	said that it is sheer torture of the English language to
22	suggest that a careful exploration all over the outer
23	clothing of a person's body is not a search. The same can
24	be said in this case. The principles in Terry, as well as
25	those in Dickerson v. Minnesota, govern this case.
	3

Now, the Government says that they do not and 1 says, instead, this Court's public exposure cases govern 2 the determination in Mr. Bond's case. The flaw in the 3 Government's argument is that it fails to recognize that 4 5 on the line between Dickerson and Terry on the one hand 6 and the public exposure cases on the other, Mr. Bond's case falls far closer to the facts, circumstances, and 7 legal principles in Dickerson and in Terry. 8

9 For example, Terry and Dickerson involved 10 searches of outer clothing being worn by a person. Outer 11 clothing, the pockets of outer clothing in particular, 12 serve the function of being a repository of personal 13 effects. We commonly carry our personal effects on our 14 clothing, in our pockets. A travel bag, like the one Mr. 15 Bond carried, serves the same function.

QUESTION: But the difference -- the difference, Ms. Fuentes, if there is one, I mean, the difference asserted, is whether there's a reasonable expectation of privacy, and you do have a reasonable expectation of privacy in your clothing. You don't expect somebody to come up and frisk you.

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MS. FUENTES: I think that's --

QUESTION: But you don't have a reasonable expectation of privacy, your opponents will say, in a soft bag that you chuck into a -- you know, a carrier on the

airplane. You know that other passengers can go there and
 feel it.

MS. FUENTES: Well, of course, we dispute that, Your Honor. We think that Mr. Bond did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his luggage, and he had a reasonable expectation to be free from a Government tactile examination of that luggage.

8 QUESTION: But -- now, how can that be? Did he 9 have a reasonable expectation other passengers would not 10 be able to feel the luggage and see what was in it?

MS. FUENTES: He reasonably expected that other passengers might push or move the luggage if they needed to make room for their own, but that is not what Agent Cantu did.

QUESTION: They couldn't have squeezed it? 15 MS. FUENTES: I think they could have squeezed 16 17 it, but again that is not what Agent Cantu did. When we get on a bus and we put our luggage overhead, the 18 expectation is that if another passenger needs to come 19 aboard and needs room in that luggage bin, maybe he will 20 push it, maybe he will pull it, I think maybe he could 21 squeeze it. 22

QUESTION: But there are some nasty passengers who may go beyond that. Let's analogize it to the situation where you leave your window shades up. Now, you

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1 don't expect your neighbors to peek into your room, but
2 you don't have a reasonable expectation of privacy, and
3 the police are entitled to observe what is going on in the
4 room if you leave the shades up, isn't that right?

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MS. FUENTES: In that --

6 QUESTION: Now, it may be a nasty thing for 7 people to look into your room.

MS. FUENTES: In that case, I think it's 8 9 correct, Your Honor, but I think one of the major distinctions between Mr. Bond's case and the public 10 exposure cases are that in fact those observa -- the 11 12 observations in those cases and in the example that you just gave took place from public thoroughfares, and this 13 14 Court has found that people don't have a reasonable expectation to be free of visual observations made by 15 those who are in a vantage point where they have a right 16 17 to be. That's --

QUESTION: We had a case that involved an apartment building and the police went right next to the particular apartment. It wasn't a public road, and it wasn't the air space above.

MS. FUENTES: I believe you're talking about
Minnesota v. Carver --

24 QUESTION: Yes.

25 MS. FUENTES: -- Justice Ginsburg, and I think

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in that case it was still from a public vantage point. A
 street, whether it's an open public thoroughfare or open
 area next to a house, is entirely different from the
 surface of Mr. Bond's luggage.

5 QUESTION: Well, but you would have to 6 contend -- well, you don't contend that the aisle of an 7 interstate bus is not a public place for this purpose? I 8 mean, Agent Cantu had a perfect right to be in the aisle.

9 MS. FUENTES: He did, and if he had made his 10 observations from the aisle, we might have a bad case, but 11 he did not. The observations that he made about the 12 contents of Mr. Bond's luggage were made from the --13 through the surface of his luggage. The observations 14 weren't made just from the bus. They were made from the 15 luggage.

QUESTION: Yes, but he was standing in the aisle. Isn't that the point of the analogy? He did the feeling while he was standing in an aisle where at least public to the extent of bus passengers were free to be, just as the person who peeps in the window is doing so, on your reasoning, from a place where that person has a right to be.

MS. FUENTES: I don't think so.
QUESTION: Isn't -MS. FUENTES: I'm sorry.

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QUESTION: Go ahead.

MS. FUENTES: I don't think that is the analogy, 2 and I think the Court recognized as much in the Dickerson 3 case. The Dickerson case involved a pat-down of a 4 5 person's outer pockets. OUESTION: Okay, but it seems to me, and this 6 7 was what I was going to ask you to comment --MS. FUENTES: Certainly. 8 OUESTION: -- on. What is crucial is not where 9 10 they were standing, but what they were doing. MS. FUENTES: Correct. 11 OUESTION: Don't we draw a line between looking, 12 which is basically free, and feeling, which is not 13 basically free? 14 15 MS. FUENTES: Yes, I would agree, and that is another point that distinguishes Mr. Bond's case from the 16 17 public exposure cases. QUESTION: What do I do with the following 18 19 problem for me, which is, I fly quite a lot up to Boston 20 and so forth, and I put bags all the time in the upper 21 thing, and people are always moving them around. they push them, they lift them up, they move them to other 22 places, and if they're soft they would feel just what was 23 in the inside. Now, that happens all the time, and I do 24 25 it myself, frankly. I move somebody else's bag and push

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mine in, and I imagine the interstate bus here was no
 different.

3 So if that happens all the time, how can I say 4 that your client has some kind of special expectation, 5 since in my own experience, people are always handling 6 this soft luggage?

7 MS. FUENTES: I think that that experience is 8 the reasonable expectation. They need to move the luggage, and so they push it or they move it. Agent Cantu 9 was not in that position. I'll give you an example. 10 If 11 you're on the plane and there are only three people on there, and there's luggage down the hall and there's 12 13 luggage over your head, you don't expect that someone is going to come into the plane and start squeezing and 14 15 moving your luggage when --

QUESTION: Well, Ms. Fuentes, you know, we don't have a lot of evidence here about exactly what Agent Cantu did. It's very sparse. He felt -- the district court said only that Agent Cantu felt the bag, so we really don't know what's involved, more than the passenger shoving it around situation.

MS. FUENTES: I think -- excuse me, Your Honor. I think we do have a good idea of what was involved if we look at Agent Cantu's testimony itself. Agent Cantu said he squeezed the bag, and he described what he felt. He

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felt a brick of methamphetamine, which is a rectangular
 object. Now, that brick was wrapped in --

3 QUESTION: I thought it turned out it was an4 oval, not a brick at all.

5 MS. FUENTES: It was wrapped with duct tape 6 until it became oval-shaped. Then it was wrapped in a 7 pair of pants. Then it was placed inside a canvas bag 8 which was closed to the public.

9 QUESTION: How large was the brick, Ms. Fuentes? 10 Does the record show that?

11 MS. FUENTES: The brick was approximately 4 to 5 12 inches wide by 6 to 7 inches long. It doesn't give the 13 third dimension of the brick.

QUESTION: There's a difference here in what the police officer did and what the fellow passenger does to Justice Breyer's luggage. In this case the purpose of the manipulation, or the touching of the bag, was to see what was inside. That, I presume, is not the purpose of a passenger.

20 On the other hand, I think this is a difference 21 that the law ignores, is it not? We do not ask about the 22 subjective intention --

23 MS. FUENTES: We do --

24 QUESTION: -- of the person that touches the 25 bag, or do we?

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1 MS. FUENTES: I --2 QUESTION: Or is there something like an objective purpose that we look -- I think this is one of 3 those differences to which the law is blind, or am I wrong 4 about that? 5 6 MS. FUENTES: No, I don't think the law is blind 7 to it. I think what the law says is that we -- is that an 8 officer's subjective motive, or subjective intent, may not 9 serve to invalidate objectively justifiable behavior, and I think that was the Court's holding in the Whren case. 10 11 QUESTION: How do we distinguish the dog-sniff cases, where we've upheld the use of police dogs to sniff 12 13 luggage for narcotics? 14 MS. FUENTES: There are multiple factors, but I 15 think the most important one is that a dog-sniff is incapable of revealing anything to the police except the 16 presence of contraband. 17 18 QUESTION: Well, just to conclude my previous question, do you submit the case on the proposition that 19 20 the purpose of the search, or, rather, the touching, is 21 irrelevant? 22 MS. FUENTES: No. I don't think the purpose is 23 irrelevant to the extent --24 QUESTION: All right. Do you have some 25 authority for that proposition? 11

MS. FUENTES: Yes, I hope so.

(Laughter.)

MS. FUENTES: To the extent that the purpose serves to describe what the officer has done, I think the Court considers it. I'm not saying look at what was in Agent Cantu's head. I'm saying, look at what Agent Cantu did. Now, he told you --

QUESTION: What he do that's different, because 8 9 if you're -- that's -- Justice Kennedy had exactly the 10 question that I was thinking. Purpose doesn't seem relevant. I mean, inso -- because if it were relevant, 11 12 obviously, if you fly the plane over and look down at the marijuana fields, your purpose is a search if you're a 13 policeman, and not if you're not. The Peeping Tom example 14 15 that Justice Scalia gave is the same.

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Did he do something different? What?

MS. FUENTES: Let me go back first to the purpose, and I think the airplane example is a very good one. The purpose, the purpose of looking down from an airplane doesn't make any difference, because the officer had a justifiable reason to be in the air. It's an open, public air space, and he can be there and he can look down just like anybody else can.

In Mr. Bond's case, the officer did not have the same sort of right to have his hands on Mr. Bond's

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luggage, because the inside of a bus and the surface of 1 2 luggage is not like open public air space or other --OUESTION: Well, did he have as much of a right 3 as a fellow passenger would have --4 MS. FUENTES: I don't --5 6 QUESTION: -- to manipulate the luggage? 7 MS. FUENTES: I don't think so, but I don't know 8 the Court has to reach that issue for the second part of 9 the question that Justice Breyer asked --QUESTION: What does the right make any -- why 10 11 does the right make any difference? I mean, let's take garbage standing at the curb. There's another example 12 13 where purpose makes no difference. Do you have a reasonable expectation of privacy in your trash? We've 14 15 said not, because anybody going by can paw through it. Now, that's not a nice thing to do, and it 16 doesn't make any difference whether somebody paws through 17 18 it because he's a busybody or whether a police officer 19 paws through it. 20 Now, I don't see why there's any difference in 21 this pawing over the luggage. MS. FUENTES: Well --22 23 QUESTION: Anybody could do it. It would not be 24 a nice thing for a passenger who sees a nice bag there -doesn't need the room to -- doesn't need to move it, but 25 13

1 says, I wonder what's in that --

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MS. FUENTES: Well --

3 QUESTION: -- and a passenger can do that. 4 That's not a nice thing to do. It doesn't make any 5 difference whether it's a nice thing to do. It can be 6 done.

7 MS. FUENTES: In deciding reasonable 8 expectations of privacy I think this Court looks at myriad 9 factors, not just one or two, and in the garbage --10 QUESTION: Do you agree with Justice Scalia -- I 11 don't mean to interrupt you -- that if you're a passenger -- first of all, I take it your -- a bus case 12 13 isn't like an airplane because you don't have the -luggage doesn't go through any kind of a detector. I 14 15 suppose you have much less expectation of privacy on 16 airplanes than you do on buses. But do you agree that a person has no right to tell someone else, don't squeeze my 17 18 bag to see what you can find, what's in it, just --19 MS. FUENTES: No. 20 QUESTION: What? 21 MS. FUENTES: No, I don't agree. 22 QUESTION: So you don't agree with the premise 23 of Justice Scalia's question, then? 24 MS. FUENTES: Correct. I don't think -- a person retains the right to say, get your hands off of 25 14

luggage, and that helps to define this reasonable 1 2 expectation. But I --OUESTION: You think a person has a right to 3 say, don't paw through my garbage? 4 5 MS. FUENTES: Yes. QUESTION: You think a person has a right to 6 say, don't peek into my windows? 7 MS. FUENTES: Yes, but --8 QUESTION: I mean, indeed, there are some laws 9 10 against Peeping Toms. MS. FUENTES: I agree, but as to --11 12 QUESTION: But there are Peeping Toms, and when you leave your blinds open, you know you're exposing 13 yourself to them. 14 MS. FUENTES: As to the garbage first, the 15 privacy interest in garbage is far different than the 16 privacy interest -- the expectations may be the same, they 17 may be similar, but the privacy interest in garbage is far 18 different from the privacy interest in luggage. 19 20 QUESTION: Did you make the analogy to abandored 21 property? If you put your garbage out there, it's gone? 22 MS. FUENTES: Correct. 23 QUESTION: If somebody has a piece of luggage, and the police officer says, whose is this, and nobody 24 answers, then it's abandoned. 25

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MS. FUENTES: Then it's abandoned.

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2 QUESTION: Is there -- I beg your pardon. 3 QUESTION: But here, I think your case is 4 resting on the difference between ordinary pushing and 5 shoving and taking a bag and feeling around like this, 6 which, at least from my experience on airlines, doesn't 7 happen. People jam their stuff in. They don't take it 8 out and feel here and there.

MS. FUENTES: That is one of the major points 9 upon which Mr. Bond's argument rests, and what Mr. Bond 10 did, Justice Breyer -- excuse me. What Agent Cantu did to 11 Mr. Bond's luggage that was different than what other 12 passengers do is demonstrated by the agent's testimony. 13 Any passenger pushing or pulling luggage, or even 14 15 squeezing luggage, grasping it, would not have been able to discern the edges of a rectangular brick which had been 16 wrapped in duct tape until it became oval, placed in a 17 pair of pants, wrapped in a pair of pants, put in a canvas 18 19 bag --

20 QUESTION: Well, I'm not sure that's right, 21 Ms. Fuentes. I mean, supposing you had someone who had 22 the same experience Mr. Cantu had, he now retired from the 23 Government service and was simply pushing and shoving 24 without any particular motive, he could have discerned the 25 same thing that Agent Cantu could, could he not?

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MS. FUENTES: No. I think there's a difference. 1 2 I think Agent Cantu's experience is what led him to think 3 that what he felt was narcotics, but it's simply the same 4 sort of physical manipulation that anybody could use in finding out what that brick felt like. I don't think 5 6 anyone, whether they'd been trained or not, can feel the 7 details that Agent Cantu described unless they are manipulating that bag in a way that is significantly 8 different from the way passengers are reasonably expected 9 10 to push and --QUESTION: You don't mean just with respect to 11 purpose or intent --12 13 MS. FUENTES: Correct. QUESTION: -- but you mean a lot more 14 15 manipulation. 16 MS. FUENTES: In the manner in which the bag was 17 manipulated, that's correct. QUESTION: You want us to decide these cases on 18 19 that basis, decide in each case what degree of 20 manipulabil -- manipulation would have had to occur to -if it was a bigger brick, it might have been -- I'm very 21 22 unlikely to come up with a rule like that, I'll tell you. 23 It seems to me --MS. FUENTES: That is --24 25 QUESTION: -- you can either squeeze the bags or 17

you can't squeeze the bags, but I don't think we're likely 1 2 to make it depend upon how much you squeezed it. 3 MS. FUENTES: Well, I think that is a very hard 4 question, and I think --5 OUESTION: It is. 6 MS. FUENTES: -- the issue in Mr. Bond's case 7 could be decided by saying, officers cannot squeeze bags. 8 QUESTION: On the degree of manipulation point 9 and the questions put to you by Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia, it does seem to me that a passenger does 10 11 not have the right to start manipulating my luggage to see 12 what's in it. Is that a tort? It's not a conversion. 13 There's no asportation of the property. I just -- it's not an assault, because an inanimate thing can't be 14 15 assaulted. 16 MS. FUENTES: I'm not certain that it rises to 17 the level of a tort. QUESTION: I'm not sure it does, although it 18 19 seems to me that it's -- there's some level of wrong occurring there. 20 21 MS. FUENTES: If the officer -- if Agent --22 Agent Cantu took that bag and he converted it to his own 23 purpose. It doesn't amount to a conversion because it wasn't so intrusive that it would be a conversion, but for 24 25 a dispossession of property in tort law there are some 18

damages. I don't know if it would rise to that level, but 1 I think the important point is that tort law provides a 2 3 privilege to Mr. Bond to stop even harmless interference with is luggage. 4 5 QUESTION: Did he object? 6 MS. FUENTES: No, he did not. QUESTION: And how is it different physically 7 8 from, say, what happens occasionally -- one of the flight attendants, or maybe a passenger will take my canvas bag 9 10 out, they'll be holding it, they'll move it to a different compartment, they'll push it around, and I guess they can 11 12 feel something. Now, how -- physically what happened, how is it different from that? 13 14 MS. FUENTES: Because Agent Cantu was able to feel more than the actions you described --15 QUESTION: How do we know that? How do we know 16 that? 17 MS. FUENTES: By his testimony. By the fact 18 that it was a rectangular brick whose edges were so 19 20 disquised by duct tape that it was described as an oval 21 mass, to be able to feel those rectangular edges through duct tape, through --22 23 QUESTION: All right. So one way you might win is, we'd say there's a difference between the manipulation 24 physically and taking the bag out and moving it from one 25 19

1 place to another. There had to be more here. Is there
2 any other way you could win?

3 MS. FUENTES: I think so, Your Honor, and I 4 think it goes back to expectations of privacy, and not to 5 purpose, but to how -- what means are used to achieve that 6 purpose. For example, reasonable expectations of privacy I think cannot rest on the extremes of conduct, because we 7 8 have to look at what we as a society, a civil society, 9 expects is the norm, and we expect that maybe the flight 10 attendant, or maybe someone else will push or move our 11 luggage.

But when a uniformed officer comes in and starts squeezing all of the luggage, clearly from his actions you can see he's trying to find out -- and I'm not talking motive, I'm talking manner. You can see that he's trying to find out what's in your luggage, that is an incredible intrusion on personal security.

QUESTION: You know, I'd feel more sympathetic to your client, you know, from this terrible intrusion on his privacy if there were not some very easy way to avoid it, which is called hard luggage. If he's really concerned about the privacy of the contents of whatever he's carrying, put it in hard luggage. What's the big deal?

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MS. FUENTES: Well, I think that's very

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demonstrative of what a reasonable expectation of privacy 1 The way -- he kept it with him on the bus. I don't 2 is. think that can be discounted. I think that probably a 3 passenger's first line of defense, and best line of 4 defense against others, is keeping his luggage with him. 5 6 Hard-backed luggage, of course, would have helped --7 QUESTION: Second after that is getting a hard 8 baq, but if he gets a soft bag he knows people are going 9 to be able to feel things through it. 10 MS. FUENTES: I -- he expects that if he doesn't 11 like the way people are feeling it, he can stop them, and action by a police officer is different. 12 In addition to that, if you look at the way 13 Mr. Bond wrapped his methamphetamine brick, that wrapping 14 would have withstood any discoveries by passengers who are 15 moving luggage in the way that we would reasonably expect. 16 QUESTION: Well, would you agree that the 17 passenger had a right to tell the policeman, don't feel my 18 19 bag? 20 MS. FUENTES: I think he did. I think he had a 21 right to. OUESTION: But he didn't do that. 22 23 MS. FUENTES: No. Agent Cantu came on this bus with a show of authority. The bus was pulled off of IH-24 10 for border for an immigration inspection --25

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QUESTION: Well, we've been through that in Florida and Bostick, in which we said that the police officer with a show of authority -- two of them in that case, in fact, with guns and so forth -- said, may I search your bag, and we said the passenger, the citizen has to exercise his rights.

MS. FUENTES: Agent Cantu did not say, may I
squeeze your bag, and that is really the critical --

9 QUESTION: But the point is, the passenger was 10 there and didn't try to stop him. He had the right to do 11 it if he wanted, I assume. I'm making that assumption.

MS. FUENTES: I think he did have the right to 12 13 do it, but the difference is, Agent Cantu came on the bus and started questioning people about their citizenship or 14 15 other right to be in the country. He's coming on board. 16 He's demanding answers of them. He doesn't have to do it in an ugly way, but he is telling them, you must answer me 17 18 about your citizenship, and then, without a do-you-mind and may-I-please, he starts squeezing their luggage. That 19 20 is very different than saying, may I squeeze your luggage.

21 QUESTION: In Bostick it rested on consent. The 22 question was asked. Here, there was no --

23 MS. FUENTES: He --

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24 QUESTION: -- endeavor to obtain consent.

MS. FUENTES: Correct. The officer never said,

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1 Mr. Bond, may I squeeze your luggage.

2 QUESTION: Did the expectation of privacy change 3 at the moment he saw the officer squeezing and he did not 4 object? Is that relevant?

MS. FUENTES: No. I think that's when the 5 6 expectation of privacy was violated, when he saw the officer squeezing. He expected, reasonably, as we all do, 7 that other passengers might move or push his luggage to 8 make room for their own, but it is very startling, and it 9 10 is an invasion of personal privacy, when a law officer gets on and starts squeezing those bags. Another example, 11 12 not --

OUESTION: What if the officer has stood there 13 squeezing the thing for 15 minutes and he had said 14 nothing? Would we at that point be able to infer a 15 consent, or at that point, alternatively, would we be able 16 to say, the terms of the bus travel in effect had changed 17 whatever his original expectation may have been, and he no 18 longer had a reasonable expectation of privacy? Would 19 20 that be a valid line of reasoning?

21 MS. FUENTES: I don't think so, because the 22 longer he squeezes the more intrusive it is.

But in terms of consent for Fourth Amendment constitutional purposes, I don't think this Court has ever accepted mere acquiescence to a show of authority, whether

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it is short or whether it is long, as consent. There has
 to be an affirmative indication that the person has
 consented to a search under the Fourth Amendment, and the
 Court has never accepted any less.

Now, in this case, let me return --

6 QUESTION: I suppose what we'd be saying -- I'm 7 not sure there's any authority for it -- is that your 8 expectation of privacy is reinforced by the fact that you 9 have at hand the means to protect it.

MS. FUENTES: Yes, I think that's correct.
 QUESTION: And you haven't availed yourself of
 that means.

MS. FUENTES: Well, you haven't -- again, the circumstances in this case are, you haven't availed yourself of it because of the show of authority. The fact that the right exists, I think, shows --

17 QUESTION: But that's where Bostick comes in, 18 and it seems to me that case is against you.

MS. FUENTES: Again, respectfully, I would disagree, because if Agent Cantu had said to Mr. Bond, may I squeeze your luggage, I would have a much harder case, but he didn't. He just --

23 QUESTION: Do you think your fellow passengers 24 can sniff your luggage?

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MS. FUENTES: I think you wouldn't like it, and

1 I think it would --

2 QUESTION: But that's okay. You don't think 3 that would be an invasion of privacy. 4 MS. FUENTES: Again, you pose a very hard 5 question --QUESTION: I mean, you have to say that it 6 7 wouldn't, because we've said that the police or police 8 dogs can sniff the luggage, right? 9 MS. FUENTES: Well, we've -- this Court has 10 approved police dogs sniffing --QUESTION: Uh-huh. 11 MS. FUENTES: -- luggage, and I think that 12 anything --13 14 QUESTION: Now, do you think it would be an 15 invasion of privacy if you saw a passenger who was 16 moving --17 (Laughter.) 18 QUESTION: -- you know, as he's moving one of 19 your bags? Would you consider that invasion of privacy? 20 MS. FUENTES: I think I would. 21 QUESTION: Yes, because --22 QUESTION: I think I would, too, but you know it 23 can happen, and you've exposed yourself to it when you put the soft luggage up there --24 25 MS. FUENTES: Because --

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1 QUESTION: -- just as you expose yourself when 2 you put your trash out in containers that can be readily 3 opened and looked into.

MS. FUENTES: Again, I find the difference between luggage, which is meant to safeguard personal belongings and kept close by, the difference between that and former possessions that have been placed in a bag and set on the street to be destroyed, to be -- it is a qualitative difference that I think shows absolutely different privacy interests.

In this case, again returning to privacy interests, I think that if you were to see -- for example, if there were a bored 15-year-old in the front of the bus, tired of the layover, who decided to tap out a tune on the bags in the overhead bins in time with the music he was listening to, I think that would be an invasion of privacy because it's not what you reasonably expect.

18 I'd like to reserve the rest of my time for 19 rebuttal.

20 QUESTION: Very well, Ms. Fuentes. 21 Mr. Lamken, we'll hear from you. 22 ORAL ARGUMENT OF JEFFREY A. LAMKEN 23 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT 24 MR. LAMKEN: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it 25 please the Court:

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Placing a bag in the overhead rack of a public conveyance like a bus necessarily subjects it to touching and handling by other members of the traveling public who may need to move or push on the luggage to make room for additional bags, to retrieve previously stowed bags, or --

6 QUESTION: Yes, but do they squeeze and 7 manipulate it in such a way as to disclose contents by 8 virtue of the kind of handling that's done? I wouldn't 9 think so.

10 MR. LAMKEN: That very well may occur, Justice 11 O'Connor, because when bags are so handled the sense of 12 touch inevitably operates, so if a passenger places his 13 hands on a piece of luggage to push it or snug it into the 14 rack, he may very well --

QUESTION: Well, certainly you could, but I would think there would a difference in the kind of squeezing and manipulation that would occur to identify objects within a bag than would occur normally when you just move it to make more room for your own.

20 MR. LAMKEN: That's possible, Your Honor. The 21 distinction, however, and the principle that governs the 22 case, is one of knowing exposure. That which any other 23 member of the traveling public might have observed is 24 knowingly exposed, and the agent does not violate the 25 Fourth Amendment by observing it. That's not to say that

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the agent can manipulate the bag in any way or for any
 extended period of time.

3 QUESTION: Mr. Lamken, supposing the passenger
4 put a sign on his bag that said, fragile, please do not
5 touch?

Your Honor, there's a very good 6 MR. LAMKEN: 7 possibility that touching that bag notwithstanding the sign would be a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth 8 9 Amendment. I would have a very -- I would hesitate to call it a search, on the other hand, because this cases --10 this Court's cases in Oliver and Dunn, for example, make 11 it clear that violating signs on land that say, no 12 13 trespass, do not convert the entry on land into a search, but it may very well be a meaningful deprivation of the 14 15 individual's possessory interest --

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QUESTION: Is there --

17 MR. LAMKEN: -- it would be a search.

QUESTION: Is there a seizure or an invasion of privacy if the passenger moves your object, the object for any reason other than to make room for his or her own luggage?

22 MR. LAMKEN: Would that constitute -- well, if 23 it's private conduct it would not be governed by the 24 Fourth Amendment at all, but if a passenger moves it for 25 any other reason, I don't -- still don't think that would

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1 be a meaningful deprivation of a possessory interest, which -- so it's not a -- it's not a Fourth Amendment 2 violation. 3 QUESTION: Well, a meaningful deprivation of 4 5 possessory interest is defined how? The injury caused to the owner, I take it? 6 MR. LAMKEN: Yes, that the owner's dominion 7 or --8 9 QUESTION: All right. And here, the injury was very substantial, was it not? 10 MR. LAMKEN: No, Your Honor, I don't believe 11 12 there was any injury to the chattel of any variety. There 13 was no damage to --14 QUESTION: I'm talking about the injury to the 15 owner. MR. LAMKEN: That he was caught with drugs and 16 17 sent to jail? I'm not sure that's an injury that he would have a right to expect that would not occur. 18 QUESTION: You're saying he has no standing to 19 object, he hasn't been injured. I don't understand that. 20 21 He's in jail. MR. LAMKEN: Well, no, I'm not saying that he 22 23 does not have standing to seek -- file a motion to suppress, but in terms of the bag being moved, if you're 24 applying common law standards, which would be neither 25 29

necessary nor sufficient for a Fourth Amendment violation, there certainly wouldn't be any sort of tort, because there is no damage to the chattel, the object was not meaningful -- he wasn't deprived of possession of it for any meaningful period of time, and in the absence of those conduct there would be no trespass to chattel.

7 In addition, the tort of trespass to chattel 8 wouldn't occur if contact with the bag were privileged, 9 and that is, all the other passengers would be privileged 10 by custom, and I think the Restatement in 892(d) makes it 11 clear, besides which, your -- all the other passengers --12 QUESTION: May I ask a question about the --

13 what if he kept it in his lap?

MR. LAMKEN: The law treats items that are on the person and in the person's grasp as if they're part of the person itself. If the object is in his lap, the officer would not be permitted to touch it, and no other member of society would --

19 QUESTION: What if he had it under the seat?
20 What if he had it under his seat?

21 MR. LAMKEN: To the extent that's an area 22 reserved for the exclusive use of the passenger sitting 23 behind the seat, that would not be a public area.

24 QUESTION: Maybe somebody else needed to use it. 25 Sometimes you have to put two bags under a seat. If there

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1 was another person's bag under the seat, would it then be 2 okay to search it, or not?

3 MR. LAMKEN: I think ordinarily, Justice 4 Stevens, the rule would be that the area under the seat in 5 front of you is reserved exclusively for your use and 6 possession. It's part of your seat, effectively.

QUESTION: What if the bus was empty, except for -- and he had the choice of putting it in the seat or an entirely overhead bin, and only one bag up there?

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MR. LAMKEN: Again, I think --

11 QUESTION: What about that case?

12 MR. LAMKEN: The happenstance that the bus is 13 empty does not convert an area that is ordinarily shared 14 with other passengers --

QUESTION: So even on an empty bus, if he made the mistake of putting it up in the overhead bin he would allow it to be searched, but if he put it under the seat, it could avoid that?

MR. LAMKEN: I think that would be correct, Your Honor, because the area under the seat is reserved exclusively for his use under most circumstances, and you would not expect other passengers to be pushing or touching or having contact with the bag in that area. QUESTION: Since this case may well turn on rather fine-spun distinctions, would there be any

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difference between the situation where, by simply observing the bag, and there's something unusually kind of sticking out that you can tell, and this, where apparently there was nothing unusual sticking out, and it required, you know, pushing, feeling, whatever you want to call it, to discern the methamphetamine?

7 MR. LAMKEN: I think, Your Honor, in both cases 8 the question is one of knowing exposure. Was there 9 something that any member of the traveling public, or any 10 other member of the traveling public could have observed 11 during handling of the bag? If the answer to that is yes, 12 then it's knowingly exposed and is not a subject of Fourth 13 Amendment protection.

QUESTION: You do want us to go into the degree of manipulation, then, you're say. We're going to have to decide, you know, whether a normal member of the traveling public would have manipulated it to this degree.

18 MR. LAMKEN: No, I don't think that's the 19 inquiry, Justice Scalia. I think the inquiry is one of knowing exposure. Again, if this is the type of item that 20 another member of the traveling public could have felt 21 while handling the bag, such as by pushing on it to snug 22 into the rack, or grabbing the bag to remove it from the 23 rack, then it's knowingly exposed, and the officer's 24 observation --25

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QUESTION: Well, okay, suppose I say no. 1 MR. LAMKEN: Pardon me? 2 3 QUESTION: Suppose I -- if my answer to that question is no, it would not have been discerned simply by 4 pushing or by grabbing, it would have taken -- it would 5 have had to be another member of the traveling public who 6 7 wanted to know what was in the bag, and who squeezed it to figure it out, you say, if that's the case, you lose. 8 MR. LAMKEN: Yes, I think we would lose if that 9 10 were the case, and -- now --QUESTION: I think you may lose. 11 12 (Laughter.) 13 MR. LAMKEN: I don't think so, Justice Scalia. QUESTION: I think you're making two different 14 15 assertions. You're saying if the bag and its palpability is knowingly exposed to the public, the police can take 16 17 advantage of that, and you're also saying that whatever the public can do, the police can do, the public in this 18 19 case at least being fellow passengers. 20 In the latter example, the only thing that you 21 in effect consent or understand that your fellow passengers will do will be to make room for their own 22 luggage. You do not understand that your fellow 23 24 passengers are going to work their way up and down the bus 25 feeling other people's luggage to see if anything

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interesting turns up. So if the criterion, it seems to me, is what other passengers can do, then what this officer was doing was outside of that, and would be outside the reasonable expectation.

On the other hand, if you abstract from that and 5 say, anything that could be felt by the public can be felt 6 by the police, you're at a different level of generality, 7 and I guess my question is, why should we take the 8 abstract proposition, anything feelable can be felt by the 9 police, as opposed to your other proposition, that what 10 the passengers can do the police can do? Why do we choose 11 one rather than the other to answer the question of what 12 is a reasonable expectation? 13

MR. LAMKEN: You would choose the latter, for -because it's consistent with this Court's cases, for example. In Sorallo and Raleigh, for example, the dissent contended that other people flying over the yard wouldn't stare down. They might want to glance down --

19 QUESTION: Ah, but you're making -- your 20 argument there makes the assumption that touching and 21 looking are for Fourth Amendment purposes identical, and I 22 don't see that identity at all. We in -- generally in 23 society I think we accept the fact that what is out there 24 to be seen can be looked at, and we may be irritated when 25 someone stares, for example, but we don't say, you know,

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you're doing something wrong. It's a question of
 etiquette and that's all.

But when it comes to touching, that's a very different thing. People can stare at you on the street, but if they start coming -- patting down your pockets, I think you're going to feel that a different value is involved, and for that reason I don't see how you can equate looking with touching.

9 MR. LAMKEN: Well, the two -- the same Fourth 10 Amendment principles apply to both cases, but they may 11 turn out to yield different results. There are many 12 fewer --

QUESTION: Well, the basic principle is one of reasonable expectation, and the reasonable expectation in looking, or being seen, is different from the reasonable expectation, or the expectation about being touched, or explored by someone who is touching to find out what he can feel.

MR. LAMKEN: Your Honor, that is correct, and there are many circumstances where one would knowingly expose their person, for example, to visual observation, and I can't imagine any circumstances where they'd knowingly expose -- we'd say they'd knowingly expose their person to tactile observation.

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But one of the few circumstances in which

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something is knowingly exposed to the touch of other
 people is when a bag is placed in an overhead rack in a
 public conveyance.

QUESTION: It is -- yes, but there again, you make the argument easy when you make it at that generality and say, it's exposed to touching. What it is exposed to is to being moved to make room for other luggage.

8 MR. LAMKEN: That distinction I think turns on 9 the purpose with which someone is acting.

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QUESTION: Well, there's --

MR. LAMKEN: I think that's not a purpose that
the law recognizes in the Fourth Amendment --

13 QUESTION: I don't know that that is so. I 14 mean, our purpose inquiry, again, turns at different 15 levels. We say the very fact that you may have a law 16 enforcement objective, purpose in mind as opposed to a 17 private one doesn't matter, but it seems to me that at a 18 lower level of generality the purpose for which you may 19 engage in touching may very well matter.

Take a nonlaw enforcement example. We both agree that generally speaking we expose ourselves to being looked at, but we don't expose things that we carry to being touched, so if somebody comes up to you on the street and starts feeling the package you have in mind, you'd tell them to get away. On the other hand, if you

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drop the package and someone politely comes along and
 picks it up for you, even though they're touching it,
 you'd say thank you.

In that sense, at that level of purpose, purpose 4 5 matters a very great deal to reasonable expectation, and 6 that's the suggestion that I'm making about the purpose 7 for which luggage is touched. It is touched for the 8 purpose of being moved, not for the purpose of being 9 explored, and I don't see why that is not a relevant 10 consideration for the law in judging reasonable 11 expectation.

MR. LAMKEN: Your Honor, those are individual subjective reactions to how certain observations are made. Purpose may make a difference. We may respond differently to someone who happens to glance up through a window and see --

QUESTION: Yes, but just --

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MR. LAMKEN: -- compared to someone --

QUESTION: Just one thought. I'm intending, at least, to suggest something more than a personal idiosyncracy. What I was intending to describe I think was a, kind of a generally shared set of expectations. if you think I'm wrong there, I -- you know, I'll stand corrected, but I think it's something more than just personal subjectivity here.

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MR. LAMKEN: I think the -- I think you are 1 2 wrong there, with respect, Justice Souter, and the reason 3 for that is as follows. Whether one's expectation of privacy is reasonable or not does not vary with the intent 4 5 of the actor. It's either knowingly exposed to the public, and this is the type of thing you would expect to 6 be touched or seen, or it is not, and the actor's 7 intent --8

9 QUESTION: Do you have authority for that 10 proposition?

11 MR. LAMKEN: Yes, Your Honor. The general --12 Sorallo would probably be our best case. The dissent 13 again contended that the purpose was law enforcement, and 14 this was not simply a fly-by for ordinary purposes like --

15 QUESTION: But that was at least -- at least 16 that was in the visual context. I think you're probably 17 right about that. Can you come close to the purpose 18 analysis by using the objective criteria of how long and 19 how intrusive the manipulation was?

I make the assumption -- there's nothing in the record. I make the assumption that the police officer had to manipulate this piece of luggage for a much longer period of time and much more intrusively than he would if he were just moving it from one side of the bin to another. If I'm right about that, is that a relevant

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1 distinction?

MR. LAMKEN: I don't think you're right about 2 that, and I don't believe it's a -- well, it is a relevant 3 factor, certainly, because an officer in our view is 4 entitled to --5 QUESTION: A relevant, or irrelevant? 6 MR. LAMKEN: It is relevant. It is pertinent. 7 It doesn't take that long for a law enforcement officer to 8 observe all of those aspects of a piece of luggage that 9 are knowingly exposed to the rest of the public. 10 11 QUESTION: Suppose there were a finding that it takes 10 seconds to move a bag, and it took over 45 12 13 seconds to manipulate it, would that be a -- there is no such finding, but would that be a basis on which we could 14 15 and should decide the case if that finding were before us? MR. LAMKEN: No, but I think the amount of time 16 spent is a relevant factor, and this is why. It doesn't 17 18 take that long for an officer to observer all those things that were knowingly exposed. 19 Other passengers, for example, might push on a 20 bag to snug it in a rack. The officer, therefore, may 21 push on the bag in all of the various locations that a 22 passenger might, because all of those things were 23 knowingly exposed. Other passengers might grab a bag to 24 remove it from the rack. The officer therefore may grab 25 39

1 the bag from all the different angles another passenger 2 might, because all of those angles are knowingly exposed. 3 That actually does not take all that long. The 4 DEA advises us that it's a reasonably brief period of time, typically far less than 30 seconds, so if the 5 6 officer took longer than a reasonably brief period of 7 time, it might --QUESTION: Is that in the record? 8 9 MR. LAMKEN: No, it is not. It's simply what we 10 have been advised, Your Honor. 11 QUESTION: But Mr. Lamken, what is in the record is that this was not pushing, shoving, that this was 12 13 deliberate manipulation, and that's a distinction that you 14 don't deal with when you say, well, passengers could grab, passengers could shove. This was admittedly a 15 16 manipulation, and I don't think that there's an expectation that your fellow passengers are going to take 17 18 your luggage and go like this around it. 19 MR. LAMKEN: The record does not reflect that 20 the officer did this with the bag. The only thing the record reflects is that the officer grabbed the bag, he 21 22 squeezed the bag hard, and when he did that, he felt a 23 solid object that he thought might be drugs. 24 QUESTION: Do we have -- you have his exact 25 testimony some place here?

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MR. LAMKEN: Yes. It's in the joint appendix, 1 2 and if you look to page, for example --3 QUESTION: He was squeezing them and moving them from side to side. Was he shaking any of them? Yes. 4 MR. LAMKEN: Right. That's actually not 5 agent -- the agent's testimony. That is the defendant's 6 7 testimony. OUESTION: 18. 8 MR. LAMKEN: That's on page 18, but there's 9 nothing in the record that suggests that he actually 10 handled the bag for a greater period of time -- excuse me. 11 That he had repeated squeezings of the bag or anything 12 13 else. The only thing it reflects is that he grabbed the 14 bag once. 15 QUESTION: Mr. Lamken --QUESTION: Do you think it would make a 16 17 difference? That's really the question. MR. LAMKEN: No, we don't believe it would make 18 a difference, because we believe --19 20 QUESTION: Then why argue it? Let's assume he took 45 seconds, then. You'd say that wouldn't matter. 21 MR. LAMKEN: Your Honor, if he took 45 seconds, 22 that could raise an inference that he was observing things 23 that other members of the public --24 QUESTION: You're asking us to draw a line that 25 41

1 based between 15 seconds and 45 seconds --

2 MR. LAMKEN: No, Your Honor, we're not. 3 QUESTION: -- there's a constitutional

4 difference between the two?

5 MR. LAMKEN: We're not. We think the district 6 courts would fulfill their normal fact-finding function in 7 this context.

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QUESTION: The only thing --

9 QUESTION: You say that if he took more than 45 10 seconds he would be observing things that other polite members of the public would not observe. I don't 11 understand why you take the position that the only thing 12 13 you expose yourself to when you put a soft piece of luggage in a public space that you know people can paw 14 15 through is pawing through by other polite members of the public. Why isn't the case that he exposed that to 16 17 somebody else who could readily go in there and manipulate the bag in order to find out what was inside of it? 18

Now, I agree that that's not a polite thing to do, but isn't the question whether he really expected to be protected from that kind of inquiry when he put it in a public place in a soft bag, and it seems to me there are a lot of impolite travelers who might well have done that. MR. LAMKEN: Justice Scalia, we could take that

position, and it would be certainly a defensible one.

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when people do push -- in fact, it may be even more 1 2 defensible than impolite people. Someone who's grabbing a bag in order to move it may very well be keenly aware of 3 what they're grabbing to make sure they don't break 4 5 something or to make sure they support a heavy object 6 which is loosely packed in the bag, so people may 7 actually, even when they're being polite, explore the contents of the luggage to some degree. 8

9 However, for purposes of this case, because the 10 contact was not particularly extended, and there's nothing 11 in the record which suggests --

QUESTION: Well, it's not going to be for the 12 13 purpose of this case. You're going to come out with an 14 opinion that says so long as you don't do, you know, 15 anything more than what a polite member of the public 16 would do, and I'm not sure that's going to help you, 17 because in every case you're going to have to get into 18 this inquiry about, was it 45 seconds or 50 seconds, did he really squeeze it hard, or squeeze it more lightly. I 19 20 don't think courts are able to manage this kind of a principle. 21

22 MR. LAMKEN: Your Honor, I think in most cases 23 it will be relative, a relatively simple process.

24 QUESTION: How is it simple here? I mean, the 25 only thing I've found on this is, the owner says he

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reached for my bag and he shook it a little and squeezed
 it, and then sniffed it.

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MR. LAMKEN: Right.

QUESTION: Then he says, I squeezed the bag, and 4 5 how -- the way you usually do these inspections, yes, when you squeeze the bag, you squeeze them very hard, yes, 6 okay, so it's a hard squeeze, and I quess Justice Scalia's 7 expected you to say, which I rather did, too, that it is a 8 mistake to generate a juris prudence of hard squeezes. 9 10 (Laughter.) OUESTION: What we will have is an infinite 11 12 number of cases trying to decide whether a hard squeeze is more than a soft squeeze, is more than medium squeeze, et 13 cetera. Now, there may be extremes, of course. 14 But you don't say that, and I'm rather curious 15 why. 16 MR. LAMKEN: Well, actually, I think what I mean 17 to exclude are the extremes, where based on the evidence 18 you have the micromanipulation and the rearrangement of 19 the contents of the luggage, such that it's -- the 20 21 officer's enabled to observe that which no other passenger could potentially have observed, and in that case we would 22

23 say that it would violate the Fourth Amendment.

24 QUESTION: Would you accept a rule that the 25 police cannot touch or manipulate or probe baggage to a --

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any greater degree than a passenger might do in moving it? 1 MR. LAMKEN: No, we would not, because that 2 would not be consistent with the principle of knowing 3 exposure. The officer is permitted to observe all those 4 5 things that were knowingly exposed to other members of the 6 traveling public. Objects --7 QUESTION: So you think the traveling public has 8 no reasonable expectation that their bags will be left 9 untouched, except for being moved? MR. LAMKEN: Again, I think because that 10 11 distinction turns on the purpose of the handling, it's not one that the law recognizes. 12 13 QUESTION: Do I assume --QUESTION: Well, but you just accepted the 14 15 previous premise in the answer to my earlier question. QUESTION: Well, all our cases say about purpose 16 is the fact it's not a law enforcement purpose doesn't 17 18 matter, but we have never said you don't look at the 19 purpose of the activity. We've never said that. 20 MR. LAMKEN: Oh, you have in Sorallo, Your 21 Honor. You said quite squarely that the officer's purpose was to observe marijuana is irrelevant. I mean, the Court 22 used the word irrelevant. That would be on page 213 --23 24 QUESTION: No. That's a different --25 QUESTION: Well, but purpose would certainly 45

matter in Justice Souter's example, wouldn't it? I mean, 1 imagine that I have a particular kind of object, and it's 2 almost always going to be mine, and no one will ever touch 3 4 it, but we have -- we can dream up some weird purpose for which, I guess, it would be touched. Well, the fact that 5 99 percent of the time it wouldn't be touched, but it 6 would be touched for one weird purpose 1 percent of the 7 time, wouldn't that be highly relevant to my expectation 8 of privacy? 9

10 MR. LAMKEN: What it would be relevant to is 11 whether you consider the object knowingly exposed. The 12 frequency with which other people handle your luggage, for 13 example, if it were never the case that people touch 14 luggage on overhead racks, and it were prohibited --

15 QUESTION: Ah, so you would say in respect to 16 the fact that I have a package, and the only time I expect 17 somebody else to touch it is when they drop it, is that 18 doesn't show the purpose of dropping it's irrelevant. It 19 just shows it doesn't happen very much.

20 MR. LAMKEN: Well, it would show that when -- if 21 the -- unless the package is dropped, you would expect 22 that no one else would handle it, but once the package is 23 dropped, you would expect that people would.

24QUESTION: So the person in that case --25MR. LAMKEN: Whether they're handling it for law

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enforcement purposes or otherwise is irrelevant. 1 OUESTION: Well, all right, but --2 MR. LAMKEN: But their handling it once it's 3 dropped, and once it's dropped on the ground, it's fair 4 game for someone to pick it up and hand it back to you, 5 6 regardless of what their subjective intent is. 7 QUESTION: Mr. Lamken, does it make any difference whether the luggage is in a closed luggage 8 9 compartment or an open one? On airplanes and some buses there are cupboard doors that close, so the luggage is all 10 11 in there and behind the door. MR. LAMKEN: No, Your Honor, it would --12 QUESTION: Now, is it reasonable to expect that 13 a police officer could come on board and open the luggage 14 compartment and then squeeze? Does that matter? 15 MR. LAMKEN: No, Your Honor, we don't believe it 16 would make a difference whether they're closed or open 17 variety, and the reason is, whether or not it's closed, it 18 is a shared location with other members of the traveling 19 public. It is not a location --20 21 QUESTION: But then if that's your view, then on a bus sometimes they have a compartment for luggage kind 22 23 of underneath, and all the stored luggage goes in there together. He could say to the driver, unload all that 24 luggage. I want to squeeze it. 25 47

MR. LAMKEN: Well, if you were to do --1 2 QUESTION: Is that your view? 3 MR. LAMKEN: Your Honor, we don't believe that check -- there's a reasonable expectation of privacy with 4 5 respect to handling of checked luggage, either. 6 QUESTION: No, no, not checked. It's just, you 7 know, on the -- you -- the driver, the bus driver often will take the luggage from the passenger and put it in 8 9 kind of a bin under the truck, and then when they get to the destination they unload it all out together, and you 10 11 pick out your bag. Now, would they -- would the -- would your agent 12 13 have a right to say to the driver, I want to go through all that luggage down there? 14 15 MR. LAMKEN: No, Your Honor. I don't think you would normally expect the bus driver to do it. 16 17 QUESTION: So if it's closed overhead, he can 18 look at it, but if it's closed under the bus, he cannot? 19 MR. LAMKEN: I -- you know, I don't -- the 20 problem is, I'm not understanding the circumstances you're 21 describing. 22 OUESTION: I think --23 QUESTION: You've never ridden on buses, I 24 guess. You only ride airlines. MR. LAMKEN: That's probably the answer, Justice 25 48

Stevens. 1 (Laughter.) 2 3 MR. LAMKEN: That's probably it. QUESTION: You don't have the expectation of 4 privacy on the airline, because it's all X-rayed as you go 5 in. 6 MR. LAMKEN: I don't think that's the critical 7 factor. 8 9 QUESTION: That's an entirely different case. MR. LAMKEN: On an airline, sometimes larger 10 bags are taken to another compartment at the front of the 11 airplane, for example, where it's -- other people's 12 13 luggage is placed. QUESTION: Can --14 15 QUESTION: Well, could he then say, I want to see all the stuff in the front of the airline? 16 17 MR. LAMKEN: You wouldn't normally expect him to do that, but you would also expect other people --18 QUESTION: Well, the question is, would it be 19 20 constitutional if he did? MR. LAMKEN: Unless the bus driver is a 21 22 Government agent, I'm not sure that it would be a 23 constitutional question, because private conduct doesn't implicate the Fourth Amendment. 24 25 QUESTION: We may not be understanding -- I'm 49 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

asking if, under your view, if a lot of luggage is put in 1 either the rear of the bus, or underneath the bus as it 2 sometimes is, the agent could say, I want to squeeze all 3 that luggage? 4 MR. LAMKEN: Oh, the law enforcement agent. I'm 5 6 sorry, I misunderstood your question. 7 OUESTION: Yes. MR. LAMKEN: Yes. If it's a shared location, and 8 other passengers have access -- were going to have access 9 to it, like it's time to unload the stuff, it would be --10 QUESTION: They don't have access to it. It's 11 the bus driver who pulls it out and puts it on the floor. 12 MR. LAMKEN: He pulls it out and puts it on the 13 14 floor --15 QUESTION: Outside the bus. MR. LAMKEN: Outside the bus --16 17 QUESTION: Right. MR. LAMKEN: And then all the passengers gather 18 round and grab what's theirs. 19 QUESTION: What's theirs. 20 MR. LAMKEN: Other passengers may handle your 21 bag to get at their bags, they may look at your bag in 22 order to determine whether it's theirs. I think again we 23 would consider that knowingly exposed to touching and 24 handling by other members of the traveling public. 25 50

OUESTION: And if the bus driver alone was the 1 person who put the bags in the compartment, what would 2 your answer then be? 3 MR. LAMKEN: And he's the one who pulls them 4 out, but other members -- but they're presented out on the 5 6 ground --QUESTION: He takes them one by one. He looks 7 at the name, he says, Jones. Jones, come on up here. 8 9 (Laughter.) QUESTION: This is a slow bus. 10 (Laughter.) 11 QUESTION: It's an unusual bus driver, too. 12 MR. LAMKEN: Yes. 13 QUESTION: What's your answer? 14 15 MR. LAMKEN: I think as you're moving the hypothetical towards an example, for example, like a coat 16 check in a restaurant --17 QUESTION: Okay, but I've given you the 18 19 hypothetical. I'm not moving it. 20 MR. LAMKEN: Okay. QUESTION: It's this hypothetical. What's the 21 answer in the case of this hypothetical? 22 MR. LAMKEN: I think in that case you would have 23 to say that you would have a reasonable expectation of 24 25 privacy because there's only one other person with whom 51

1 you have an established relationship. That is, the bus --

2 QUESTION: What does it matter whether it's only 3 the bus driver who can touch it, or a fellow passenger who 4 can touch it?

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MR. LAMKEN: Well, I think --

6 QUESTION: You have given up -- on your theory, 7 you've given up your right to demand privacy, and if the 8 law enforcement officer in effect can share in what the 9 fellow passenger can do, why can't he share in what the 10 bus driver can do?

MR. LAMKEN: For the same reason that, for example, in a -- you may give access to your hotel room to the maids and the janitors and the manager, but you don't necessarily mean that the whole world or law enforcement officers can enter your hotel room.

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QUESTION: Okay --

17 QUESTION: The bus driver's a bailee, I

18 assume --

19 MR. LAMKEN: Yes.

20 QUESTION: And he probably has some

21 responsibilities as a bailee --

22 MR. LAMKEN: He doesn't --

23 QUESTION: -- not to feel your luggage.
24 MR. LAMKEN: There's an established
25 commercial --

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1 QUESTION: -- which the impolite passenger does
2 not.

3 (Laughter.) QUESTION: So in effect I guess you're saying 4 5 that the general expectations of what will happen, and by 6 whom things will be done, matters. 7 MR. LAMKEN: Yes, I think that's correct. 8 QUESTION: And if it matters, why doesn't it 9 matter that the only general expectation is that a fellow 10 passenger may move the luggage in order to get his luggage in? That's all you expect. Why isn't that relevant? 11 12 MR. LAMKEN: Well, I think you expect other 13 passengers to have contact with your bag. QUESTION: No, I don't expect other passengers 14 to walk through the bus and feel my luggage gratuitously. 15 QUESTION: And isn't that because the general 16 17 principle of law is, you cannot touch another person's chattel if that touching is going to cause harm to the 18 19 owner? 20 MR. LAMKEN: No, Your Honor. QUESTION: Which it did here. 21 22 The principle of law, if you're MR. LAMKEN: 23 looking to common law the principle is that you'd have no 24 expectation that anybody -- if it's placed in a shared and common location, where the custom is that other people 25 53

handle it, then you would have no cause of action if 1 somebody else handled it, and you'd have no --2 QUESTION: Would you have a cause of action if 3 someone touches your chattel and thereby causes harm to 4 5 you, if someone trespasses on your chattel and causes harm 6 to you, which is what happened here? MR. LAMKEN: I -- Justice Kennedy, I can't 7 8 fathom what the nature of the harm is. I think they'd have to injure the chattel and deprive you of possession 9 of --10 QUESTION: I think your opposing counsel will 11 12 say that the owner is in jail as a result of the touching. MR. LAMKEN: Yes, but I'm not sure that that --13 certainly that would give you standing to seek suppression 14 15 of the evidence, but that would not be sufficient for purposes of a tort action. 16 QUESTION: I don't think it's regarded as common 17 law harm. It --18 19 MR. LAMKEN: Pardon? No, it wouldn't be 20 regarded as a common law harm. 21 QUESTION: It's called justice, really, in common law, isn't it? 22 23 QUESTION: Well, if a fellow passenger got up and jarred Bond's bag, such that the brick fell out, I 24 don't think the fellow passenger would be liable for 25 54

1	damages for his imprisonment.
2	MR. LAMKEN: No, I don't think that would
3	(Laughter.)
4	MR. LAMKEN: He certainly would not, and I think
5	that's a very good analogy.
6	QUESTION: But that was not intentional. This
7	is an intentional tort, and that's the difference.
8	There's a difference between intentional and unintentional
9	torts.
10	QUESTION: So if the fellow passenger
11	intentionally threw it the ground and the brick fell out,
12	the fellow passenger would be liable for his imprisonment?
13	MR. LAMKEN: Again, I think a
14	QUESTION: The fellow passenger is not an agent
15	of the State, so it would take away the
16	QUESTION: Let's let counsel
17	MR. LAMKEN: Exactly, since he's not an agent of
18	the State.
19	QUESTION: But you were about to make a
20	distinction between the cloakroom, and that seems to me
21	the same thing. You hang up your coat in a public space,
22	so why couldn't the police go into every coatroom and
23	start manipulating what's there?
24	MR. LAMKEN: The coatrooms that I've seen, Your
25	Honor, there would be no reason for anybody else ever to
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have contact with your possessions, with your coats, and
 certainly not the pockets.

3 QUESTION: Well, there are plenty of coatrooms4 where there is no attendant.

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MR. LAMKEN: Well --

6 QUESTION: You just put your coat there. You 7 may put your bag, hard or soft --

8 MR. LAMKEN: Right. If it begins to resemble 9 and have the characteristics of the overhead rack, then we 10 would agree that you don't have a reasonable expectation 11 of privacy.

12 If I could turn to the record for one moment, 13 I'd like to point out one thing. Whether or not the 14 object was disguised in the various ways that petitioner 15 declares would not make much of a difference to the agent 16 feeling the package, since what they're attuned to are 17 things that are signature disguises.

But the record also does not reflect that this was a rectangular object that was then so wrapped in durt tape that it somehow became rounded. At page 23 of the transcript, the agent describes it as a brick with rounded edges, and it was a brick with rounded edges, so it could also be described as an oval mass.

In fact, petitioner's own brief in the district court described the object as an oval brick. It's for

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that reason I don't think it's fair to construe the record 1 as having an object that had sharp edges and was so 2 wrapped up in brick -- in tape --3 QUESTION: There isn't any 23, or at least the 4 5 appendix --6 MR. LAMKEN: Joint appendix? 7 QUESTION: The joint appendix doesn't seem to go -- the transcript doesn't seem to go beyond page 20. 8 MR. LAMKEN: 26, I think -- oh, if you're 9 10 talking about --**OUESTION:** The --11 12 MR. LAMKEN: It's -- joint appendix, page 26, is the district court opinion quoting petitioner's 13 description of it as an oval brick; in the transcript 14 pages, page 53, which does not appear in the joint 15 appendix. 16 17 QUESTION: Thanks. MR. LAMKEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 18 19 QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Lamken. 20 Ms. Fuentes, you have 4 minutes remaining. 21 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF M. CAROLYN FUENTES ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER 22 23 MS. FUENTES: I think overall, Your Honor, the -- all of the Government's argument is based on the 24 25 knowing exposure of Mr. Bond's bag, and those cases that 57

this Court has decided on knowing exposure vary so
 radically from Mr. Bond's situation that they should not
 be applied.

That public exposure principle has been applied primarily for visual observations with very limited exceptions, the garbage case, for example, and luggage is different than garbage, and I believe Maryland v. Macon where police officers went into a store where people were invited to buy, and they bought. So they touched it, they bought, they did just what the public could do.

But on that line, what happened to Mr. Bond was 11 much closer to Dickerson and to Terry, and so the public 12 exposure principle should not be applied. Instead, the 13 limited public access principles in Mancuson v. DeForte 14 for example, just because other people have access to our 15 16 office doesn't mean that the police can have access, those principles, as well as Dickerson and Terry, are more 17 applicable in this case. 18

I also wanted to say one thing about purpose, and that is that purpose can be instructive if it is manifested by objective actions, and that purpose is what helps to define reasonable expectations. We do expect that other passengers may move our luggage for the purpose of making room for their own, and when their actions go beyond that, our reasonable expectations of privacy are

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1 violated.

More than 30 years ago, in Terry, this Court had to decide whether it wanted to isolate an entire range of police conduct from Fourth Amendment constraints, and really much the same question is before the Court today. Will the police be permitted to manipulate luggage basically as much as they want under the Government's theory?

9 If anything could have been observed by a member 10 of the public, then the police are entitled to observe it. 11 Will they be able to do that outside the constraints of 12 the Fourth Amendment, and I think the answer should be no.

Unless the court has any more questions --

QUESTION: Well, I'll ask you one -- I mean, when I came into this, I thought, well, it isn't that hard. Maybe it is harder, but the real question's just whether, when you put this luggage up in a place, you have a reasonable expectation that somebody could go and feel the brick, and if the answer's yes, then he has no expectation. The answer's no, he does.

All right, now, on that theory the only way -the answer must be yes, there's a good chance somebody would feel the brick unless it requires a special hard touch, all right?

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MS. FUENTES: Yes.

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QUESTION: Now what? I'm not sure.

MS. FUENTES: Well, I think the answer is, the 2 3 reason they will do it is to move their luggage, and your expectations would be violated if it were an empty bus and 4 someone came and started touching your luggage anyway, and 5 6 when our reasonable expectations of privacy are violated 7 by private persons, that doesn't matter for Fourth Amendment purposes. 8 9 But when the Government does it, and Agent Cantu did it in this case, that is covered by the Fourth 10 11 Amendment, and unless it is done with some sort of

12 individualized suspicion, it is a violation of the Fourth 13 Amendment.

14 CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: Thank you,

15 Ms. Fuentes. The case is submitted.

16 (Whereupon, at 11:04 a.m., the case in the 17 above-entitled matter was submitted.)

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