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PROCEEDINGS BEFORE
THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
UNITED STATES

CAPTION: UNITED STATES, ET AL., Appellants v. PLAYBOY
ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, INC.

CASE NO: 98-1682 e-1

PLACE: Washington, D.C.

DATE: Tuesday, November 30, 1999

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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UNITED STATES, ET AL., :

Appellants :

v. : No. 98-1682

PLAYBOY ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, :

INC. :

- - - - -X

Washington, D.C.

Tuesday, November 30, 1999

The above-entitled matter came on for oral argument before the Supreme Court of the United States at 10:06 a.m.

APPEARANCES:

JAMES A. FELDMAN, ESQ., Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on behalf of the Appellants.

ROBERT CORN-REVERE, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf of the Appellee.

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1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 (10:06 a.m.)

3 CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: We'll hear argument
4 now in No. 98-1682, the United States v. Playboy
5 Entertainment Group.

6 Mr. Feldman.

7 ORAL ARGUMENT OF JAMES A. FELDMAN

8 ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS

9 MR. FELDMAN: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
10 please the Court:

11 This case concerns Congress' attempt to address
12 the problem of graphic sexually explicit adult programming
13 that is available on cable televisions -- on cable
14 television to minors with merely the flip of a dial. It's
15 available to children even though their parents have not
16 subscribed to the cable channels carrying the programming
17 and therefore have every reason to believe that they're
18 not receiving that programming on their televisions.

19 The phenomenon is known as signal bleed, and it
20 occurs when a cable operator scrambles partially the video
21 portion of a premium channel like that operated by
22 appellee, but -- and -- but meanwhile the soundtrack from
23 that channel and other portions of the video programming
24 are allowed to get through, even to non-subscribers.

25 As a result, children with access to cable

1 television gain access intentionally or accidentally to
2 what the district court termed the virtually 100 percent
3 sexually explicit programming.

4 QUESTION: Mr. Feldman, is there evidence in the
5 record of actual signal bleed as opposed to the potential
6 for it? I mean, what -- what does the record show?

7 MR. FELDMAN: There's very substantial evidence
8 of that. In the first place -- and I think the easiest
9 way to approach that is the district court found that on
10 most cable television systems -- and there's some
11 variation, to be sure, but on most cable television
12 systems, the audio portion of programming on channels like
13 those that Playboy or Spice or Spice Hot operates -- the
14 audio portion goes through unhindered. So, that -- that's
15 there and that's a finding of the district court.

16 QUESTION: While I have you interrupted, what
17 level of scrutiny do you think our precedents dictate --
18 govern our analysis here in light of the fact that we've
19 said that cable television and the Internet are entitled
20 to strict scrutiny?

21 MR. FELDMAN: The Court has never said that with
22 respect to the question of indecency on cable television,
23 and in fact, the Court has specifically declined to decide
24 that question in the past on a number -- several
25 occasions.

1 In our view, the right answer, for the reasons
2 given in our brief, is not quite strict scrutiny; that is,
3 there should be a showing of a compelling interest because
4 it is a content-based regulation.

5 But some deference should be given in light of
6 the factors that the Court has noted in *Pacifica* and later
7 cases, the pervasiveness into the -- in the home, the harm
8 to children. Some deference should be given to Congress'
9 choice among alternatives of -- of how to deal with the
10 problem. And especially that's true where what the -- the
11 alternative that Congress has chosen is time-channeling as
12 one option, which permits the cable operator to show the
13 -- show the material from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.
14 unhindered and with no restrictions. That is the --
15 that's the solution that the Court approved in *Pacifica*,
16 and it's a reasonable accommodation of the competing
17 interests. It keeps --

18 QUESTION: Mr. Feldman, do -- do I have to -- do
19 I have to assume, for purposes of this case, that what is
20 at issue here is just what you call indecency and not
21 obscenity? I mean, I've read some of the footnotes in --
22 in your brief that describe -- describe these matters.
23 My law clerks have looked at the videos that were lodged,
24 and I wouldn't even read the descriptions in -- in public.
25 It seems to me obscenity.

1 MR. FELDMAN: I think that for purposes of this
2 case you have to assume that it's indecency.

3 QUESTION: Why do I have to assume that?

4 MR. FELDMAN: Well, because -- I suppose because
5 that's -- that's what -- insofar as -- insofar as there's
6 obscenity that's being broadcast on cable television, it's
7 already independently unlawful under the statute.

8 QUESTION: Well, you -- you can have -- you can
9 have more than one means of -- of preventing that evil, it
10 seems to me. There's no factual finding of the court
11 below that this was not obscenity, is there? And even if
12 there were, I just can't -- can't imagine that what you
13 describe in your brief doesn't qualify as obscenity.

14 QUESTION: The Government didn't charge that it
15 was obscene.

16 MR. FELDMAN: Yes. I mean, it wasn't really a
17 -- it wasn't a subject of proof at trial. One reason is
18 that the obscenity issue turns on contemporary community
19 standards in different communities across the country. It
20 also -- and a number of other factors as well.

21 QUESTION: I don't care what community you're
22 in. The things described here and lodged with the Court
23 strike me as obscene.

24 MR. FELDMAN: Well --

25 QUESTION: On that score, Mr. Feldman, you -- in

1 your brief you urge particularly that we look at exhibits
2 1, 2, and 44.

3 MR. FELDMAN: Um-hmm.

4 QUESTION: Are those typical or are those the
5 worst cases?

6 MR. FELDMAN: Those are -- I can't -- I can't
7 answer that question because I can't say which they are.
8 They are examples of what happens when signal bleed
9 occurs, and this goes back to Justice O'Connor's question
10 a little bit.

11 QUESTION: Yes, but for example, one of them, 2,
12 is not as graphic as 1.

13 MR. FELDMAN: Right. It definitely varies. It
14 varies from time to time and from place to place. At the
15 times when those tapes were made, there's no reason not to
16 think that the exact same material is being pumped down to
17 all of the other subscribers on those particular cable
18 television --

19 QUESTION: Yes. I -- I can imagine a cable
20 channel advertising itself as we -- you know, we transmit
21 indecent programming. That's going to get a lot of
22 viewers I suppose as opposed to, quote, sexually explicit
23 programming.

24 I had thought that the answer to my question you
25 were going to give was that this is a facial challenge and

1 that even if these particular productions are obscene and
2 if this whole channel can be characterized as obscene, you
3 -- you have to consider the application of this statute to
4 other channels that -- that qualify as, quote, sexually
5 explicit channels that are not obscene.

6 MR. FELDMAN: I -- I would -- I would agree with
7 that.

8 QUESTION: That -- that would be a good answer
9 if there existed any such channels. Are you sure that
10 there exist any such channels? In a facial challenge, do
11 we have to imagine factual situations that we know do not
12 exist out in the real world?

13 MR. FELDMAN: Well, I -- I guess the -- the -- I
14 don't think there's a record made as to whether there are
15 other channels that broadcast materials that -- that
16 wouldn't be obscene under -- well, let me put it this way.

17 QUESTION: What does the statute cover in -- in
18 its terms? What -- what channels are -- are subject to
19 this -- this law?

20 MR. FELDMAN: I think it's channels primarily
21 devoted to sexually explicit programming.

22 QUESTION: Right. Now, do you think there are
23 out there in the real world channels primarily devoted to
24 sexually explicit program that do not -- do not contain
25 obscene transmission in large part?

1 MR. FELDMAN: Well, I don't know based on this
2 record whether there are or not. But I do think that it
3 -- it is jumping to a conclusion that all of --

4 QUESTION: I have a -- I have a very deep
5 suspicion what the answer is.

6 MR. FELDMAN: Well, I -- I don't know -- I don't
7 know what the answer is. But I do know that based -- that
8 based on the record that -- the question of whether
9 something is obscene, as I said before, depends on the
10 local -- on contemporary community standards of specific
11 communities. That wasn't an issue that was litigated in
12 this case, and there aren't any findings in this case
13 about it. And I'm not sure --

14 QUESTION: Maybe it should have been.

15 MR. FELDMAN: I beg your pardon?

16 QUESTION: Maybe it should have been. Maybe we
17 cannot answer the -- the facial challenge question without
18 inquiries into those questions, including inquiries into
19 -- into whether there are any, quote, sexually explicit
20 channels that do not regularly contain material that is
21 obscene by anybody's community standards.

22 MR. FELDMAN: Well, I think it's exceptionally
23 difficult to litigate an issue such as whether material is
24 obscene that's broadcast on a nationwide channel because
25 there are standards that differ from State to State and

1 the case law and the results --

2 QUESTION: Mr. Feldman, wouldn't that be the --
3 wouldn't that be the prosecutor's choice? I mean, a
4 court -- could a court say, if the Government chooses not
5 to characterize something as obscene, I don't care what
6 the prosecutor or the Government's attorney chooses to
7 bring to this court, I'm going to make the case and insist
8 that the Government makes the case that it's obscene? I -
9 - I didn't know that a court had that authority.

10 MR. FELDMAN: No. I don't think it does.

11 QUESTION: May I ask this, Mr. Feldman? If
12 Justice Scalia is right, that all this stuff is obscene,
13 you didn't really need the statute, did you?

14 MR. FELDMAN: If it were all obscene, then --
15 then --

16 QUESTION: The statute is a nullity. It's just
17 superfluous.

18 MR. FELDMAN: The statute wouldn't -- wouldn't
19 have been necessary --

20 QUESTION: Can you tell me --

21 MR. FELDMAN: But I -- I do think that -- well,
22 I'd just go back to what I said --

23 QUESTION: You'd prosecute each one of these
24 movies one by one. Is -- is that right? And that's --
25 that's how you would protect the little children.

1 know how MR. FELDMAN: Well, that's not -- that's not
2 historically what has been done. What happened is that is
3 there were -- and this goes back to the exhibits that on
4 Justice Ginsburg was talking about, is that -- that this
5 material was coming down the line on cable channels to
6 parents into homes who had specifically chosen not to be of
7 subscribe to it and only found out after their children
8 had viewed it that they were seeing it. And the audio
9 portions of the programming, as I mentioned, are exactly
10 the same kinds of audio material that was at issue in --
11 in Pacifica, which only involved the radio, and in Sable
12 -- in Sable -- the Sable case, which involved the dial-a-
13 porn regulation of telephone lines.

14 QUESTION: Mr. Feldman, I -- I'm sure everybody
15 would agree that this happens in some instances. Does the
16 record, however, give us any basis for determining the
17 extent to which it is happening, i.e., the extent to which
18 in non-subscriber homes the bleed is being observed by the
19 children -- by children? I'm sure there are some.
20 Everybody agrees --

21 MR. FELDMAN: How -- how often the children are
22 actually tuning in to it? Significant problem in the Pacifica

23 case -- QUESTION: How much -- how much of it is
24 being -- QUESTION: Significant problem nationwide?

25 MR. FELDMAN: I don't think there's any way to

1 know how much the children are actually tuning in to it.
2 There was -- the evidence that the district court cites is
3 that it's available in 39 million homes with 29 million
4 children. Now, how often the children actually watch it
5 or listen to it I don't know.

6 QUESTION: Does that include the -- the homes of
7 the parents that subscribe to these channels?

8 MR. FELDMAN: I don't think it does. That was
9 the figure that the district court used. And if you --
10 the number of parents who actually subscribed to this is
11 rather low. The district court found that between 800,000
12 and 1.6 million people subscribe to the Playboy channel in
13 a year.

14 QUESTION: I -- I think the figures you cite
15 show there there's a substantial problem.

16 Can you tell me what is the standard for how
17 widespread the bleed must be? I think it's widespread
18 here based on what you said. What is the legal standard?
19 If this happened in 1 community to 10 homes, would it
20 justify the statute --

21 MR. FELDMAN: I think it has to -- it has to be
22 a -- it has to be a significant problem. In the Pacifica
23 case --

24 QUESTION: Significant problem nationwide?

25 MR. FELDMAN: Well, I guess I -- I would want to

1 know whether what you're talking about is the availability
2 of it in 1 -- or 10 homes or the number of children that
3 are actually watching --

4 QUESTION: I think it's fairly much of an
5 academic point based on your figures, but I just wanted to
6 know what the -- what the standard was to the extent of
7 the evil.

8 MR. FELDMAN: I think that the -- the only --
9 well, the reason I can't answer that is I think the
10 question and the question on which the district court
11 decided -- well, the key question here is to compare the
12 extent to which there's a burden of speech that's imposed
13 by section 505 with the evil that it's addressing. And
14 so, you have to look at kind of both sides of the
15 equation. The evil that -- that it's addressing is what
16 I've addressed -- talked about so far, and that includes
17 the audio signal bleed that is very widespread at least
18 and video signal bleed that varies from time to time and
19 place to place but that was the cause of a lot of
20 complaints and clearly does happen, as shown by the
21 tapes --

22 QUESTION: Well, certainly in our kiddie
23 pornography cases, Ferber against New York, we did not
24 require any very comprehensive showing of how many
25 children were engaged in it. A few was too many.

1 MR. FELDMAN: That's correct, and if you look at
2 the Pacifica case, there was one complaint by -- from one
3 parent that triggered the Pacifica litigation, and there
4 was no showing in that record that there was more than one
5 child who listened to it.

6 It's the -- the problem here is the risk that -
7 - is that the availability of this material in people's
8 homes who have not subscribed to it and don't even think
9 that they're getting it. What Congress did to --

10 QUESTION: What material? I mean, all we know,
11 if you're going to defend this statute facially without -
12 - without making a determination that all of these
13 channels, as far as we know, are -- are carrying
14 obscenity, they can just be dirty words. Right? They can
15 just be, you know, blue language.

16 MR. FELDMAN: They -- they -- well, I suppose
17 they could be --

18 QUESTION: You -- you want us to decide this
19 case on the basis of -- really what Congress was after was
20 channels that use some -- some naughty words that
21 shouldn't be used, indecency and not -- not obscenity.

22 MR. FELDMAN: No. I -- I don't think so. I
23 think that the -- what was -- the facts that were
24 underlying Congress' action are the facts that were found
25 by the district court, and they are that there are

1 channels that broadcast virtually 100 percent sexually
2 explicit content and that that content is continuously
3 broadcast.

4 QUESTION: That's not what Congress addressed in
5 -- in using the word indecency, which is -- which is
6 defined very broadly. It covers many other things.

7 MR. FELDMAN: Right, that's true. But -- that's
8 true.

9 QUESTION: For purposes of the facial challenge,
10 we have to assume the existence of -- of a person who uses
11 the most innocuous of -- of those programmings.

12 MR. FELDMAN: I don't -- I -- I don't -- I don't
13 think that that's correct. I think that you can look at
14 the -- at the -- I don't think appellee would have
15 standing to challenge the statute based on someone else
16 who used the most innocuous of the material that would
17 fall within this.

18 But in any event, this is the same material --

19 QUESTION: I thought that's -- I thought that's
20 what a facial challenge was, that if -- if you could show
21 that this would be unconstitutional as to anybody, you can
22 -- you can plead that person's defense. Isn't --

23 QUESTION: Is -- is this -- I read this
24 provision. It says in providing sexually explicit adult
25 programming. That's one. Or two, other programming that

1 is indecent. I thought this case involved one not two.
2 Am I right?

3 MR. FELDMAN: It involves -- well, the FCC took
4 that -- that definition and said that one is a subset of
5 two, and it defined them both in the same way that -- the
6 same definition that it has used in the regulation of
7 dial-a-porn on -- on telephone lines which has been upheld
8 now in the lower court.

9 QUESTION: It may be a subset.

10 MR. FELDMAN: It's a subset.

11 QUESTION: Is it still that we're dealing with
12 one?

13 MR. FELDMAN: I -- I don't think that there's
14 any determination of which we're dealing with. We're
15 dealing with material that is -- that is indecent as
16 defined by the FCC with a definition that is used and has
17 been used for the past 20 years to control indecency on
18 broadcast television.

19 QUESTION: And so for purposes of the facial
20 challenge, we must assume anybody --

21 MR. FELDMAN: Right.

22 QUESTION: -- who does anything which is
23 indecent.

24 MR. FELDMAN: You know, I -- maybe you can
25 assume that. Maybe you can assume that.

1 QUESTION: We must --

2 MR. FELDMAN: It has to be a channel -- it only
3 applies to channels that are primarily devoted to -- to
4 that kind of programming.

5 QUESTION: Well, to indecent programming.

6 MR. FELDMAN: Right. That's correct. It
7 applies only to channels that are primarily devoted. So,
8 that's a -- if a channel broadcast 24 hours a day the
9 kinds of words that were at issue in Pacifica, then that
10 would be covered by the -- that would surely be covered by
11 the statute.

12 QUESTION: We have to deposit in our minds a
13 dirty word channel. Right?

14 MR. FELDMAN: No, but I don't think so. I think
15 you can deposit the whole range of different kinds of --

16 QUESTION: Well, if -- if the -- if the sentence
17 actually is broken down, in providing sexually explicit
18 adult programming or other programming that is indecent.
19 I'm not so sure that someone who is providing sexually
20 explicit programming can challenge it on the basis of --
21 of the other part of the sentence.

22 MR. FELDMAN: Well --

23 QUESTION: There's no reason why you should try
24 to resolve all these nuances.

25 MR. FELDMAN: Well, I probably prefer not to.

1 The FCC gave a definition -- gave a definition which is as
2 a whole, if you take both halves, it refers to the -- it
3 refers to any programming that describes or depicts sexual
4 or excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive
5 manner as measured by contemporary community standards for
6 the cable medium, which is the same definition that
7 governs indecency on broadcast television. It's the same
8 definition that governs indecency on dial-a-porn. It has
9 done that for the last 10 years or more, 20 years on
10 broadcast television, since the time of Pacifica. And if
11 there's something wrong with the statute that regulates
12 that material, then all of that regulation would have to
13 fall.

14 QUESTION: Mr. Feldman, can I ask you one
15 question about Pacifica? Because you've mentioned it so
16 often. Do the findings describe the aural content, the
17 sound content, as opposed to what you see because of the
18 bleed? I didn't -- I missed that part of it when I --

19 MR. FELDMAN: They don't -- they don't
20 specifically describe it.

21 QUESTION: They don't tell us what -- what words
22 are heard over the -- this --

23 MR. FELDMAN: No, they don't. I -- it has never
24 been disputed, and if you look at --

25 QUESTION: But that's a big part of your

1 argument. It's not even mentioned by the district court.
2 that I don't. MR. FELDMAN: Well, you know, I would prefer if
3 the district court had, but the tapes are in the record.
4 It's certainly never been disputed. If you look at
5 Playboy's own programming content guidelines or those of
6 Spice, they say we use strong language. Strong language
7 is something that we use. Feldman --
8 QUESTION: Well, you see an awful lot of strong
9 language on -- on WGN or whatever the best channels are.
10 I'm very often shocked at what I see on television. And I
11 just wonder -- FELDMAN: It's actually much -- it's the
12 same -- MR. FELDMAN: I think you might be -- it's
13 repeated QUESTION: -- if strong language is enough.
14 the context MR. FELDMAN: Well, if -- if -- again, the --
15 the record is full of tapes of -- for instance, there were
16 tapes of material that was broadcast on -- on Spice and on
17 Playboy on certain, specific, randomly selected days.
18 just with QUESTION: So, we should have to make our own
19 findings about what the aural content is by ourselves
20 looking at these tapes. It's court, any parent who wants to
21 stop this MR. FELDMAN: It's -- in the price of a telephone
22 call. A QUESTION: I'm not particularly anxious to do
23 that. MR. FELDMAN: Right. And there's -- I think
24 there are MR. FELDMAN: Right. Well -- well, the -- the
25 Court -- the only other choice I think would be to remand

1 it if -- to the district court for it. But I will say
2 that I don't think it's disputed among the parties that
3 the sound tracks on these tapes are the same kinds of
4 sound tracks that were -- it's the same kind of indecent
5 audio material that was at issue in the dial-a-porn cases
6 and at issue in Pacifica.

7 QUESTION: Mr. Feldman --

8 QUESTION: Well, much of the language in
9 Pacifica you can hear on television any night of the week
10 on any channel.

11 MR. FELDMAN: It's actually much -- it's the
12 same -- some of it is the same language. Actually it's
13 repeated in terms that are much courser and that are in
14 the context of people actually engaging in the activities
15 that are described.

16 QUESTION: But what of the argument that unlike
17 Pacifica where there was no opportunity for the parent who
18 just switched on the signal to control it? Here the
19 answer, in the next part of the statute that was
20 persuasive to the district court, any parent who wants to
21 stop this can for the -- not even the price of a telephone
22 call, a free telephone call.

23 MR. FELDMAN: Right. And there's -- I think
24 there are two problems as -- as we've -- as we've
25 discussed in our briefs. There are two problems with the

1 district court -- two reasons why the district court was
2 just wrong about that.

3 The first is it's not just a question of each
4 individual parent being able to decide for his or her own
5 children. There's a social interest in the upbringing of
6 children, society's interest, that this Court has
7 repeatedly recognized.

8 Now, acting on that interest, Congress has
9 decided that this material is harmful for children and
10 shouldn't be shown to children unless the parents consent
11 and that parental consent cannot be inferred simply from a
12 parent's failure to act under a provision like 504. Now,
13 that's very common in our society that --

14 QUESTION: The idea that the Government is a
15 kind of a super parent.

16 Would you take the same view if Congress did the
17 same thing with respect to violence on television? I was
18 struck looking at some of the European Union countries.
19 They put violence first on what the children can't see and
20 then pornography comes after that.

21 MR. FELDMAN: There are some analogies to the
22 situation to -- to a law like that about violence. I
23 mean, one difference is that this Court has repeatedly
24 recognized that this material is harmful to children and
25 that our society has an interest in seeing to it that

1 children don't get it.

2 But I -- I think it's important that what
3 Congress decided is not that children can't get this.
4 What Congress decided is that it's harmful to children and
5 they shouldn't get it unless their parents consent. And
6 it's not uncommon in our society that children don't get
7 things unless their parents consent, and ordinarily that
8 requires affirmative consent by the parent, not really the
9 parent's failure to act. And it's particularly --

10 QUESTION: Well, why -- why should it, though?
11 I mean, if -- if the -- if the public interest, as you
12 describe, yields to a parent's decision to subscribe to
13 the channel so that the children can see it -- presumably
14 can see it unscrambled, why doesn't the public interest
15 also yield when a parent, in effect, says I don't care
16 whether my kids get to see this or not?

17 MR. FELDMAN: It's -- I think it's more complex
18 than just to say a parent who says it. There are
19 certainly parents who will say that. But they've said
20 that after subscribing to the cable channel and making an
21 affirmative decision that I don't want these channels. I
22 know I can pay more for them and get them. I don't want
23 them. And therefore, they have every reason to think --
24 and these are the complaints and the record show this --
25 these parents have every reason to think that they're not

1 getting this material.

2 QUESTION: Yes, but on the district court's --

3 MR. FELDMAN: And they find their children --

4 QUESTION: But the district court's proposal is
5 that the parents will be advised in -- in connection with,
6 I guess it's section 504, that in fact this kind of bleed
7 goes on and in fact they -- they can block it
8 absolutely --

9 MR. FELDMAN: Right.

10 QUESTION: -- if they want to call for a
11 blocking device. So that on the district court's
12 analysis, the -- let's say the -- the totally ignorant,
13 indifferent parent is -- is going to be, for practical
14 purposes, eliminated, and on that assumption, why doesn't
15 the public interest yield to the parents' decision in the
16 face of that choice just as the -- just as the -- as the
17 public responsibility somehow yields to the parents'
18 affirmative choice to subscribe?

19 MR. FELDMAN: Well, I think that actually gets
20 to the other half of the argument, and it's the -- the
21 reason why Congress acted is because a scheme like the
22 district court envisioned can't work and it can't work for
23 three reasons.

24 The first reason is the kind of notice that
25 would have to be given would have to be -- it's very

1 doubtful that really effective notice that permits a
2 genuinely informed and effective choice to be made would
3 be even plausible to be given --

4 QUESTION: I don't understand.

5 MR. FELDMAN: Well, let me explain why. For two
6 reasons. One reason is you're operating against -- in a
7 situation where the cable operator has a financial
8 incentive not to give the notice both because giving the
9 notice is expensive. If the parent chooses to elect
10 blocking, that's a further cost.

11 QUESTION: The Government presumably can tell
12 them to give the notice and tell them what notice to give.

13 MR. FELDMAN: It has to be -- right.

14 Secondly, you're operating against a system
15 where the parent already thinks that he's not getting it
16 and it requires an exceptional amount of notice and
17 effective notice in order to take a parent who thinks he's
18 not getting it and convince him that he is getting it, and
19 therefore he has to act once again and do something.

20 QUESTION: I just don't understand that. If the
21 cable operator provides a notice saying you are getting
22 this. If your children turn into channel X, they're going
23 to get certain -- a certain signal bleed. Why is that
24 difficult to convey to parents?

25 MR. FELDMAN: Well, I think you have to sketch

1 out exactly what would be said and how it could be said in
2 such a way to counteract the two things I just mentioned.

3 But then you get to the next problem which is
4 that itself is going to be expensive. If it has to be
5 done on bill inserts, on advertisements on other channels,
6 on all the means that the district court said, and they
7 would have to be specified very, very particularly.

8 QUESTION: Well, but the broadcasters accept
9 that.

10 QUESTION: Yes. I would accept your argument
11 there perhaps if -- if the channel here weren't quite
12 willing to -- to do what the district court had in mind.

13 MR. FELDMAN: I'm not sure that -- that the
14 channel here is or the other channels are willing to do
15 it. They -- they --

16 QUESTION: They're certainly willing for
17 purposes of this case.

18 MR. FELDMAN: Well, because they -- it hasn't
19 been spelled out for them exactly what kind of a notice is
20 required and what would -- what effective --

21 QUESTION: Well, but we're talking now about the
22 -- about the expense and -- and the effect of the expense.
23 And I presume they can calculate the -- the expense and
24 they've calculated it and they don't think that that is
25 tantamount to equal or -- or more severe regulation.

1 MR. FELDMAN: I -- I would suggest that they've
2 calculated something different which is that the minimum
3 amount that they could do that was consistent with the
4 vague guidelines that the district court gave would be
5 something that they could do that wouldn't have much
6 effect on that.

7 QUESTION: Well, let's -- let's assume they've
8 made their mistake. Why isn't that their problem?

9 MR. FELDMAN: Well, I think --

10 QUESTION: In other words, why -- why -- if
11 they've made a mistake in calculation, why should we
12 decide this case on the basis of saving them from that
13 mistake?

14 MR. FELDMAN: Well, because I don't really -- I
15 guess I don't really think they've made the calculation.
16 That's not a position that they took at trial in this case
17 in front of the district court. Let's have a lot of
18 notice.

19 QUESTION: Well, let -- let's assume --

20 MR. FELDMAN: We'll explain to you what we'll
21 do. And I just don't think that it's fair to say that
22 they now have a choice of either having this statute
23 struck down and therefore it being open season or saying,
24 yes, we'll abide by some kind of vague notice -- notice if
25 anybody can ever figure out what it would be.

1 QUESTION: Well, for purposes of developing the
2 -- let's just assume that in the district court, they
3 said, we're not concerned about the cost. We'll -- we'll
4 take the risk that we're going to get cancellations
5 because local channels are going to find that this is too
6 -- we'll take that risk. We don't care. Could the
7 Government come forward -- come back and say, oh, well,
8 this might be more expensive than you think? That -- that
9 sounds like an odd argument to me.

10 MR. FELDMAN: Well, I think it's not an -- I
11 guess I don't think it's an odd argument to make when it's
12 in the context of -- of a case where they're trying to get
13 out from under a statute and where they're not genuinely
14 faced with a particular regulatory program. In fact, I -
15 - I would guess that if Congress really enacted a statute
16 that detailed in the precise terms that would be necessary
17 how -- what kind of a notice would be given and how that
18 would work, and once they saw that, first of all, it would
19 be very expensive for cable operators to provide the
20 notice, and secondly, it would lead to an enormous number
21 of people who, if they really knew about the problem and
22 haven't subscribed to this have -- have no reason to want
23 it, they would just say, no, I don't want it --

24 QUESTION: Well, but your guessing and -- and
25 the burden is on -- is on you to sustain the legislation.

1 MR. FELDMAN: Right, and I -- I think -- you
2 know, I think that that partly goes back to Congress
3 having looked at the situation and said there are so many
4 reasons why a system like section 504 can't work, starting
5 with the fact that these are parents who have already
6 decided they don't want these channels, and only then they
7 find that they're getting them anyway.
8 QUESTION: Well, even as to that, I think it may
9 be a cost consideration. You get the cheapest channel and
10 then you hope to get the sports on the bleed, you know?
11 (Laughter.)
12 MR. FELDMAN: For some it may be.
13 Let me just -- let me just also say that the
14 district court's own findings are that -- with a very,
15 very small number of people requested blocking under
16 section 504 or under a section like 504 -- under the
17 factual findings of the district court, it would be
18 uneconomical for cable operators to carry appellee's
19 programming, and they would drop it altogether, which
20 would be a restriction on speech greater than that that
21 results from 505. That operates from the same effect of
22 market forces that 505 operates. If more people
23 subscribed to -- to appellee's programming, then the
24 market -- market would mean that it would be -- that it
25 would be -- that maybe stations wouldn't have to move to

1 time-channeling or they might be able -- well, it would
2 mean that they would mean that they would got out and get
3 the equipment that was necessary to block it and provide
4 it 24 hours a day.

5 QUESTION: Mr. Feldman, you spoke of what
6 Congress had contemplated. Am I right that in fact the
7 provision in question here was -- was offered as an
8 amendment on which there was never a hearing?

9 MR. FELDMAN: That's correct. But it was
10 amendment to the same bill that contained section 504, and
11 what we do know about it, it was specifically addressed to
12 the fact that there was this 504 alternative out there,
13 and Senator Feinstein specifically said, we should put the
14 burden not on the parent, having already not subscribed to
15 these channels to now say again, I don't want them, but to
16 put it on the cable company to say, if you want to
17 transmit these -- this material, people should
18 affirmatively request it.

19 You know, I'd add that under the district
20 court's findings, it would take a -- an extremely small
21 number of parents to request blocking to make the whole
22 scheme uneconomical, something like 1 or 2 percent. The
23 district court found 3 percent would -- to 6 percent would
24 completely exhaust all the revenues that the cable
25 operators get from appellee's programming.

1 QUESTION: Well, I suppose if that happened and
2 then they started complaining, the answer would be, you
3 asked for it, you got it.

4 MR. FELDMAN: Well, that might be the answer,
5 but I think they would be in here with the same kind of
6 argument they're making now, which is this is -- this is
7 -- this violates the First Amendment because it's content-
8 based, which it would be --

9 QUESTION: You'd have a different argument from
10 the one you're making now.

11 MR. FELDMAN: Well, they would be saying this is
12 content-based, which it would be, and it violates the
13 First Amendment because it's leading these cable operators
14 to completely drop our programming. Actually section 505,
15 when Congress adopted the time-channeling option, it's the
16 same option that's been used in broadcast television.
17 That was a reasonable choice, and in fact it was the only
18 effective way of achieving the compelling interests at
19 stake.

20 If I could reserve the balance of my time.

21 QUESTION: Very well, Mr. Feldman.

22 Mr. Corn-Revere, we'll hear from you.

23 ORAL ARGUMENT OF ROBERT CORN-REVERE

24 ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLEE

25 MR. CORN-REVERE: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it

1 please the Court:

2 This is a case of regulatory overkill. Section
3 505 of the Telecommunications Act violates the First
4 Amendment because, as the district court found, the law
5 significantly restricts Playboy's opportunities to convey
6 and the opportunity of Playboy's viewers to receive
7 protected speech.

8 The Government here is asking for greater
9 flexibility to regulate which is really nothing more than
10 a euphemism for expanding governmental authority over
11 protecting -- protected speech.

12 QUESTION: Did the district court find that this
13 was protected speech?

14 MR. CORN-REVERE: Yes, it did.

15 QUESTION: I don't -- I didn't discover that in
16 -- in the findings of fact by the district court.

17 MR. CORN-REVERE: Well, I don't know you'd find
18 that in -- in the findings of fact other than in the
19 conclusions of law that indecency is protected by the
20 First Amendment.

21 QUESTION: Where did it find that what is
22 involved here is only indecency and not pornography?

23 MR. CORN-REVERE: There wasn't a specific
24 finding on whether or not we are dealing with obscenity
25 here, but perhaps the confusion that arises from that

1 point comes with the emphasis the Government has placed on
2 certain exhibits that give an atypical view of -- of
3 really what's out there. They lodged with this Court a
4 number of videotapes that they hand-selected and found
5 from the most explicit examples they could find out there.

6 In particular, they focused on a -- a service
7 called Spice Hot which only came into existence after
8 section 505 was adopted. At the time in the record it was
9 available in only 20 cable systems and there's no
10 indication of whether or not it was subject to signal
11 bleed on any of them.

12 They also focused on a service called
13 AdultTVision which the record reflected doesn't even have
14 signal bleed. It's available only on totally encrypted
15 systems.

16 QUESTION: Well, what -- this applies only to
17 channels that are exclusively devoted to sexually explicit
18 programming. What --

19 MR. CORN-REVERE: That's not quite correct. The
20 actual language, Justice Scalia, in section 505 is that it
21 applies to channels that are primarily dedicated to
22 sexually oriented programming.

23 QUESTION: Okay, primarily dedicated to sexually
24 oriented programming.

25 Are -- are there, to you -- your knowledge -- I

1 have no problem with -- with saying that since the result,
2 Government didn't raise the obscenity point, it cannot
3 come down on this particular cable operator for obscenity.
4 But I am troubled by the fact that simply by choosing not
5 to raise the obscenity point, the Government allows a
6 facial challenge to eliminate this entire statute as
7 applied to all -- all channels that -- that are devoted to
8 primarily to, quote, sexually oriented programming.
9 facial ch. Do you know whether there are channels devoted
10 primarily to sexually oriented programming that do not
11 contain material of this sort that's described in the
12 Government's brief? And -- and unless there are some
13 findings MR. CORN-REVERE: I would -- I would describe
14 Playboy Television as one of those channels. It is not
15 primarily dedicated to sexually oriented programming, but
16 we have disagreed from the beginning that it's necessarily
17 dedicated to indecency or much less obscenity. And as a
18 result, we had a running argument with the Government over
19 the nature of the indecency standard and how it applies to
20 these channels because it requires certain determinations
21 that are difficult to make and certainly have not been
22 made and not been clarified by the Government on this
23 record. ng what you would expect, nude models and so on,
24 and as we QUESTION: Do you -- was this case presented to
25 just as a facial challenge? et. And out of that broad

1 MR. CORN-REVERE: Yes, it was, and as a result,
2 on the face of the statute, it applies in a much more
3 broad way, not to anything approaching obscenity, but to
4 channels that are primarily dedicated to sexually
5 oriented --

6 QUESTION: If there exist any such channels.
7 And I -- I'm not prepared to -- to believe that there are.
8 And that seems to me a matter that -- for purposes of a
9 facial challenge, it seems to me we don't imagine things
10 that don't exist.

11 MR. CORN-REVERE: And I don't --

12 QUESTION: And -- and unless there are some
13 findings that, indeed, there are channels that -- that
14 just engage in -- in innocuous indecency, I -- I'm not
15 prepared to say the whole statute is bad.

16 MR. CORN-REVERE: Well, and that was actually
17 the underlying premise of the district court's decision.
18 And in fact, it looked at a number of specific examples of
19 Playboy programming that we had submitted to the FCC
20 asking for a ruling of whether or not it was indecent.
21 Our argument was that Playboy Television is analogous to
22 Playboy Magazine and includes a number of features,
23 including what you would expect, nude models and so on,
24 and as well as other features that are difficult to -- to
25 characterize even as indecent. And out of that broad

1 editorial content, we --

2 QUESTION: There's some of that, but is -- is
3 there nothing beyond that?

4 MR. CORN-REVERE: Well, yes, there is. But we
5 -- we have argued that because of the statutory vagueness,
6 that it's impossible to distinguish what might be
7 prohibited from what might otherwise be wrapped up in the
8 requirements of section 505, and none of that approaches
9 what I think this Court's rulings have said about
10 obscenity, much less indecency.

11 QUESTION: May I -- may I ask for a
12 clarification on what the overall statutory and regulatory
13 scheme entails? Is there any prohibition currently on
14 showing indecent speech on the ordinary cable channels
15 that are not -- that don't require subscription during
16 certain hours?

17 MR. CORN-REVERE: I'm not aware of a specific
18 statute that touches on basic cable channels.

19 QUESTION: Or regulations?

20 So, it -- is it entirely open, as far as you
21 know, for ordinary cable channels to carry indecent speech
22 in the early evening hours today?

23 MR. CORN-REVERE: The tradition is -- is that
24 they do not, although again I don't know of a regulation
25 that touches on that, except for the regulation that this

1 -- this Court addressed in the Denver Area case which
2 dealt with leased access channels which are not
3 subscription channels. They're presented as basic
4 channels. And the Government's argument in that case is
5 that leased access channels presented indecency and
6 therefore needed to be regulated.

7 This Court's decision in the Denver Area case is
8 quite pertinent to this case because it recognized a
9 governmental interest, but yet found that the regulations
10 imposed would restrict more speech than necessary and
11 adopted instead the analysis that the Government should
12 have focused on less restrictive means. That is --

13 QUESTION: Isn't that what the case is about,
14 the less -- I mean, can I get over the first problems by
15 simply assuming -- is this a fair assumption? This deal
16 -- this case deals with channels that are primarily
17 oriented to sexually -- to sexually oriented programming,
18 that that means in this context channels that have
19 sexually explicit adult programming, and that in this
20 context that means that programming which is, among other
21 things -- depicts sexual or excretory activities in a
22 patently offensive manner?

23 Now, you -- you -- if I'm right, this is not
24 concerning seven words on some other channel. This is a
25 channel dedicated to explicit adult programming where that

1 means patently offensive depiction of sexual activity.

2 Right?

3 Now, you may have all the standing to raise
4 anybody who fits that description, but is it fair to say
5 you do not attack the statute, and I don't have to
6 consider the statute, insofar as it is applied beyond
7 that?

8 MR. CORN-REVERE: Well, in fact, we do argue
9 that the statute applies to any channel that is primarily
10 dedicated to sexually oriented programming, whatever
11 channels those may be.

12 QUESTION: And that must be adult explicit
13 material, and as far as I know, there is no channel that
14 wouldn't fit within the definition as I described it,
15 though you could argue about whether or not it is patently
16 offensive. But I have to assume for this case that it is,
17 I take it.

18 MR. CORN-REVERE: Well, one of the interesting
19 things about this case is that we did ask the Government
20 for an ability to try and distinguish between that which
21 is sexually --

22 QUESTION: I know, but I'm trying to think of
23 what I have to decide selfishly on this appeal.

24 (Laughter.)

25 QUESTION: That is, in -- in this case can I --

1 can I make the assumptions that I made and say, okay, now
2 we're going to go on to the basic issue, which I thought
3 was the basic issue, which is the question of whether or
4 not this means is an appropriate means under the First
5 Amendment?

6 MR. CORN-REVERE: Yes, and that was the heart of
7 the district court decision.

8 QUESTION: Mr. Corn-Revere, on page 42a of the
9 appendix where the court is giving its opinion in this
10 case, it says, plaintiffs conceded that their programming
11 is essentially 100 percent sexually oriented in contrast
12 to the other entertainment channels that display only
13 occasional or sporadically -- sporadic sexually explicit
14 scenes or programs. That tends to, I think, answer
15 Justice --

16 And it also suggests that this was not a -- a
17 facial challenge. I mean, if -- if it was a facial
18 challenge, I wonder why the court is saying that these
19 particular plaintiffs -- what they've done.

20 MR. CORN-REVERE: Well, we acknowledged before
21 the district court that Playboy is primarily dedicated to
22 sexually oriented programming, but disagreed on whether or
23 not we crossed the line into indecency in many cases.

24 And that is part of the difficulty with this
25 statute. While it applies to networks in general that are

1 sexually oriented, the safe harbor prohibitions and the
2 actual restrictions of section 505 are supposed to target
3 only that which is indecent or that which is sexually
4 explicit adult programming. The difficulty is the statute
5 doesn't provide the analytic tools necessary for dividing
6 one from the other, and we think that the network does
7 carry programming that should be able to be presented in
8 the non-safe harbor hours that once again the Government
9 has not been able to define for us.

10 As a matter of fact, the Government's definition
11 of the case, as a facial matter of the indecency standard
12 and has litigated in this case, is that there is no
13 distinction between hard-core pornography, as Justice
14 Scalia was mentioning earlier, and safe sex information if
15 it's presented on Playboy Television. And as a result,
16 the overbreadth and the restrictiveness of section 505 is
17 exacerbated.

18 And in fact, for that reason too, the issue of
19 least restrictive means becomes paramount. As the
20 district court found, section 504 would appear to be as
21 effective as section 505 for those concerned about signal
22 bleed while clearly less restrictive of First Amendment
23 rights.

24 QUESTION: Can we talk about the Government's
25 arguments with reference to 504? I -- I have some

1 trouble, as indicated by questions from me and Justice
2 Souter, with the Government saying, oh, this is going to
3 be too expensive for you and the broadcaster seemed to
4 accept it.

5 The other point, though, it seems to me the
6 Government makes is -- is troublesome for you, and that is
7 that many parents are just not going to know about this,
8 they're not going to do anything about it.

9 MR. CORN-REVERE: Well, Justice Kennedy, that's
10 why we would agree --

11 QUESTION: And -- and I'd like to talk about
12 that a little, and you -- and perhaps you should tell me
13 if you think that's something that I can just assume or if
14 I need findings of fact on that. I mean, I think I pretty
15 well know that it's a fact, but maybe you think that's out
16 of the ability of the judges to know.

17 MR. CORN-REVERE: No. I think findings of fact
18 would be required to determine that section 504 was
19 ineffective because it's the Government's burden of proof
20 to demonstrate that they have adopted the least
21 restrictive means.

22 And with respect to the Government's argument
23 that it is simply too expensive, I would suggest that the
24 record is clear --

25 QUESTION: You -- you think we can't know that

1 there are -- are parents who are so busy working and
2 making a living that they don't have adequate time to
3 supervise their children, they don't care about this sort
4 of thing? And the Government is very concerned about it.

5 MR. CORN-REVERE: Well --

6 QUESTION: Can't I make that assumption? Don't
7 I know that?

8 MR. CORN-REVERE: I think when it comes to
9 making a decision that's going to restrict a significant
10 amount of speech that is protected by the Constitution,
11 that something more would be required than simply an
12 assumption.

13 And in fact, this is the very argument that the
14 Government presented in the Denver Area case involving
15 indecency on leased access channels, in fact, in almost
16 the same language that they've presented here. If you
17 look at pages 36 to 37 of the Government's brief to this
18 Court in Denver Area, which unfortunately I guess you
19 wouldn't have today, the Government claimed, just as it
20 does here that innumerable parents, through absence,
21 distraction, indifference, inertia, insufficient
22 information, would fail to take advantage of subscriber
23 initiated measures to protect children from viewing
24 indecent programming. It's almost identical to the --

25 QUESTION: Well, tell me whether you think the

1 Government -- the Congress could prohibit broadcasting on
2 ordinary channels patently offensive sexual material
3 during early evening hours. Can it do that --

4 MR. CORN-REVERE: I think it would require --

5 QUESTION: -- without violating the First
6 Amendment in order to protect children?

7 MR. CORN-REVERE: I -- I think that would
8 require an analysis of whether or not less restrictive
9 measures than a ban would also touch on that problem. And
10 that also is the distinction that we've drawn between this
11 Court's holding in *Pacifica* which applied to broadcasting
12 and this case where there are less restrictive measures.

13 And with respect to the possibility that some
14 parents may not be fully attentive, as Justice Kennedy's
15 question got to, I think the Court's analysis in *Denver*
16 *Area* speaks to that issue.

17 QUESTION: What do you say to the argument
18 that's made here that on the assumption that there are
19 indifferent parents, the district court was really being
20 utopian in thinking that on -- on the section 504
21 modification it proposed, that effective notice could be
22 given to parents that would get their attention and
23 explain to them that bleed was possible and make it clear
24 to them that they really did have an option to -- to block
25 it entirely? The Government, in effect, is saying that

1 the district court came up with a scheme that in the real
2 world wouldn't work. Now, that's -- that's quite apart
3 from its -- its concern about the cost to you. What is
4 your response to the utopianism argument?

5 MR. CORN-REVERE: Well, my response, Justice
6 Souter, is that we at least ought to try that first before
7 we decide that we're going to restrict a significant
8 amount of protected speech.

9 QUESTION: Well, don't we want to know more than
10 -- that the fact that we might try it? I mean, shouldn't
11 -- when -- when we -- when we say that this is bad because
12 there is a less restrictive alternative, I mean, I think
13 we've -- we've got to make the assumption or -- or draw
14 the conclusion that the less restrictive alternative is a
15 real alternative. And -- and that's why I'm interested in
16 this utopianism argument. Do you think -- do you think
17 it's non-utopian? May we conclude that, in fact, this
18 argument on the Government's part is -- is unsound?

19 MR. CORN-REVERE: Well, I think it's no more
20 utopian than this Court was being in Denver Area where it
21 listed other alternative measures that would have been
22 less restrictive, including a possible coding requirement
23 or blocking available by a phone call, which is what we
24 have with section 504.

25 QUESTION: But I don't think we're really

1 getting to the -- what I intend to be the heart of the
2 question. Do you believe that you can give effective
3 notice or that the -- the cable operators can give
4 effective notice if they are required to do -- to do so
5 under -- under a 504 scheme, as -- as envisioned by the
6 district court?

7 MR. CORN-REVERE: Well, yes, I do. I think the
8 notice could be effective, and -- and we detail the number
9 of measures that Playboy was prepared to do and the
10 National Cable Television Association --

11 QUESTION: What would such a notice consist of?
12 If you were writing the notice, what would it say?

13 MR. CORN-REVERE: It can take various forms and,
14 in fact, has in practice. It can be a video announcement
15 that is made on various channels on the cable system. It
16 could be written notice that is sent separately from
17 bills. It could be a written notice --

18 QUESTION: And what would -- let's assume it
19 were a written notice that went with the bills. What
20 would it say?

21 MR. CORN-REVERE: It would say that there is a
22 phenomenon known as signal bleed, that -- that many
23 households may find offensive that may contain sexually
24 explicit or sexually oriented programming and that you
25 have a right to block it. In fact, there are examples in

1 the record of a number of cable operators who sent such
2 notices and had visual information on it to get the
3 attention of the subscriber to provide that notice.

4 QUESTION: Now, of course, your -- your argument
5 in -- in your brief to the effect that it would not be
6 disastrously expensive is that there would not be that
7 much response to it, not that many people would want to
8 block. And I suppose the Government might say in response
9 to that, well, that simply shows that the -- the notice in
10 fact is not effective because if it were effective, more
11 people would want to block. How would we resolve that --
12 that conundrum?

13 MR. CORN-REVERE: The inference that the
14 Government makes that that demonstrates the
15 ineffectiveness of notice provision simply underscores the
16 Government's failure to demonstrate the pervasiveness and
17 difficulty of solving signal bleed.

18 QUESTION: So, you're saying it's a burden of
19 proof issue.

20 MR. CORN-REVERE: Well, it's partly a burden of
21 proof issue, and that's how the district court viewed it
22 when they suggested that if there is a low rate of lockbox
23 distribution, that that is as indicative of the fact that
24 the Government never demonstrated the pervasiveness of the
25 issue in the first place.

1 It's also important to note that section 505 is
2 not the only means out there -- and nor is section 504 --
3 for dealing with the phenomenon of signal bleed in those
4 places where it occurs, as the Government conceded it very
5 significantly from time to time and place to place. And
6 the market has provided a number of mechanisms to allow
7 individuals to deal with signal bleed even without respect
8 to Government regulations.

9 For example, 80 percent of the televisions on
10 the market on this record have channel locking features
11 that will also block signal bleed. The same is true of
12 VCR's on the market and -- and cable television set-top
13 boxes. There are a number of ways that you can deal --

14 QUESTION: When you say on the market, you mean
15 for sale?

16 MR. CORN-REVERE: That's right.

17 QUESTION: Rather than what's actually out there
18 in the homes.

19 MR. CORN-REVERE: Well, I -- I can't tell you,
20 based on the record, how many televisions are currently in
21 homes that have channel locking features, but we do know
22 that 80 percent of those on the market have them and that
23 approximately 20 to 30 million televisions are sold every
24 year.

25 QUESTION: The Government's figures as to the

1 number of houses in which presumably signal bleed occurs
2 and the number of children in those houses -- should we
3 assume that the figure of the number of children did not
4 reflect anything one way or the other about the
5 availability of these other blocking devices that you're
6 -- you're considering?

7 MR. CORN-REVERE: That's right, and that's
8 one --

9 QUESTION: So, that's -- that's the maximum
10 possible figure.

11 MR. CORN-REVERE: The maximum possible without
12 respect to these other measures that others might use.

13 QUESTION: May I ask you a factual question?
14 I'm not -- does the record tell us -- I understand that
15 this bleed is not always the same. Some bleed you can
16 hardly see anything and some bleed you can really -- it's
17 just as though you're watching the original version. Does
18 the record tell us how -- what proportion is is what and
19 how pervasive the -- the really clear reception is when
20 there's a bleed?

21 MR. CORN-REVERE: No, it doesn't, and that's one
22 of the curious things about the record because that's one
23 of the issues that the district court asked the Government
24 to demonstrate more fully at the permanent injunction
25 stage.

1 QUESTION: Well, there were lots of tapes put
2 in.

3 MR. CORN-REVERE: There were a number of tapes.
4 Most of the tapes that the Government submitted were in
5 the clear and weren't examples of scrambled imagery.

6 QUESTION: I asked about 1, 2, and 44 because
7 those are graphic, particularly 1 and 44.

8 MR. CORN-REVERE: Let me address those.

9 QUESTION: Before you get off that question, I
10 -- is the thesis that little kids aren't going to watch
11 this unless it's really good reception?

12 (Laughter.)

13 MR. CORN-REVERE: I think given the range of
14 other media that are available --

15 QUESTION: I don't see how it makes very much
16 difference how clear the picture coming through is. You
17 really think that's crucial?

18 MR. CORN-REVERE: I think --

19 QUESTION: Well, it seems to me if you can't
20 understand what's going on because the thing is so
21 clouded, it's not all that dangerous.

22 (Laughter.)

23 QUESTION: Well, they -- they mean by bleed more
24 than -- more than that -- that you see something that's
25 not visible, don't they?

1 MR. CORN-REVERE: Well, not -- not if you look
2 at the Government's tapes, particularly tape number 2
3 which -- which Justice Ginsburg alluded to.

4 QUESTION: You don't see much of anything.

5 MR. CORN-REVERE: Tape number 2 was actually a
6 compilation tape made by a Department of Justice attorney.
7 It was edited down from a 4-hour tape. If you look at
8 tape number 2, you'll see every now and then 2 or 3
9 seconds of an image you can see, and if you add it all up,
10 82 percent of that image is completely blocked. You see
11 nothing. If you look at the 4-hour tape, rather than the
12 Government's greatest hits tape --

13 (Laughter.)

14 MR. CORN-REVERE: -- you get something like 93
15 percent of the programming is completely blocked. It does
16 vary from time to time and place to place, but the
17 Government never even attempted to demonstrate the
18 phenomenon of --

19 QUESTION: Are you talking about video rather
20 than audio?

21 MR. CORN-REVERE: Yes, primarily. But the audio
22 transmission varies as well. Tape number 44, which
23 Justice Ginsburg also alluded to, the audio tends to come
24 in and out, just as in the other examples the video may.

25 The phenomenon of signal bleed varies

1 significantly from time to time and place to place based
2 on a range of different factors, including the equipment
3 used, its installation, its maintenance, and even factors
4 such as the weather. And as a result of that, a blanket,
5 across-the-board approach is strikingly inappropriate and,
6 for that reason, is overly broad, rather than a tailored
7 solution such as section 504 --

8 QUESTION: The basic difference between the
9 broad and the tailored is not broad versus tailored. It's
10 opt in versus opt out, and this is different from Denver
11 because Denver was taking a lot of programs on a lot of
12 different channels and forcing them to segregate. Here
13 we're dealing with material that is segregated. So, as I
14 see it, it's the narrow question: opt in versus opt out.
15 And I'd appreciate your answer if that's right, really to
16 go back to Justice Kennedy's question and focus
17 explicitly.

18 Unlike the world where I grew up, I think many,
19 many thousands of children come home after school and
20 there's no one there and parents don't want to say I'll
21 call up the program and do something because that means
22 they lose an afternoon at work while -- while they're home
23 while somebody comes out to the house, if they've
24 understood it, and then he didn't show up on time. I
25 mean, we've all lived through having to stay home all day

1 because the repairman didn't come, and he still doesn't
2 come.

3 So, they're saying that world is the world we
4 live in. I don't think we have to have proof of that.
5 And in that world opt in versus opt out makes an enormous
6 difference. And you say you're going to segregate. Fine.
7 Segregate, segregate. Just don't give it to people who
8 don't want it. That's all.

9 MR. CORN-REVERE: That's --

10 QUESTION: And -- and don't force them to opt in
11 -- rather opt out, or we get into the repairman problem,
12 plus the fact we don't know, plus the fact my kid is at
13 somebody else's house, and I trust my neighbors, but
14 they're not so activist as me. All right?

15 I mean, that's what I want you -- that seems to
16 me to be the pressure for saying it makes a big difference
17 opt in versus opt out, and I'd like to get your response.

18 MR. CORN-REVERE: Notwithstanding those
19 practical difficulties, every one of the examples that the
20 Government was able to provide -- and it really was only a
21 few anecdotal examples -- where signal bleed occurred, the
22 individuals were able to get blocking from the cable
23 operator upon request. And that was a factual finding of
24 the district court.

25 And while I recognize the difficulties of opting

1 in, this is different from the Denver Area case in this
2 respect, in that if you decide to make a single phone
3 call, you have blocked the channel that you're concerned
4 about. Whereas, in Denver Area, as Justice Thomas pointed
5 out in his separate opinion in Denver Area, the difficulty
6 on leased access indecency is that you had no central
7 editor and you didn't know when an indecent program may
8 appear. Here the voluntary solution of making that call
9 is a lot more effective because you have to just deal with
10 that --

11 QUESTION: Well, in addition to making the call,
12 does something have to be done to the television set?

13 MR. CORN-REVERE: Well, it would depend on the
14 method that the cable operator uses to address the issue.

15 QUESTION: But in many cases it would require
16 someone to come and do something to the television set.

17 MR. CORN-REVERE: We disagree that it would
18 necessarily require a service call since someone is
19 calling in to ask for a trap that can be attached to the
20 television set. And in fact, the Government presented
21 evidence at the preliminary injunction stage that traps
22 could be installed very easily by the cable subscriber.
23 You wouldn't have to --

24 QUESTION: What does Playboy do if somebody
25 calls up and says, I want -- I'm getting this on channel

1 2, you know, the educational channel? I don't want it.
2 Okay, it's bleeding. What does Playboy do? Do they send
3 somebody to the house or do they not?

4 MR. CORN-REVERE: Just as a point of clarification, it's not Playboy that responds to those
5 calls.

6 QUESTION: All right. What percent would it be
7 in your view? QUESTION: No. All right, whatever.

8 MR. CORN-REVERE: And -- and also signal bleed
9 doesn't intrude on other channels. It would occur only on
10 the channel on which Playboy was designated.

11 QUESTION: You're clients. Let's say -- you
12 have clients, I take it. They're involved in the signal
13 bleed. I call up tomorrow and say it's bleeding. What do
14 they do? Do they send somebody to the house or do they
15 not?

16 MR. CORN-REVERE: The normal practice has been
17 to do that.

18 QUESTION: To send someone to the house.

19 MR. CORN-REVERE: That's right. But that is not
20 necessarily what would need to be required. As the court
21 found below, if there were a lot more requests for traps,
22 then the cable operators would be free to look for the
23 more economical way to do that. And once again, it was
24 the Government's witness that demonstrated that the traps
25 could be installed by the subscriber.

1 QUESTION: Is -- is it the case that if more
2 than 3 percent wanted to do it, then it wouldn't be
3 economical at all and you'd prefer this system?

4 MR. CORN-REVERE: Well, we disagree with -- with
5 the Government's figures on that.

6 QUESTION: All right. What percent would it be
7 in your view?

8 MR. CORN-REVERE: Well, based on the figures
9 that we presented in our reply brief at the post-trial
10 stage, we suggest that the breakeven point would be closer
11 to 80 percent. But nothing approaches that in -- in this
12 case because of the phenomenon of signal bleed being more
13 sporadic than the Government suggests.

14 QUESTION: That's a pretty big spread. Couldn't
15 you --

16 MR. CORN-REVERE: That is a --

17 QUESTION: -- get closer than that? I mean --

18 MR. CORN-REVERE: That -- that's a very big
19 spread because the Government overestimated the cost of
20 the traps by three times. They estimated the cost of
21 having a service call, which added 80 percent to the cost,
22 and when you add up all those differences, there is a
23 significantly wide spread.

24 But even if you accepted the Government's
25 figure, which is 6 percent, not 3 percent -- they tried to

1 split the difference -- then you're talking about
2 installing something like 3.72 million traps, which based
3 on this record, is utterly implausible. In the 16 years
4 that Playboy Television has -- has been on the air, the
5 FCC has received 33,000 complaints about cable in general,
6 and of those, only 72 related to indecent programming.
7 And the Government doesn't know how many relate to signal
8 bleed.

9 QUESTION: That was not a litigated issue, how
10 much it would cost.

11 MR. CORN-REVERE: It was litigated.

12 QUESTION: It was litigated?

13 MR. CORN-REVERE: Yes, it was.

14 QUESTION: I thought you were telling us that
15 you have a -- you and the Government are wide apart in how
16 much it would cost.

17 MR. CORN-REVERE: We could never reach agreement
18 on that point, but the figures are in the record --

19 QUESTION: Where is the finding of fact that
20 you're talking about? What number is it?

21 MR. CORN-REVERE: The finding of fact by the
22 district court was 6 percent, but that was expressly based
23 on the assumption that you would require a service call
24 and then didn't discuss the remaining factors that were
25 addressed in the briefs. And based on that 6 percent,

1 once again that would amount to something like 3.72
2 million traps.

3 QUESTION: Well, when you say the assumption
4 that there would have to be a service call, was the
5 district court making a finding that there would have to
6 be a service call?

7 MR. CORN-REVERE: I don't know if you'd call it
8 a finding. It seemed more offhand than that. But the
9 Government did -- I mean, the -- the district court did
10 make that assumption despite the evidence that was
11 presented below even by the Government that that wouldn't
12 be required.

13 Ultimately to resolve the Court -- this case in
14 the Government's favor, they're really asking this Court
15 to make a number of changes, significant changes in -- in
16 First Amendment doctrine.

17 First, they're asking this Court to apply the
18 Pacifica precedent specifically to cable television, which
19 this Court, at least in the past, has declined to do.

20 And secondly, they're asking for the authority
21 to restrict the speech available in all households in a
22 cable community even though they acknowledge that parents
23 are fully able to block the offensive speech in a
24 particular household.

25 And third, they're -- they're asking to

1 significantly limit the doctrine of least restrictive
2 means as it applies in First Amendment cases. There's
3 really nothing in this Court's prior decisions -- and as
4 the district court found -- that would justify significant
5 changes in the law.

6 This is particularly true with respect to the
7 notion of individual user empowerment and as we look at
8 newer technologies. If the Government were correct that
9 the complete ability of a household to stop offensive
10 speech coming into the home is ineffective and is not
11 sufficient to forestall the need for Government
12 regulation, then it would open a wide avenue for the
13 regulation not just of cable television, but of other new
14 technologies that do empower individuals to take steps on
15 their own either through market-based measures or through
16 other less restrictive regulatory measures to address
17 those issues. And for that reason, it would be a
18 significant change in the law.

19 If there are no further questions, I'll --

20 QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Corn-Revere.

21 Mr. Feldman, you have 2 minutes remaining.

22 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF JAMES A. FELDMAN

23 ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS

24 MR. FELDMAN: Thank you.

25 I just -- I wanted to point -- direct the

1 Court's attention -- the factual findings -- the facts on
2 the issues that Mr. Corn-Revere were talking -- was
3 talking about -- there was disagreement between the
4 Government and Playboy on them, and the district court
5 found in our favor. The 3 percent and 6 percent figures
6 are what the district court -- this is on page 22a of the
7 JS appendix. The district court found that those are the
8 figures, depending on how long you allow the cable
9 operator to recover its cost. Those are the figures that
10 would totally exhaust the revenues, that if 3 to 6 percent
11 of the subscribers requested blocking, the revenues that
12 the cable operator got from Playboy.

13 The district court then found that, in fact,
14 cable operators would drop Playboy before it exhausted all
15 the revenues, but when it just was no longer making enough
16 profit. That's on 22a.

17 The district court also in footnote 21 on that
18 same page said, Playboy's contention that negative traps
19 can be mailed to subscribers, thereby obviating the need
20 for installation labor costs and lowering the cost of
21 mechanism -- per mechanism, is unavailing. That sounds to
22 me like a finding of fact that the district court thought
23 that Playboy was wrong on that.

24 I'd just like to conclude by saying that
25 Congress adopted here a time-channeling alternative that

1 permits -- permits the material to be shown from 10:00
2 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. when most of the audience for the
3 material is there. The people who -- people have -- given
4 the virtually universal presence of video cassette
5 recorders in homes, people who want to watch it at other
6 times can watch it. But it imposes the least risk to
7 children.

8 That was a -- more than a reasonable -- that was
9 the only effective solution to the problem that Congress
10 saw. And there -- Playboy hasn't suggested any reason why
11 Congress' determination that that test, 10:00 p.m. to 6:00
12 a.m. safe harbor which governs the same kind of problem on
13 broadcast television, shouldn't be equally applicable and
14 equally effective here.

15 Thank you.

16 CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: Thank you, Mr.
17 Feldman.

18 The case is submitted.

19 (Whereupon, at 11:05 a.m., the case in the
20 above-entitled matter was submitted.)

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CERTIFICATION

Alderson Reporting Company, Inc., hereby certifies that
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The United States in the Matter of:

UNITED STATES, ET AL., Appellants v. PLAYBOY ENTERTAINMENT GROUP,
INC.

CASE NO: 98-1682

and that these attached pages constitutes the original transcript of
the proceedings for the records of the court.

BY: *Jonathan M. May*
(REPORTER)