SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NARKIS ALIZA GOLAN,
Petitioner,
V.
No. 20-1034
ISACCO JACKY SAADA,
Respondent.
)

Pages: 1 through 83 Place: Washington, D.C. Date: March 22, 2022

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1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 2 NARKIS ALIZA GOLAN, 3) 4 Petitioner,) 5) No. 20-1034 v. 6 ISACCO JACKY SAADA,) 7 Respondent.) 8 9 10 Washington, D.C. 11 Tuesday, March 22, 2022 12 The above-entitled matter came on for 13 14 oral argument before the Supreme Court of the United States at 10:00 a.m. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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     APPEARANCES:
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     KAREN R. KING, ESQUIRE, New York, New York; on behalf
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 4
          of the Petitioner.
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      FREDERICK LIU, Assistant to the Solicitor General,
 б
          Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for the
7
          United States, as amicus curiae, supporting
8
          vacatur.
     RICHARD MIN, ESQUIRE, New York, New York; on behalf of
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10
          the Respondent.
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1 PROCEEDINGS 2 (10:00 a.m.) 3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Thomas is unable to be present today but will 4 participate in consideration and decision of the 5 case on the basis of the briefs and the 6 7 transcript of oral arguments. 8 We'll hear argument this morning in Case 20-1034, Golan versus Saada. 9 10 Ms. King. 11 ORAL ARGUMENT OF KAREN R. KING 12 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER MS. KING: Mr. Chief Justice, and may 13 14 it please the Court: 15 The Hague Convention provides that a 16 court is not bound to return a child once the 17 grave risk exception is met. The district court 18 here, after finding grave risk to this child, 19 was operating under an incorrect rule of law, that is, the Second Circuit's requirement that 20 21 courts must examine the full range of potential 2.2 ameliorative measures and return the child if at 23 all possible. That requirement should be overturned 24 25 for four reasons. It's not found in the text of

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1 the convention or its implementing legislation. 2 It runs counter to the convention's purposes and framework, which emphasize expeditious 3 proceedings, the safety of the child, and not 4 getting entangled in custody matters. 5 It's 6 contrary to the long-standing views of the State 7 Department. And no other signatory nation has adopted that interpretation of this treaty. 8 9 If this Court agrees with us, what 10 remains is how best to resolve this case. Τn our view, a reversal is warranted. It was three 11 12 years ago today that the district court made its grave risk finding. Safe and swift resolution 13 then would have allowed the child to remain in 14 15 the U.S. in the interim while the custody 16 proceedings deal with the complex family issues 17 at this -- in this case, including the 18 implications of Mr. Saada's sustained and 19 horrific abuse. 20 But the district court was forced by 21 the Second Circuit to take a lengthy detour, 2.2 which entangled itself in custody matters, 23 forced the parties to obtain an Italian court order without investigating the effectiveness of 24 25 that order.

1	That process and the results are
2	inconsistent with the convention, at once, far
3	too long, far too entangled, and at the same
4	time not robust and not protective enough.
5	The child here is almost six years
6	old. He has spent the vast majority of his life
7	in legal limbo. Reversal provides the safe and
8	swift closure he deserves.
9	I welcome the Court's questions.
10	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Your position
11	is that the district court should not have been
12	required to consider ameliorative efforts,
13	right?
14	MS. KING: That's correct, Your Honor.
15	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But would it
16	be necessarily an abuse of discretion if he
17	chose to do so?
18	MS. KING: It it depends on the
19	manner in which that consideration might take
20	place. Our position is that the discretion to
21	consider ameliorative measures is provided by
22	the convention but is also limited by the
23	convention.
24	So, if consideration of ameliorative
25	measures takes too long or entangles the court

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1 in custody matters or is -- is somehow 2 inconsistent with the convention on other grounds, that would be an abuse of discretion. 3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Okay. But, if 4 it was something pretty, you know, cut and dried 5 and very simple, I mean, the -- the grave risk 6 7 is that, you know, his house is next -- next to a nuclear waste dump, and he says, well, I'm --8 9 I'm moving in two weeks, you know, here's the agreement. That is an ameliorative condition 10 11 that the judge can take into account? 12 MS. KING: Well, it -- it depends on 13 the stage of the case. At the grave risk 14 determination phase, the -- the judge can 15 certainly take into account whatever evidence 16 the parties submit to -- to the court. 17 After determining that a grave risk 18 exists and you move to a remedy stage and 19 consider ameliorative measures, in the case 20 where the grave risk is straightforward and 21 simple, easy to identify and easy to resolve, 2.2 then, certainly, it makes sense that the court 23 does have discretion to consider the easy 24 solutions and to consider return subject to 25 those solutions, but that is in the discretion

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1 of the court. 2 JUSTICE KAGAN: The way you just 3 framed the inquiry, Ms. King, is like, well, first, we decide whether there's a grave risk, 4 and then we see whether there's anything that we 5 6 can do about it. 7 But is it -- is that necessarily the right way to frame the -- the -- the issue? I 8 9 mean, how do you decide really whether there's a 10 grave risk without thinking about ameliorative 11 measures at -- at that stage? I mean, is this 12 really a two-step inquiry, or should we think about ameliorative measures in order to 13 14 determine whether there's a grave risk? 15 MS. KING: Well, Justice Kagan, I 16 acknowledge that there is some overlap in the 17 inquiry here because both address risk, but the 18 grave risk analysis is separate from an 19 ameliorative measures analysis because the grave 20 risk analysis, which is provided for by the convention itself, is simply identifying whether 21 2.2 or not the circumstances that exist now to which 23 the child would be returned present a grave risk 24 of exposure to psychological or -- or physical 25 harm.

1	Once that is determined, then the
2	district court should have the discretion to
3	decide whether or not it is possible to consider
4	or even preferable to consider ameliorative
5	measures to then address the risk.
6	If you combine the two, you run the
7	risk of making the trial extremely lengthy and
8	wading into issues that a Hague-expedited
9	proceeding should not be wading into. So it
10	should be kept as two separate inquiries.
11	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I
12	JUSTICE BREYER: The
13	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: just very
14	briefly, it seems to me that if you separate the
15	two inquiries, that's what's going to lengthen
16	the process. If you say the grave risk here is
17	that the he's going to live next to a nuclear
18	waste dump and some he says I'm leaving,
19	well, that's fine. But, if you have to go
20	through an entirely separate analysis and say
21	don't tell me whether there's ameliorative
22	measures or not, don't tell me if you're going
23	to move or not because that comes later, that
24	seems to be something that's going to delay it.
25	MS. KING: Well, if there's no grave

risk at all, then you wouldn't even reach that second stage. And in the vast majority of cases, the parties are not going to be able to satisfy the very high evidentiary burden that ICARA places on parties to satisfy the grave risk exception. It has to prove by clear and convincing evidence.

So there's no need to even get into 8 9 this hypothetical world of what ameliorative 10 measures are -- are necessary. I mean, I -- I 11 acknowledge that there may be some cases where 12 it's so obvious and so discrete and simple that the court may, in the course of -- of having the 13 14 trial, think about ameliorative measures. And, 15 certainly, the parties can always propose 16 measures and -- and make evidentiary 17 submissions.

18 But I don't think, as a matter of 19 principle and process, it makes sense to combine 20 the two because that would entangle the court in 21 a very lengthy process in every case, which is 2.2 exactly what we don't want --23 JUSTICE BREYER: But is there a --24 MS. KING: -- in an expedited 25 proceeding.

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1 JUSTICE BREYER: Look, this is a 2 problem that I had, exactly what's been 3 articulated, and then I began to think -- and tell me if I'm right, because I am a layperson 4 here, you are the expert -- that --5 6 "ameliorative measures" wasn't the right words, 7 that what happened was better words were "undertakings." See. The -- the father who was 8 9 in the foreign country was a risk to the child 10 either because he beat up the wife or maybe he -- he attacked the child. I don't know. And 11 12 then the judge would say here: Well, give us a 13 promise and maybe backed up by some money or a 14 bond or something. 15 And then "undertakings" didn't seem 16 the right word because undertakings could have 17 included not just "I promise" but also because they get some kind of a foreign lawyer or judge 18 19 to say "he has to follow these undertakings and

20 we'll watch it." So now it's undertakings plus.

21 And then we get to a new word for it 22 called ameliorative measures. Now, if what I've 23 said is correct, I understand the confusion. I 24 don't know how to write it still, because my 25 first reaction when a layperson reads those

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1 words "ameliorative measures" is to say, hey, if 2 there are ameliorative measures, what's the 3 risk? And, if there's not, well, then there's a risk. So, of course, they're going to consider 4 this when they consider whether there's a risk. 5 6 Now -- now do you see how confused I 7 am? 8 MS. KING: The -- the terminology --9 JUSTICE BREYER: Now can you 10 straighten me out in a minute or two? MS. KING: -- is certainly confusing 11 12 in this space. 13 JUSTICE BREYER: But have I got it 14 sort of right or not? 15 MS. KING: Well, different courts use 16 these words interchangeably, which is really the 17 -- the problem in -- in --18 JUSTICE BREYER: Are we talking 19 basically about undertakings or undertakings 20 plus? 21 MS. KING: Undertakings are promises, 22 I think, of the Petitioner below himself. So he 23 might make promises. JUSTICE BREYER: But undertakings 24 25 plus, he makes some promises and then we get to

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try to make them enforceable. 1 2 MS. KING: Well, yeah, what the Second 3 Circuit then required was trying to overlay on top of that some guarantee of performance. And 4 5 that's where we ended up on this path of trying 6 _ _ 7 JUSTICE BREYER: Of ameliorative. 8 Okay. MS. KING: -- to figure out something 9 10 by the court. 11 JUSTICE BREYER: So the answer is, 12 Judge, you're the trial judge. You look in these things when you think they're useful and 13 14 you don't when you think they're not. 15 MS. KING: We certainly agree that the 16 district court should have had discretion to 17 look at things when it seemed appropriate or 18 perhaps even reject the entire concept because 19 the very act of walking the path of considering 20 hypothetical full range, full panoply of 21 ameliorative measures is -- is simply too 2.2 burdensome in this --23 JUSTICE BREYER: No, no, of course 24 not. 25 MS. KING: -- proceeding.

1 JUSTICE BREYER: But, of course, it 2 does make sense if they have an ongoing -- like 3 the EU does it within the EU, you know, because they all know there are courts in the other 4 countries and they have family courts in other 5 6 countries, and the family courts in other 7 countries, if they are going to deal with it, they can deal with it. 8 9 MS. KING: Right. Justice Breyer, I 10 think that's -- that's exactly our point here. 11 The United States is only a signatory and has 12 only adopted the 1980 convention. The EU 13 countries are part of Brussels 2A. Other 14 countries have adopted the 1996 convention, and 15 the United States did not ratify that. 16 So we are working only within the 17 framework of the 1980 convention. 18 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel, can --19 JUSTICE ALITO: I -- I have --20 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- can -- I -- I'm 21 sorry. 2.2 JUSTICE ALITO: Go ahead. 23 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel, I like to 24 go back to the question the Chief started with, what's an abuse of discretion? 25

1 Assume, as I do, that there are two goals to the convention, not one. It's not just 2 a speedy proceeding. It is an intent to return 3 a child to its habitual residence. That's its 4 number one priority. 5 Its second priority is to protect the 6 7 child if there's grave danger. But, if the convention insisted that a child shouldn't be 8 returned, it would have said don't return the 9 child if it's a grave danger. But, instead, it 10 11 gives a district court discretion. 12 So, to me, that means that you have to 13 keep the first goal in mind as well. You can't just eliminate it when you find grave danger. 14 15 Do you agree with that? 16 MS. KING: We certainly agree that the 17 convention vests discretion with the court --18 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: All right. So let's stop with that question there. Maybe the 19 Second Circuit went too far in saying the 20 21 district court has to look at every possible 2.2 ameliorative measure, even those not raised by 23 the party. That seems contrary to the 24 adversarial system. Generally, we depend on 25 judges to rely on what the parties present.

1 MS. KING: That's right. 2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: We don't make the 3 judge a -- a litigant by looking for things. So assume we say you don't -- that 4 Second Circuit rule is too extreme. What if a 5 6 district court judge said: You know something, 7 yes, there's an ameliorative measure like he can move away and we can wait two weeks and he would 8 9 do it, but I really don't want to bother waiting 10 those two weeks. I don't care whether it would 11 fix the problem or not. 12 You seem to be using the word 13 "discretion" to say, if the measures are 14 proposed, the judge never has to explain what 15 they think or, no matter what they think, we 16 have to uphold it --17 MS. KING: Well, Justice Sotomayor --JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- or even any 18 delay whatsoever is enough of a reason not to do 19 20 it. That seems contrary to the concept that 21 there should be a reason for what you do and 2.2 that the reason should be based in the evidence 23 and that you shouldn't just say I don't want to. 24 You should give a reason. 25 MS. KING: We certainly were not

implying that it's unfettered discretion with no
 limitations and that you can not give a reason
 and reject submissions by the parties.

I think, in that circumstance, it
falls back to reasoned judgment as the judge
treats any evidentiary submission by the parties
below. There has to be reasoned consideration
and some reasoning for the -- the decision that
follows.

10 But I do want to clarify that the 11 hierarchy you posed of prioritizing return of 12 the child and only secondary consideration of the safety of the child, I think, is incorrect. 13 14 The convention has multiple goals and 15 multiple purposes. Safety is, I think, the 16 preeminent one. The interests of the children 17 are cited as the paramount interest in the 18 preamble to the convention, expeditious 19 proceedings, which we all acknowledge is definitely a goal, and return of the child is a 20 21 goal, but there are exceptions. 2.2 And the very existence of the 23 exception, the grave risk exception here, shows 24 that that goal is not without limitations. It's 25 not at all costs, as this Court has recognized

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1 before. And there are certain values and 2 principles that are more important than prompt 3 return. 4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Thank you. JUSTICE ALITO: I have a -- sort of a 5 threshold problem in understanding this statute 6 7 and the way the parties and the Solicitor General have interpreted it. 8 9 Article 13(j) says that a requested state is not bound to order the return of the 10 11 child who would otherwise have to be returned if 12 there is a grave risk, right? 13 MS. KING: Correct. 14 JUSTICE ALITO: So are there 15 circumstances in which you think a district 16 court could order the return of a child who 17 would be at grave risk? 18 MS. KING: I think that would become 19 an abuse of discretion unless there were some extraordinarily unusual circumstances. But I 20 21 think --2.2 JUSTICE ALITO: Yeah, I mean, just to 23 say it's an abuse of discretion doesn't really 24 answer the question for me. 25 What -- under what -- under what

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1	circumstances would it not be an abuse of
2	discretion to do that? Under what circumstances
3	would it be permissible for an individual
4	district judge to say it's been proven by clear
5	and convincing evidence that there would be a
6	grave risk; nevertheless, send the child back?
7	MS. KING: If if there were some
8	balancing of grave risk and there was
9	JUSTICE ALITO: And what?
10	MS. KING: a demonstration that
11	there's more grave risk in the present country
12	versus the return country. I think it would be
13	an extraordinary circumstance. And our position
14	would be it would be an abuse of discretion in
15	in the regular course.
16	JUSTICE ALITO: All right. Well, that
17	sounds like basically a categorical rule that
18	you can't do it, which is not what
19	MS. KING: I I think
20	JUSTICE ALITO: Article 13(j) says.
21	MS. KING: given the, you know,
22	different interests of the convention, which
23	places the child's safety as the paramount
24	interest, returning a child after finding that
25	there's clear and convincing evidence of grave

1 risk is -- is fundamentally antithetical to the 2 convention and, therefore, an abuse of 3 discretion. JUSTICE ALITO: Okay. I think that's 4 a strong argument. I think it would have to be 5 6 based on something other than the convention 7 itself. It would have to be based on the way the United States chooses to interpret the --8 9 the convention. That could be done by statute. 10 But, since statute doesn't address 11 this, could it not be done by the courts in the 12 case law interpreting it?

MS. KING: Well, ICARA implements the treaty and adopts the provisions of the treaty, and I think that includes putting safety of the child as the -- as the primary goal in -- in interpreting the treaty and -- and -- and handling these Hague cases.

JUSTICE ALITO: Well, do you see my problem? I'm stuck on the idea that every one of the district judges in the United States has the discretion to decide whether I'm going to return this child to the country where the -- of habitual residence, despite the fact that it's been shown that there would be a grave risk

1 there? 2 MS. KING: I -- I definitely think that would be an abuse of discretion. And if it 3 makes sense --4 JUSTICE ALITO: So there have to be 5 standards about when that would be done. 6 Т 7 don't know when. When would that be appropriate? You don't think there are any 8 circumstances? 9 10 MS. KING: We don't think there are. 11 JUSTICE ALITO: Okay. So then it's 12 pretty much a categorical rule. And if it's 13 going to be a categorical rule, then doesn't 14 that lead you to something like what the Second 15 Circuit has done -- maybe they've gone too far 16 -- but to develop standards that have to be met, 17 such as providing ameliorative conditions in 18 that country so that the child would not be at 19 grave risk? MS. KING: I mean, ultimately, we have 20 21 competing goals in the operation of the 2.2 convention and the Second Circuit in trying to 23 satisfy this ameliorative measures exercise, which by itself is not -- by the way, is not in 24 25 the convention or ICARA, so this is already off

1 on a -- on a tangent. But that process cannot 2 apply for all cases because then you end up with 3 a delay situation. You may not be able to 4 satisfy --5 JUSTICE ALITO: Right. Their -- their 6 standards might not be the right standards, but 7 do you dispute the fact that they -- do you 8 dispute the -- the proposition that it was 9 entire -- it's entirely appropriate for them or 10 for us to develop standards? 11 MS. KING: If the standards --12 JUSTICE ALITO: Or are we just 13 supposed to say just --14 MS. KING: No --15 JUSTICE ALITO: -- abuse of 16 discretion? Every district judge just does 17 whatever the judge wants? 18 MS. KING: It is entirely appropriate 19 to develop standards that are consistent with the convention and that come from the 20 21 convention's own requirements and limitations. 2.2 And Congress has also done that in 23 ICARA --24 JUSTICE ALITO: Right. 25 MS. KING: -- by setting us a higher

evidentiary standard.

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2 JUSTICE ALITO: And standards designed to make sure that the child is not sent back if 3 there is a grave risk. If there's a grave risk, 4 with or without -- even with any ameliorative 5 6 conditions that could be put in appropriately 7 without undue -- unduly delaying the proceeding or getting into custody determinations in the 8 9 country of habitual residence, then the child 10 cannot be sent back? 11 MS. KING: We certainly agree with a 12 standard that prevents sending children back to situations where they are at grave risk of harm. 13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice 14 15 Breyer, anything further? 16 Justice Alito? 17 Justice Kagan? 18 Justice Gorsuch? 19 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Can you just 20 briefly summarize why you think a remand would be problematic as compared to a reversal? 21 2.2 MS. KING: So this case has been 23 progressing for three and a half years at this 24 point. A remand would require more process 25 because there needs to be a reevaluation of the

current circumstances. A lot has happened in
 the last two years since the -- the last return
 order.

And that process alone, in the same 4 way that we object to the -- the categorical 5 sort of Second Circuit mandatory rule in the 6 7 first place, that process alone is damaging to the child and inconsistent with the convention. 8 9 It's certainly a possible outcome 10 here, a possible remedy, but we think, on 11 balance, there is a safe and swift remedy 12 available to this Court and for this child, and 13 it would serve the child's interests and be consistent with the convention to take that 14 15 remedy now and end this, rather than send it 16 back for a third bite at the apple. 17 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Thank you. JUSTICE BREYER: You're -- you're 18 19 thinking -- maybe I will ask a question I -- I 20 think might be a problem. Judges in different countries, there's a child in front of them. 21 2.2 The child is facing harm if they send him away. 23 And the judge is going to think whatever he 24 says, or she, hey, I've got this child here in 25 my country and I know that child is safe and

24

1	I'll be damned if I'm going to send him to some
2	other place that I don't even know about. Okay?
3	So there will be a tendency to keep
4	the child here. And I think what the Second
5	Circuit wants to say is remember the overall
6	purpose of this that treaty. It's trying to
7	stop kidnappings. And remember that. And try
8	and overcome your natural instinct, but pay
9	attention to it, but, but, but okay.
10	We, of all the courts, know least
11	about it. Family courts know about it. We
12	don't. You know about it. Federal courts
13	don't. Okay. What words do you suggest that we
14	write in this opinion which I think recognize
15	the motivating problems and and would try to
16	do what the Second Circuit is trying to do but
17	may be overkill?
18	What you're the expert. What words
19	would you like, if we can, to deal with the
20	problem I sketched?
21	MS. KING: Well, we would suggest that
22	after a grave risks finding, courts have
23	discretion to deny the petition for return or to
24	grant it subject to ameliorative measures. But
25	consistent with the convention, any

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1 discretionary consideration of ameliorative measures must be expeditious, it must not 2 entangle the court in custody matters, and any 3 measures imposed must be limited, enforceable, 4 and effective at protecting the child. 5 And just speaking to your point, 6 7 Justice Breyer, of the -- the court's instinct to want to protect the child, these are cases 8 9 where the mother, in this case, has already demonstrated by a very high evidentiary 10 11 threshold clear and convincing evidence that the 12 child is at risk of harm. 13 And in those types of cases, 14 protecting the child is a worthwhile instinct, 15 keeping in mind that the Hague process is an 16 interim measure. It's a temporary resolution to 17 keep the child while the custody courts, the 18 courts that have expertise and time to deal with 19 these complicated, very difficult issues -- they are the ones that can move forward. 20 21 And the irony in this case is, because 2.2 of this detour, this child has not had that type 23 of custody hearing. And if this case had ended 24 three years ago, we wouldn't be here today. And 25 we think that the case should end today as well.

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1	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
2	Barrett, anything further?
3	JUSTICE BARRETT: I do. Am I correct
4	that the vast majority of these grave risk cases
5	are ones involving domestic abuse or no?
6	MS. KING: There are certainly grave
7	risk cases of of all types. There is the
8	majority of them these days is now involving
9	domestic abuse, but only a very, very small
10	percentage get to the level of proving grave
11	risk by clear and convincing evidence. I'm
12	referring to the number of cases that raise the
13	grave risk defense.
14	JUSTICE BARRETT: Right. It just
15	seems to me that that's a much different case
16	for ameliorative measures than, say, the nuclear
17	plant next door that the Chief posited at the
18	outset. That would be a very pretty
19	straightforward move, and then there would be no
20	more grave risk, whereas I think you get into
21	the complexity of the financial support payments
22	and the the undertaking or restraining order,
23	however it should be categorized, in these
24	domestic abuse cases that pose maybe a unique
25	circumstance?

1	MS. KING: That's right, Justice
2	Barrett. I think that the nature of the grave
3	risk in a domestic violence case is extremely
4	complicated, and it gets into mental health
5	issues, psychological, very detailed family
б	issues, and it would be very difficult to
7	resolve that in an expedited proceeding, much
8	less try to resolve that thinking about what
9	it's like in a foreign country.
10	The coercive control elements. It's
11	not just about physical abuse. It involves
12	emotional, psychological, verbal, and all the
13	types of abuse that you alluded to.
14	JUSTICE BARRETT: So, as we're
15	tiptoeing up and talking about the discretion of
16	a district court, almost seems like what you're
17	suggesting is that in cases of domestic abuse,
18	ameliorative measures are not almost ever going
19	to be acceptable if you've proven the grave
20	risk?
21	MS. KING: We're not seeking a
22	categorical rule. It really depends on the
23	nature of the grave risk
24	JUSTICE BARRETT: But a proceed
25	MS. KING: and the circumstances.

1	JUSTICE BARRETT: with great
2	caution kind of rule?
3	MS. KING: Certain certainly, the
4	courts below, some of the circuits, have have
5	advised to proceed with caution and that there
6	should be great hesitation to try to solve this
7	type of complicated problem in an expedited
8	proceeding. And we agree with that.
9	JUSTICE BARRETT: Thank you.
10	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
11	counsel.
12	Mr. Liu.
13	ORAL ARGUMENT OF FREDERICK LIU
14	FOR THE UNITED STATES, AS AMICUS CURIAE,
15	SUPPORTING VACATUR
16	MR. LIU: Thank you, Mr. Chief
17	Justice, and may it please the Court:
18	The Second Circuit requires courts to
19	consider the full range of ameliorative measures
20	in every case involving a finding of grave risk
21	under Article 13(b). That mandatory rule has no
22	basis in the text of the convention, and,
23	indeed, Respondent hasn't identified any country
24	in the world that has held that the convention
25	imposes such a rule.

1	The convention instead leaves
2	consideration of ameliorative measures to the
3	discretion of the courts. And ICARA, which
4	Congress implemented enacted to implement the
5	convention, leaves that discretion undisturbed.
6	The Second Circuit's rule wrongly supplanted
7	that discretion in this case.
8	Accordingly, this Court should do what
9	it usually does when lower courts have
10	misunderstood the scope of their discretion. It
11	should vacate and remand for further
12	proceedings.
13	I welcome the Court's questions.
14	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, one of
15	the problems here, as Ms. King pointed out, is
16	the delay. And you're sending it back after how
17	how many years has this been going on?
18	MR. LIU: About three and a half
19	years.
20	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Three and a
21	half years, under a convention that is designed
22	to get this resolved quickly, for obvious
23	obvious reasons. And you want there to be more
24	proceedings. What what do you think is going
25	going to happen on remand that is going to

1 put the district court in any different position 2 than it's in now? MR. LIU: Well, we think the Second 3 Circuit's mandatory rule may well have distorted 4 the district court's analysis of the sufficiency 5 of the ameliorative measures in this case. 6 7 Under the Second Circuit's rule, which is articulated at Petition Appendix 14a and 81a, 8 the district court had to order return "if at 9 all possible." That "if at all possible" 10 11 standard, in our view, places too heavy a thumb 12 on the scales in favor of return. 13 It essentially renders denial of 14 return a highly disfavored remedy, despite the 15 convention's objective of protecting the child 16 from grave harm. And so, if this Court were to reject 17 18 the Second Circuit's rule and remove that thumb 19 from the scales, the district court may well evaluate the sufficiency of the ameliorative --20 of ameliorative measures differently on -- on 21 2.2 remand. 23 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Yeah, I don't 24 -- not sure that touched on my main concern, which was the additional delay that further 25

1 proceedings is.

2 MR. LIU: Oh. Well -- well, the --3 the convention doesn't pursue any of its 4 objectives at all costs, not even the objective 5 of prompt adjudication. The convention also 6 cares about protecting children from the grave 7 risk of harm.

8 And we think the court that's in the 9 best position to evaluate whether this child 10 should be sent back in the face of a grave risk 11 of harm is the district court. That's because 12 the inquiry is highly fact-intensive and the 13 district court is the court that has the closest 14 and deepest understanding of the record.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Counsel, if I can follow up. My concern is similar to the Chief Justice's, and I -- I think Justice Kavanaugh touched on it.

19 The district court initially held, I 20 think, a nine-day bench trial and found a grave 21 risk and -- and -- and refused return before he 22 -- the court -- she was reversed by -- I think 23 by -- by the court of appeals. 24 So why isn't that in the entirely

24 SO why ISH t that In the entirely25 appropriate, if -- if we agree with everything

1 you've said about the law, why isn't that the appropriate conclusion in this case and 2 reversal, therefore, warranted? Because the 3 court did it -- nine days. I mean, you say it 4 should be thoughtful, and it was thoughtful. 5 Ιt 6 was supposed to be quick. It was quick. And 7 here we are three and a half years later. MR. LIU: Well, I think the fact of 8 9 the matter is that Respondent has gotten two 10 bites at the apple at proving up ameliorative 11 measures. 12 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Now we have a third? MR. LIU: Well, my point is that 13 14 Petitioner, in contrast, has had zero chance to 15 ask for a favorable exercise of discretion --16 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Petitioner is happy 17 with the first judgment of the district court. I'm pretty sure about that. 18 19 MR. LIU: Well, no, Petitioner --Petitioner lost the first time at the district. 20 21 JUSTICE GORSUCH: At the court of 22 appeals, but the Petitioner, it was a grave risk 23 finding at -- at the district court. 24 MR. LIU: There was a grave risk 25 finding, and then the district court --

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1 JUSTICE GORSUCH: That was it. MR. LIU: -- the district court, under 2 the Second Circuit's mandatory rule --3 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Yeah. 4 MR. LIU: -- felt bound to then 5 6 consider --7 JUSTICE GORSUCH: But, if we -- if we say no, if -- maybe I'm -- I'm -- I'm sorry if 8 9 I'm not being clear, but if we say that the Second Circuit's rule is inappropriate --10 11 MR. LIU: Correct. 12 JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- right, and the district court after a nine-day trial found 13 14 grave risk, why doesn't that lead to a reversal 15 and -- and at least allow the parties in this 16 case to move on with their lives? 17 MR. LIU: If the Court thinks that the 18 proper exercise of discretion in this case in the face of a finding of grave risk is to deny 19 20 return, then that is a perfectly acceptable 21 result. I am certainly not going to fight it. 2.2 The only reason why we think a -- a 23 vacatur and remand is appropriate is because we 24 think, after a finding of grave risk, there is room for discretion for the district court to 25

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1 analyze whether or not there's grave risk. 2 Now, of course, here, after the 3 district court's initial ruling, which -- which denied return in the face of ameliorative 4 measures that were ultimately found to be 5 6 insufficient, there has been this Italian court 7 order that's entered the picture. We think it would be perfectly 8 9 acceptable for the court now to consider, as it did in the -- its most recent decision, the 10 effect of that order on ameliorating risk. 11 12 But the key point for us --JUSTICE GORSUCH: If I understand it, 13 14 that -- that Italian order came about as a 15 result of this self-directed inquiry that the 16 district court did on remand on its own motion. 17 MR. LIU: Absolutely. And -- and we -- we agree that when the Second Circuit in the 18 19 initial appeal found the original set of ameliorative measures insufficient --20 21 JUSTICE GORSUCH: I have trouble with 2.2 it too. MR. LIU: -- I have a lot of trouble 23 with it -- the -- the Second Circuit should have 24 25 done one of two things. It should have simply

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1 denied return, as I think Your Honor is 2 suggesting. JUSTICE GORSUCH: Which is what he did 3 4 the first time -- she did the first time. MR. LIU: Well, no, the first time she 5 -- she ordered return because she thought the 6 7 first set of ameliorative measures were sufficient. 8 But, if the Second Circuit was right 9 10 that those measures were insufficient, what the 11 Second Circuit should have done was one of two 12 things: either simply deny return, or remand 13 the case for the district court to exercise its 14 discretion on whether to deny return. 15 What it should not have done is 16 mandate that the district court engage in 17 another round, another full examination of 18 whatever ameliorative measures exist, including 19 measures that Respondent had never even 20 proposed. 21 That added nine more months to the 2.2 proceedings that had already lasted 10 months. 23 And while it's true that we cannot undo the procedural implications of the Second Circuit's 24 25 rule, that is, we can't go back in time and put

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1 us back to where we were a -- a couple years 2 ago, what the Court can do in our view is undo the substantive implications, which is to vacate 3 the judgment below and at least send it back for 4 the district court to take a fresh look at this 5 6 in light of the right standard. 7 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well --JUSTICE GORSUCH: Thank you. 8 JUSTICE KAGAN: -- Mr. Liu, I guess 9 two questions. I -- I mean, suppose we were to 10 send it back and say, no, the Second Circuit 11 12 rule is wrong and you had discretion. 13 Number one, and this relates to 14 Justice Alito's question, could she then use her 15 discretion? Notwithstanding that the court had 16 found grave risk, could it nonetheless say, yes, 17 we're going to send the child back because there 18 are sufficient ameliorative measures? So the 19 first question is, could she make that order 20 without abusing discretion? 21 And I guess the second question is you 2.2 -- you know the record better than I do, and you've read the various opinions more closely 23 24 than I have. Do you think that the district 25 court -- like, what do you think that the

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1	prospects are that the district court would want
2	to do that?
3	I mean, once the Second Circuit rule
4	is taken away, do you think that there's really
5	any chance that the district court would have
6	said, yes, under my discretion, I think that
7	these ameliorative measures are sufficient so as
8	to send the child back?
9	MR. LIU: So, as to your first
10	question, Justice Kagan, we think it's possible
11	for the district court on remand to conclude
12	that return is appropriate in light of what the
13	district court views to be the sufficiency of
14	the measures. And that would not be an abuse of
15	discretion if the Court thought those measures
16	were, indeed, sufficient under a proper
17	understanding of the law.
18	As to your second question, I think
19	the record is, frankly, unclear what the
20	district court would do. This is a district
21	court that initially found this is Petition
22	Appendix 80a that this particular Respondent
23	has to date exhibited no capacity to change his
24	behavior.
25	And the Second Circuit on appeal, that

1 was the very reason the Second Circuit found the 2 first set of measures insufficient, because the 3 Second Circuit itself concluded that there was 4 ample reason to doubt whether Respondent would 5 comply with those conditions.

I think, once this Court -- if this 6 7 Court were to remove the thumb on the scales, it's possible the district court would feel, 8 9 frankly, less pressure to conclude that return 10 was appropriate in light of these measures and 11 may well think that, although there are some 12 indications going both ways on whether Respondent would or would not comply, it's 13 14 simply not worth the gamble to send the child 15 back.

16 I think it's that sort of 17 discretionary judgment that the discretion --18 that the convention and ICARA leave to the 19 district court in a case like this. And because the district court is most familiar with the 20 21 facts in the record, a remand would be 2.2 appropriate. 23 JUSTICE ALITO: Can I ask you the

questions that I asked Ms. King? To start out with, does the United States think that there

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1 are any circumstances in which it would be 2 lawful for a district judge to send a child back to the country of habitual residence, despite a 3 finding that the child would be at grave risk? 4 MR. LIU: We do. The -- the 5 circumstance is limited, I think, to cases where 6 7 the risk of the child staying in the country 8 where the Hague Convention proceedings are 9 taking place is equally as grave or even graver. 10 I suppose that that's a very small set 11 of situations, but I certainly cannot rule it 12 out. And I think that's why, from the 13 explanatory report to the State Department's 14 original analysis of this convention in 1986, 15 we've always said, and everyone has always said, 16 that there is discretion left in the -- in the 17 judicial authority to send the child back even 18 in the face of grave risk. 19 JUSTICE ALITO: Okay. That's a very, 20 very narrow set of cases then, a very small set of cases, as you just acknowledged. 21 2.2 MR. LIU: I agree. 23 JUSTICE ALITO: And would it be fair 24 to say that in this country that would be even narrower than it might be in all of the 25

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1 signatory nations? 2 MR. LIU: I -- I'm fairly confident 3 that's true, yes. 4 JUSTICE ALITO: So you're pretty close to a categorical rule, if there's a grave risk, 5 the child can't be set back -- sent back. 6 7 However, ameliorative measures goes -- they go to the issue of whether there would be a grave 8 risk. 9 10 MR. LIU: Right. 11 JUSTICE ALITO: Right? MR. LIU: Well, I think -- I -- I 12 13 think there's --14 JUSTICE ALITO: So the only question 15 that's left is how deeply can the court in one 16 of these proceedings get into the issue of 17 ameliorative measures. If it's something 18 simple, like moving away from a -- a toxic waste 19 dump, that's one thing, but if it --20 MR. LIU: Right. 21 JUSTICE ALITO: -- if it gets into the 22 sorts of things that are generally done by 23 family courts in determining -- in -- in issuing protective orders, custody determinations, 24 25 visitation rights, that sort of thing --

1 MR. LIU: We --JUSTICE ALITO: -- are they completely 2 3 off the board? Are they possibly -- are -- are they things that can be considered provided it 4 can be done expeditiously? What if they're 5 6 already in place? 7 MR. LIU: Well, we think that a district court's consideration of ameliorative 8 measures should be entrusted to the court's 9 sound judgment, as many issues are under the 10 11 convention, and then reviewable for an abuse of 12 discretion. 13 Now I think there's a big difference, 14 though, between the general abuse of discretion 15 standard and the Second Circuit's rule, and I 16 think the line is crossed with the Second 17 Circuit's rule because it is not simply applying a general -- generally applicable background 18 19 abuse of discretion standard, the sort of 20 appellate standard Congress certainly had in 21 mind when it enacted ICARA and granted the 2.2 courts jurisdiction. 23 Rather, the Second Circuit's rule is a 24 convention-specific rule that I think crosses 25 the line into implementing the -- the

convention, which is not a role that in this 1 country we entrust to courts. That is a role 2 3 that belongs to Congress only. And so, when Congress enacted ICARA 4 against the background of general principles of 5 6 appellate review, it empowered courts to police 7 the discretion that lower courts are going to be exercising and to --8 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, what -- well, 9 what I get from your answer so far is that the 10 11 Second Circuit went too far in limiting the 12 discretion of the district court. But is it 13 inappropriate for a court of appeals that may 14 see a number of these cases -- I don't know how 15 many there are. There are not that many, I 16 don't believe. But, if they -- you know, if they see a series of them, they have to have 17

18 some standards in determining --

19 MR. LIU: Right.

JUSTICE ALITO: -- whether there was an abuse of discretion here and not an abuse of discretion there. So the idea of their working out standards to structure the exercise of discretion is not inappropriate.

25 MR. LIU: It's not --

JUSTICE ALITO: It's not just, well, the district court can do whatever the district court wants so long as the court says this and that and the other.

MR. LIU: Correct. And in -- and in 5 Part B of the United States' brief in this case, 6 7 we've tried to map out a basic framework for thinking about these cases, sort of a procedural 8 reasonableness side of things having to do with 9 when arguments need to be considered and then a 10 11 -- a substantive reasonableness side of things 12 which has to go with exercises of judgment, like the hypothetical you gave about sending a child 13 back in the face of a grave risk. 14

We think those sorts of general principles are fine, and they reflect, I think, what Congress anticipated courts doing when Congress gave courts jurisdiction to consider cases under the convention and to decide cases in accordance with the convention.

21 Where the Second Circuit's rule goes 22 awry is that it sets up a rigid rule that, I 23 think, can only be understood as an 24 implementation of the treaty that it has no 25 power to do.

1 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Just one 2 question, Mr. Liu. It -- it seems to me that 3 we're in a very unfortunate position because we have a very unrepresentative record, and we're 4 trying to develop a rule that applies in more 5 6 representative cases. 7 You know, this thing says -- this -this convention and the statute says we're 8 supposed to act -- district courts are supposed 9 10 to act expeditiously. But what they mean -- and 11 -- and a lot of times, when we're told to move 12 promptly, it -- you know, that means two years instead of four -- but, here, it says we -- the 13 14 judge is supposed to reach a decision within six 15 weeks, and if he doesn't, he or she doesn't, you 16 know, he's got to explain it to the central 17 authority about why it's taking so long. 18 MR. LIU: Right. 19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And what consideration of ameliorative conditions after a 20 21 determination of grave risk means in that 2.2 context, it has to be -- I mean, everybody in 23 these cases wants desperately to make sure they 24 get the right answer, but that means you've got 25 to kind of move fast and loose to get it done in

1 time. 2 And that sounds bad with respect to 3 the person -- the child's grave risk possibility, but, on the other hand, as Justice 4 5 Brever pointed out, the -- the other side, it's 6 kidnapping. 7 So how are we supposed to take all of those things, how are the district courts 8 supposed to take all of those things into 9 10 account within six weeks? It's not like a case 11 like this where you get -- you contact the 12 Italian authorities. They say we're going to do 13 this. You go through all that. That's not how 14 it's supposed to happen. 15 Now Justice Alito is asking about 16 whether there should be a categorical rule, and 17 that certainly would speed things up, and maybe 18 that makes a lot of sense. 19 MR. LIU: Well, we think our abuse of 20 discretion standard will speed things up, just 21 like the -- the rule this Court announced in 2.2 Monasky, because it will -- it will at least 23 speed up the appeal by -- by allowing courts of 24 appeals to really not need to take as deep of a 25 -- of a look as they otherwise would under de

1 novo review.

But to the question about how district courts can handle this, although we agree with Petitioner that the grave risk inquiry is analytically distinct from the ameliorative measures inquiry, we don't think those two inquiries need to happen, in terms of timing, one after another.

9 A district court can sequence them so 10 that they're happening at the same time. Just 11 as you would hear a trial about the elements of 12 an offense along with defenses at the same time, 13 all of those things can happen together.

14 And district courts, in the cases 15 we've seen, have been -- have proved quite 16 capable of hearing -- of holding very prompt 17 hearings where live witnesses are called in, the 18 parents will testify, sometimes the child will 19 be interviewed in camera. And -- and -- and so we -- we've seen district courts be able to move 20 expeditious -- expeditiously in cases like this. 21 2.2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice 23 Breyer, anything further? Justice Alito? 24 25 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Yes. T'm

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1 borrowing a page from questioning of one of my 2 colleagues usually. Tell me how to write this for the district court in this case. 3 4 MR. LTU: Sure. JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: This district 5 6 court was guided by the principle, erroneous 7 according to you --8 MR. LIU: Right. JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- that, if at all 9 possible, the child must be returned. So how do 10 we tell the district court judge it's not merely 11 12 a possibility? What is it? 13 MR. LIU: Well, I think the goal --JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: What -- what is 14 15 the issue that you have to be addressing? 16 MR. LIU: I think the overarching 17 issue is whether, in the face of a finding of 18 grave risk, there are countervailing 19 considerations that nevertheless render return 20 appropriate. 21 Now, granted, that is a broad 22 standard, but I think it avoids what the Second 23 Circuit's rule does, which is to put a thumb on 24 the scales one way or the other on return or 25 denying return.

1 And I think what the opinion could say 2 is, District Court, please take another look at the sufficiency of these measures and other 3 considerations that might weigh against return 4 in light of the fact that there is no thumb on 5 6 the scales. 7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Kagan? 8 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Liu, would you 9 clarify something for me? Because I think I'm a little bit confused because different people are 10 11 using this term "grave risk" in different ways, 12 sometimes to mean the preliminary determination before consideration of ameliorative measures 13 14 and sometimes maybe to mean the final 15 conclusion, like, even with ameliorative measures, there's still a grave risk. 16 17 So when -- when you said -- I think it 18 was to Justice Alito maybe, when you said it 19 would be extraordinary to send a child home if 20 there was a finding of grave risk, I mean, that -- on one view, that means, like --21 2.2 MR. LIU: Right. 23 JUSTICE KAGAN: -- oh, you can find all the ameliorative measures in the world and 24

25 it would still be extraordinary. On another

1 view, you only meant grave risk after --2 MR. LIU: I meant --JUSTICE KAGAN: -- the ameliorative 3 measures were considered. 4 MR. LIU: -- in that context --5 6 correct. In -- in that response, I meant only 7 grave risk after considering ameliorative measures and their effect on the grave risk. 8 JUSTICE KAGAN: Okay. And -- and --9 and if we were to try to figure out some 10 11 standards on the -- on this view that's like, 12 wow, tell every district court judge in America 13 you have all the discretion you want about how 14 to consider ameliorative measures, and I -- you 15 know, write -- write me a paragraph, along the 16 lines of Justice Sotomayor's question, what --17 what standards does the State Department, does 18 the U.S. Government think would be appropriate? 19 I mean, what -- what -- what should guide the district court's discretion in the U.S. 20 21 Government's view? 2.2 MR. LIU: Well, we think there are -to draw a contrast with the Second Circuit's 23 24 view, there are four categories of cases where a court could reasonably decline to consider 25

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1 ameliorative measures.

One category is where the parties
simply haven't raised any. Another category is
where the measures clearly have no chance of
working. Another category is where the measures
would usurp the role of the child custody court
in the court in the country of habitual
residence. And a fourth is where consideration
of the measures would unduly prolong the
proceedings.
Those are instances where a court

12 could reasonably conclude that it's just not 13 worth the candle to go through and consider ameliorative measures. But there are going to 14 15 be other cases that don't fall within those four 16 buckets where it's going to be perfectly 17 appropriate and, indeed, the best and most sound 18 exercise of judgment to consider the measures 19 that the parties had put before them.

20 Maybe they've already obtained the 21 order, the protective order, so there -- there's 22 no concern about a delay in the proceedings. 23 Maybe that order is -- is -- well, because it 24 was already issued, doesn't raise any concerns 25 at all about whether it would usurp the -- the

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1 role of the court overseas. 2 And -- and so there are certainly instances where we would -- we would encourage 3 and have no problem with courts considering 4 ameliorative measures, so long as they -- they 5 -- they abide by the other objectives of the 6 7 convention and prompt adjudication avoiding venturing into the merits of the underlying 8 9 dispute. 10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice 11 Gorsuch? 12 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Do you agree with 13 the statement that the Petitioner makes at page 17 of the brief that says "ameliorative measures 14 15 will almost never be appropriate in the context 16 of domestic violence"? MR. LIU: We think that's probably too 17 18 strong. I think we would avoid any sort of 19 categorical statement about domestic violence cases and whether the measures would be 20 21 sufficient. 2.2 The fact of the matter is even 23 domestic violence cases vary in terms of their facts and circumstances. And I think it would 24 25 be kind of, you know, making the same error to

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1 then put a thumb on the scale the other 2 direction in domestic violence cases. 3 So I -- I would just -- I would just be cautious about any sort of categorical 4 statement about domestic violence cases. 5 6 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Won't those cases, 7 though, tend to have the kinds of conditions that you were talking about as saying, I think, 8 9 that ameliorative measures will be unlikely to work, it'll take a while, it's difficult to 10 ensure it's going to work, usurping the role of 11 12 the custody, those --13 MR. LIU: Yeah. I --14 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: -- it seems like 15 those are going to be present in -- in most, and -- and they said almost never, not never. 16 17 MR. LIU: I think those -- those 18 circumstances may well be present in a fair 19 number of domestic violence cases. And I think it's true that domestic violence cases raise 20 21 those concerns more than other types of cases. 2.2 I -- I would just be wary about setting up any sort of general presumption. 23 24 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Well, what about, 25 just to add to that, this is supposed to be a

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1 temporary determination as well. This is not 2 the final determination. This is just kind of a 3 holding pattern until we get the custody determination, to pick up on the Chief Justice's 4 5 points. 6 And when you combine that with what I 7 think you've acknowledged about the domestic violence cases, it seems difficult to -- to 8 think that ameliorative measures will be able to 9 be assessed, determined in that kind of quick 10 11 period, and why would you want to in a temporary 12 -- when it's just a temporary hold? MR. LIU: I think those are all fair 13 14 points. I think a district judge who adopted 15 that sort of reasoning would be on pretty solid 16 ground. 17 I -- I -- the reason why I'm holding 18 back is because these cases are so different 19 factually that I -- I don't want to say anything 20 that would suggest there's a rigid rule going the other way in these sorts of cases. 21 2.2 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: I appreciate it. 23 Thank you. 24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice 25 Barrett?

1 JUSTICE BARRETT: So I think my 2 sticking point is the same one that others have 3 asked you. It's difficult to figure out how to write this paragraph. 4 In your answer to Justice Kagan, I 5 6 mean, I understand why the United States doesn't 7 want to box itself in to a particular thing, but it, frankly, wouldn't give district courts that 8 9 much quidance. 10 And you were talking about not putting 11 a thumb on the scale because -- at risk of 12 falling into the error that the Second Circuit may have fallen into. But it did more than have 13 14 a thumb on the scale. I mean, it had a 15 categorical rule. 16 And I don't see anything in the United 17 States' position that would prevent -- Justice 18 Alito talked about each court of appeals 19 developing standards to guide the exercise of 20 discretion. I don't see anything in what the 21 United States has proposed that would prevent a 2.2 thumb on the scale one way or another. 23 You know, in -- in my discretion, I am 24 generally going to use extreme caution, as I 25 suggested to Ms. King, before imposing

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ameliorative measures in a domestic violence 1 2 case. It seems to me like those are the kinds of things that shape discretion. 3 And as Justice Kavanaugh said, it 4 seems like, in these complex domestic 5 6 violence-type cases, all of the risks that 7 you're talking about would be present. So would it really be so bad if we try 8 to -- if we send it back, offer something in the 9 way of guidance, even if it is simply to say, 10 11 yes, district courts have discretion that should 12 be exercised consistent with ICARA and the Haque Convention; however, given these concerns and 13 14 how they are often present in domestic violence 15 cases, use caution before going forward with 16 them in that context? 17 MR. LIU: I think so long as there's a 18 substantial caveat that there may be other cases 19 even in the domestic violence context where 20 ameliorative measures are appropriate, that that would be fine. 21 2.2 You know, the United States is in a 23 position where we have children, of course, 24 abducted from foreign countries who are here, 25 but we are also in a situation where we have

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1 children from the United States abducted to 2 other countries. 3 And there may be allegations of domestic violence in those cases, and we want 4 the judges abroad to also take into account the 5 specific circumstances of each case and -- and 6 7 -- and be sensitive to how those differences may or may not make ameliorative measures in that 8 9 case an appropriate remedy. 10 So -- so we -- I'd -- I'd -- I -- I 11 would simply, you know, make sure that I got 12 across that the United States is on both sides of -- of -- of the issue of whether the 13 14 child is incoming or outgoing. 15 JUSTICE BARRETT: That's very helpful. 16 Thank you, Mr. Liu. 17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, 18 counsel. 19 MR. LIU: Thanks. 20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. Min. 21 ORAL ARGUMENT OF RICHARD MIN 2.2 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT 23 MR. MIN: Mr. Chief Justice, and may 24 it please the Court: 25 The convention's text, context, and

purpose require that reasonable ameliorative
 measures be considered when adjudicating these
 complex family abduction cases.

To refuse to consider measures that might allow for the safe return of children back to their home country would be an abuse of discretion and would violate the purpose of the convention, which is built on a system of mutual trust between signatory nations.

10 This approach supported by the Hague 11 Conference ensures consistent results here in 12 the United States and expectations for U.S. 13 children abducted abroad by providing courts 14 clear guidance on how to evaluate this 15 exception.

16 The lower court here took into 17 consideration the unique facts of this case and 18 of this family.

19 Specifically, the limit in provisional 20 order in this case addressed the grave risk of 21 harm to this child which was caused by potential 22 exposure to domestic violence between the 23 parties.

24The return order helps to -- to deter25future abductions, which Congress has found to

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1 be harmful to children, while also protecting 2 the interests of this child, ensuring that the custody dispute takes place in Italy, his home 3 4 country. The core premise of the convention is 5 that the interests of children in matters 6 7 relating to their custody are best served when custody decisions are made in the country of 8 habitual residence. 9 10 Ultimately, the treaty is not about who should have custody but, rather, where those 11 12 decisions should be made. 13 The Italian courts have already issued 14 orders protecting this child, and they have 15 scheduled -- scheduled a hearing in June to 16 address issues of custody. 17 As this Court found in Abbott, there 18 is no reason to doubt the ability of other contracting states to carry out their duty to 19 make decisions in the best interest of children. 20 21 Further, as this Court found in 2.2 Monasky, domestic violence should be an issue 23 fully -- fully explored in the custody 24 adjudication upon the child's return. 25 The Court should, therefore, affirm

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1 the order directing the immediate return of 2 B.A.S. back to Italy. 3 I'm happy to entertain any questions. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: This 4 ameliorative conditions doctrine, rule, it -- it 5 6 has no basis in the convention or the statute, 7 right, and by which I mean it's not its -concept that the statute or the convention 8 refers to? Grave risk is all that we're talking 9 about, right? 10 11 MR. MIN: Yes, but we believe at -it's inherent and implicit in the text of the 12 13 convention, meaning that grave risk, the Article 14 13(b) grave risk inquiry, necessitates an 15 analysis of the future risk of harm to the 16 child, including any potential mitigating 17 factors. 18 This is an approach that the United 19 States themselves supported in the Blondin 20 second appeal. On page 21 of their amicus 21 brief, they said -- and they supported the Blondin II language, saying it supported that 2.2 23 past abuse should not constitute a finding of grave risk of harm without the additional 24 25 finding that there's a likelihood of and no

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1 adequate option to prevent future abuse upon 2 return, which means that to find a grave risk of 3 harm, you must find there's no way to protect the child upon return. 4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, but by 5 6 creating ameliorative conditions as sort of a 7 separate concept, it's almost like you're adding a subsection to -- to 13. It does have the 8 9 potential, and maybe the -- I don't want to say inevitable, but the likelihood of extending the 10 11 -- the proceedings. 12 It's -- it's one thing if you just 13 factor it into determining whether there's a 14 grave risk. It's another thing if you say, 15 okay, you've got grave risk. Now what kind of 16 conditions can we impose? Because, once you do 17 that, you're talking about ameliorative 18 conditions that are added as the process goes 19 on. 20 You know, oh, you -- you think it's 21 risky that there's this? Okay, here's what 2.2 we're going to do. Or this? This is what we're 23 going to do. As opposed to things that are -- I 24 mean, could be factored into the grave risk 25 concerns as part of the same process. It's a

1 bad thing that, you know, the child is in this 2 situation or this is going to affect him or 3 where the education is going to be or whatever, and in the process of debating that, simply say, 4 well, this is what we're going to do, this can 5 happen, but not sort of extend it as a whole 6 7 separate inquiry. MR. MIN: Well, we agree that it 8 9 should be a one-step process and the analysis 10 should be done in the same stage. However, we 11 also believe that, pursuant to the language of 12 Article 13 and 18 of the convention, that the court has discretion to return a child even with 13 14 a grave risk finding in place. 15 That discretion, as Justice Alito

16 mentioned earlier, would reasonably only occur 17 if there were sufficient ameliorative measures 18 in place to return a child. We agree that, 19 absent measures to protect a child, it would be 20 highly unusual to direct a return of the child 21 after a grave risk finding.

However, there are certain Circumstances where they may -- that might be appropriate, such as if the abducting parent is creating the situation of grave risk in the home

1 country, such as refusing to obtain an order of 2 protection or refusing to seek some sort of relief that might protect the child. The court 3 may in that circumstance decide that, balancing 4 the factors, one, to deter future abductions, 5 they will not sanction behavior of abducting 6 7 parents who do not cooperate in efforts to 8 protect the child upon return and, therefore, 9 return the child notwithstanding a grave risk 10 finding.

But the United States' position again 11 12 in the Blondin II amicus brief -- or the -- the Blondin amicus brief talked about the fact that 13 14 the system is built on mutual trust and 15 cooperation. Ultimately, the purpose of the 16 convention is to believe that the foreign courts 17 can protect children. It will lead to 18 consistent results here and abroad.

JUSTICE BREYER: I'm afraid of writing anything. You see the problem? It seems to me that why isn't the -- the right group to write something -- there -- there are bureaus and there are people who have this as their profession. We're not a family court, and any word we write is capable of being used in a

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1 context, in a case where it does not belong. 2 Okay? 3 So, when you say let's put our thumb -- that's what Justice Barrett said -- yeah, 4 okay, that seems like the best possible 5 6 approach. And even there, I'm not certain of 7 what thumb and what those words should be. A family court judge has the hardest 8 9 judge, in my opinion, in this system. And -and so what do we say? I take it you agree that 10 11 what the Second Circuit said must be wrong. I 12 mean, there will be cases where there is nothing 13 to be said about undertakings and you shouldn't 14 go into it, Judge, or you're going to be here 15 for five years, and the child shouldn't be sent 16 back to Afghanistan because they're bombing 17 every five minutes. And I can make up some 18 other country if I need to. And, you know, so -- so it can't be an 19 20 absolute rule in my opinion, but go ahead, answer that. Tell me why it has to be --21 2.2 MR. MIN: Well, there is a --23 JUSTICE BREYER: -- why we should 24 write something and what those words should be 25 in your opinion.

1 MR. MIN: To clarify, there is a 2 distinction between consideration and implementation of ameliorative measures. 3 Consideration, as the case law suggests in the 4 Second Circuit, can be instantaneous. A court 5 can say: Well, a child was abducted from 6 7 Afghanistan. I've considered if there's 8 anything we can do to protect the child. Ι 9 don't believe there is anything because the entire country is being bombed, using Your 10 11 Honor's example. 12 That is consideration. That is what the Second Circuit rule has implemented. 13 The 14 Second Circuit case law is very clear that they 15 have not remanded cases historically to -- for 16 failure to consider all available ameliorative 17 measures, the full panoply, as the United States 18 and as Petitioner believes the rule states. 19 The application of the rule is that 20 the court examines the record put before them, considers some very readily accessible and 21 2.2 easily available ameliorative measures, which 23 the United States has supported, and in that 24 limited purpose considers normal protective 25 measures, such as orders of protection, whether

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or not supervised visitation can be put in
 place.

3 For example, the medical case is -- as part of grave risk, is very illuminating to use 4 as an analogy. In the Ermini case -- in the 5 Ermini case and I believe the Eidem case in the 6 7 Second Circuit, the abducting parent was required to show that there was no medical 8 9 treatment available in the home country before 10 the court could find that there was grave risk 11 of harm.

12 This is precisely our argument, that 13 connected to the grave risk inquiry, one must 14 show that the child cannot be protected or 15 cannot be treated in the home country. It's not 16 sufficient to show, well, the child can get 17 medical treatment in the United States; we don't 18 have to worry about what's available in the 19 other country. They must engage in some sort of 20 analysis of what is possible and appropriate in the home country before --21 2.2

JUSTICE GORSUCH: So, Mr. Min, I just want to see if you agree with Mr. Liu, and his -- he -- he gave us at least four things that he thought we could -- we could get our hands

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1	around when it comes to ameliorative measures.
2	And I understand your point that we have to
3	determine whether there's a grave risk in the
4	home country and medical conditions.
5	But he said that you don't have to
6	consider measures that are not raised by the
7	parties, one. Two, you you don't have to
8	you don't have to pursue things that were not
9	that are not that are obviously not workable.
10	Three, you don't have to consider measures that
11	would usurp local authority. And, four, he
12	said, you can you don't have to consider
13	measures if it would prolong proceedings
14	significantly.
15	Do you disagree with any of those?
16	MR. MIN: Yes. Starting from the
17	first one, the United States in their own brief
18	suggested that the courts can sua sponte
19	consider available measures
20	JUSTICE GORSUCH: No. I I of
21	course, it can, but it doesn't have to, is
22	is, I believe, as I understood Mr. Liu, that
23	that that it's not required to. It wouldn't
24	be an abuse of discretion if it failed to
25	consider sua sponte measures on its own.

1 And -- and that may be the fundamental 2 problem with the Second Circuit's approach, right? Is that it -- it -- it seemed to suggest 3 the district court had to go out and investigate 4 measures on its own, as Justice Sotomayor 5 6 suggested. 7 So, again, those four things, any problem with any of them? That one doesn't 8 9 count. 10 Well, we believe that the MR. MIN: 11 Haque Conference in their guide to good practice 12 has stated that the courts must consider available and readily accessible ameliorative 13 14 measures. And we agree that would be the 15 appropriate --16 JUSTICE GORSUCH: So "available" would 17 be presented by the parties, and "readily 18 accessible" would, I -- I think, track what --19 what Mr. Liu said in things -- it could throw 20 out things that were obviously not workable, 21 that that wouldn't be an abuse of discretion. 2.2 So I haven't heard anything that --23 from you and I haven't read anything in your brief that I recall that -- that disagrees with 24 25 these, at least these four things. What would

1 you say? 2 MR. MIN: Well, I think, if the 3 parties did not present an option such as moving away from the nuclear plant and if the court 4 considered that as a very easily accessible and 5 6 readily available ameliorative measure, the 7 court would have a -- a duty to consider something that is very knowable in those 8 circumstances, such as --9 10 JUSTICE GORSUCH: On its own? 11 MR. MIN: Yes, on its own, because --12 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Okay. Let's say we 13 disagree with that, and we -- we -- you know, we 14 don't normally have, as Justice Sotomayor says, 15 an inquisitorial justice system. It's an 16 adversarial one in this -- this country. Then 17 what? 18 MR. MIN: Well, the United States has 19 supported judges reaching out to the 20 international network of Hague judges. And we 21 should remember that Congress has promoted or 2.2 says that there should be uniform interpretation 23 internationally of this convention, which means that it should work not only for the United 24 25 States courts but also international courts and

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that courts all around the world should apply
 the provisions of the convention fairly
 uniformly.

4 So the United States has supported 5 courts and district judges reaching out to the 6 international network of Hague judges. We agree 7 that that should be something that courts 8 consider in cases of grave risk of harm.

9 We also believe that the presumption 10 should be in all cases that the home country can 11 protect children. That is the system that this 12 convention is built on. And inherent in that system would be an acknowledgment that most 13 14 countries have orders of protection, custody 15 courts that can supervise children, that these 16 are things that courts should sua sponte 17 consider before rejecting the efficacy of these 18 measures.

Now, again, the simple fact that they consider this, even if it is just a fleeting thought, is sufficient. And the Second Circuit case law does not require that they do anything further than that.

On the second point, we agree,obvious, readily accessible, available remedies

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1 is what the court should be mandated to 2 consider. The Second Circuit language in case law, as inartfully as it might be drafted, 3 again, in practice, is not applied the way that 4 Petitioner and the United States paints it. 5 It -- it is more restrictive, meaning 6 7 that they do defer to the district court's 8 analysis of the record and proposals. The 9 Davies case, which occurred the year before this case in the Second Circuit, the district court 10 11 denied the return to French St. Martin after 12 ameliorative measures and undertakings were 13 proposed. The -- on remand, the Second Circuit 14 did not -- on -- on appeal, the Second Circuit 15 did not remand for failure -- failure to 16 consider the full plan -- panoply of 17 ameliorative measures, for failure to consider 18 all theoretical ameliorative measures. Thev 19 simply affirmed stating the -- the district 20 court considered the record put forth before them, considered available ameliorative 21 2.2 measures, and agreed that the child should not 23 be returned. 24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Counsel, I'm

25 sorry, I'm about 90 seconds behind you. But you

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1 said that the consideration can be fleeting. It 2 doesn't have to be terribly involved. 3 How would you describe the consideration in this case? Certainly far 4 beyond on fleeting, right? Quite elaborate, 5 ongoing, getting the international --6 7 international courts involved? MR. MIN: Yes. 8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So -- so would 9 10 you at least acknowledge that the depth of consideration went far beyond what would be true 11 12 in the normal case? MR. MIN: Well, in this case, the 13 14 parties, again, proposed substantial 15 ameliorative measures during the evidentiary 16 portion of this case. 17 It was only after the Second Circuit 18 remand that the court engaged in further 19 analysis and trying to convert the mostly undertakings and ameliorative measures into more 20 21 enforceable orders. 2.2 Of course, to some extent, the 23 analysis or evaluation of ameliorative measures 24 is a -- a process that would take time, of 25 course, but the United States themselves in --

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1 again, in the Blondin amicus brief, criticize 2 the grave risk process, which required expert testimony, and said that it would result to 3 delays and prolonging cases. 4 And in my experience, it is grave risk 5 analysis itself that often leads to long delays 6 7 in the adjudication of these cases. There's -very rarely do grave risk cases get resolved 8 9 within six weeks. They require expert 10 testimony. They require the analysis of the 11 foreign country's mechanism and legal system. 12 In this case, Petitioner put their 13 case on first because they were trying to 14 substantiate the exception, and in their case, 15 they called an Italian legal expert who 16 criticized Italy and also criticized the U.S. 17 system for protecting domestic violence, and 18 they also called two experts on -- on grave risk of harm. 19 So simultaneous with that evidence 20 21 being adduced, the question of ameliorative 2.2 measures was also presented. So the -- there is 23 no real time delay that would be created by And, 24 considering ameliorative measures. 25 certainly, one must consider the overarching

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1 purpose of the convention, which is to return 2 children back to their home country. 3 Ultimately, the question that I've heard from several Justices is about the rule 4 that should be provided to courts in these types 5 of cases. And we believe that, very simply, the 6 7 Court must consider all evidence of ameliorative 8 measures that are presented to them by either 9 party during the course of proceedings, that it 10 is Petitioner or the abducting parent's burden 11 to overcome the presumption that the courts in 12 the system in the home country are capable of protecting children and that that presumption 13 14 may be overcome by evidence stating that they 15 have either attempted to secure protection and 16 were denied that protection, which would -- can 17 lead a district court to conclude that that 18 country cannot protect that child, or by 19 producing some sort of evidence through experts or other means about the deficiencies in that 20 21 legal system. 2.2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel, not in my 23 experience, but I have followed some of these cases with care. 24 25 If a court decides I'm not altogether

1 sure about whether the abuse occurred or, if the 2 abuse occurred, it occurred in the manner that the petitioner says -- not the petitioner, that 3 the respondent says -- I think that that issue 4 is one that should be looked at more closely by 5 6 the court making the custody decision. I need 7 to rule expeditiously in this case. 8 So given my deep uncertainty, I'm not 9 sure I'm going to make a grave risk finding or 10 I'm going to find there may be a risk, but I'm not sure of its extent, I think these measures 11 12 are enough to return the child, what mechanism is there for a court to do that? 13 14 MR. MIN: So Haque cases are often 15 described as summary proceedings. 16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Right. 17 MR. MIN: There are several rules that allow for expeditious proceedings, such as the 18 19 requirement that documents not have to be 20 authenticated to be produced as evidence. 21 We believe that a mandatory 2.2 consideration will speed up resolution of these 23 cases. First, it gives clear guidance to -- to district court judges --24 25 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: No, I --

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1 MR. MIN: -- how to evaluate --2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- I understand 3 all of that, counsel. 4 MR. MIN: Summary judgment --JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I -- I -- the 5 6 assumption here has been that there's been a 7 grave risk finding, but, as I indicated, especially in domestic abuse cases, they're --8 9 they're messy, and who's abusing whom and to 10 what extent and under what circumstances is 11 always at issue. Okay? 12 What legal mechanism is there for a court who's unsure, I don't want to make a grave 13 14 risk finding because I think that that really 15 belongs to the custody court, I'm on the margin. 16 Could, without that finding, a court say I'm 17 going to return you? 18 MR. MIN: Yes. We believe that through summary judgment motions and processes, 19 that if there is a mandatory consideration of 20 21 ameliorative measures, that the left-behind 2.2 parent can put forth evidence that taking the 23 abducting parent's allegations at their extreme, 24 which is what the United Kingdom does in their 25 analysis, taking their allegations at face

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value, there are sufficient ameliorative
 measures that would still protect the child,
 then they do not have to go through the thorough
 analysis and evidence-gathering to figure out
 whether the allegations are then themselves
 true.

And this is something that the Hague
Conference has talked about in their guide to
good practice. And so that would in effect
speed up these cases considerably.

JUSTICE BREYER: I mean, why can -what about saying that -- I'm looking for the thumb -- not say it quite in those words. After all, the U.K. is talking about a special treaty that includes the EU countries where they know the courts have these particular things maybe.

17 But just say the question's difficult, 18 has to do with whether there really will be a 19 grave risk or whether there won't be a grave 20 risk, and we'd recommend or it's quite possible 21 the district court is free to consult the 2.2 guidance of experts on the subject, for example, 23 the March 9, 2020, statement issued by the Child 24 Abduction Convention guide by the Permanent 25 Bureau of the Hague Conference, whatever it is,

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1	we cite that. But we don't tell them they have
2	to do it.
3	We just say, in an appropriate case,
4	the judge is free, of course, to consider the
5	views of those who work in this field, such as.
6	Now we don't have to say too much and
7	they'll do it, you know, I mean, so what about
8	something like that, and not in every case but
9	in an appropriate case?
10	MR. MIN: Again, we believe and we
11	agree with the United States that discretion
12	should be guided by sound legal principles and
13	the large object objectives of the
14	convention.
15	We believe that it would be an abuse
16	of discretion for a court to fail to consider
17	very reasonable and accessible and available
18	ameliorative measures in cases where they may
19	help the return of the child back to the home
20	country.
21	Again, if they if it's an extreme
22	case where an abductor has violated and shown a
23	propensity to violate court orders in the past,
24	where the abducting parent has sought orders of
25	protection and sought the refuge of police in

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1 the home country and they have not offered their 2 assistance back home, in those types of cases, the court can easily consider and say: I've 3 thought about how we could protect this child, 4 none of them I think will work, and they can 5 move on to their final decision. 6 7 We do not believe that the mandatory consideration adds any more time because, if 8 they believe that it could assist in returning 9 the child and implemented that, then it would 10 11 take the same time whether it was discretionary 12 or mandatory, and it would take the same time if they denied the implementation of the 13 ameliorative measures. 14 15 Again, the consideration versus 16 implementation is an important distinction. Α 17 lot of the concerns here are about implementing 18 ameliorative measures. But even if we concede 19 or even if we accept that ameliorative measures are discretionary, the implementation of them 20 will, of course, take some time. 21 2.2 Now, in this case, when Ms. Golan 23 actually sought the order of protection in December 2019, she obtained it one week later. 24 25 So there really was no delay in obtaining the

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1 necessary ameliorative measures to protect this child in this case, and oftentimes there will 2 3 not have to be. If this Court does not have any 4 5 further questions, we certainly would urge this Court to affirm the return of B.A.S. 6 7 As I stated in my opening statement, the Italian courts are ready to adjudicate the 8 best interests of this child. They have a 9 hearing scheduled in June. They have appointed 10 11 an attorney for the child to represent the 12 child's interests. They have issued orders that 13 substantially protect the interests of this child and reduce any risk to this child below 14 15 the threshold grave risk of harm. 16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Anything 17 further? 18 Thank you, counsel. 19 MR. MIN: Thank you. 20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Rebuttal, Ms. 21 King? 2.2 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF KAREN R. KING 23 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER MS. KING: Yes, thank you. 24 25 To start with the Italian proceeding,

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1 all that's happened in Italy is more placeholder 2 dates, the same that's happened in the last 3 three years since that case was filed. The only substantive action taken in the Italian 4 proceeding was the one that was put in place at 5 the request of this U.S. district court, going 6 7 through the parties and forcing the parties to 8 apply for a particular order.

9 I want to go back to the notion of an 10 exception. This is the fifth Hague case that 11 this Court has heard in 12 years, and in each of 12 its prior opinions, it identified the grave risk 13 exception as an example of where return is not 14 required because it is the plain reading of the 15 convention. There is no obligation to return, 16 no heavy thumb on the scale towards return, once 17 grave risk is proven.

18 And the exception exists for a reason. 19 And this is the first case where a mother has 20 proven the grave risk exception by the 21 exceedingly high evidentiary standard in this 2.2 country, by clear and convincing evidence. 23 And so, if we go back the three years 24 to March 22nd of 2019, when the district court made that grave risk finding, I just want to 25

1 note that that finding was never even appealed. 2 It stands to this day, all of those findings of horrific violence, of the character failings of 3 Mr. Saada, and of the harm, psychological and 4 physical harm, to the young child in this case. 5 But everything that followed from that 6 7 is infected by the Second Circuit's mandatory requirement to exhaustively consider and try to 8 9 find a way to send the child back. 10 And Mr. Min says that ameliorative 11 measures was part of the trial, and that's not 12 exactly true. Although they were mentioned in 13 the trial, there was not a detailed factual 14 finding about ameliorative measures. It came up 15 after -- or in the middle of closing arguments. 16 At the end of closing arguments is when the 17 district court said, oh, by the way, can you 18 please propose some ameliorative measures? 19 And, at that time, the ameliorative 20 measures proposed by Mr. Saada were a bunch of 21 promises essentially. And even the Second 2.2 Circuit agrees that those promises are not 23 reliable, are not consistent with the 24 convention's requirement to try and protect the 25 children.

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1 And, at the end of the day, the Second 2 Circuit's rule then required a -- another bite 3 at the apple, so to speak, and forced the district court then to engage in this 4 nine-and-a-half-month process that I think we 5 6 can all recognize as being improper under the 7 convention's requirements. The procedural and substantive defects 8 9 with that ultimate process are -- are too ingrained for us to send this back. If the 10 11 defect is it took too long, the remedy shouldn't 12 be, well, give them more time to try again. 13 If the defect is the district court 14 should not have entangled itself with custody 15 matters, the remedy should not be to accept that 16 protective order now and allow the parties to 17 engage with it. 18 Because there's a safe and swift 19 resolution, we -- we urge a reversal. 20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel. The case is submitted. 21 2.2 (Whereupon, at 11:21 a.m., the case 23 was submitted.) 24 25

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