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P R O C E E D I N G S

(1:00 p.m.)

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We will hear argument next in Case 07-901, Oregon v. Ice.

Ms. Williams.

ORAL ARGUMENT OF MARY H. WILLIAMS

ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MS. WILLIAMS: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court:

The factfinding at issue in this case is significantly different than the factfinding at issue in this Court's recent Sixth Amendment cases, in which the Court struck down changes in sentencing practice that had the effect of removing factfinding from the province of the jury. In those cases, the change in practice meant that a defendant could be convicted by the jury for one offense and then, based on nonjury factfinding, the defendant could be sentenced for what appeared to be an aggravated, more serious offense without the jury having made all the factual determinations necessary for that more serious offense.

That doesn't happen in this case. In this case, the jury convicted Mr. Ice of six counts, and the sentence imposed on each of those six convictions satisfies the Apprendi rule. There's no additional jury

1 factfinding that alters -- or nonjury factfinding,  
2 excuse me, that alters a specific sentence for one of  
3 the convictions. Instead, what the factfinding in this  
4 case does is to significantly restrain the judge's  
5 ability to decide how to administer those multiple  
6 sentences for the multiple convictions.

7 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, but it -- it, by  
8 reason of the unusual law at issue here -- -I think it's  
9 unusual, I don't -- I'm unaware of any other State that  
10 has one -- the sentences -- the defendant has an  
11 entitlement to have the sentences run concurrently  
12 unless a certain additional fact exists and that  
13 additional fact is to be found by the judge rather than  
14 by the jury. So that if you take seriously what -- what  
15 we have said in prior cases, namely that any fact which  
16 has the effect of lengthening the sentence to which the  
17 defendant is entitled must be found by the jury -- if  
18 you take that seriously, I don't see why it doesn't  
19 apply here.

20 MS. WILLIAMS: Justice Scalia, first on the  
21 point in terms of how unique this statute is, there are  
22 other States that have similar requirements, that there  
23 is initially a presumption that multiple sentences will  
24 be concurrent unless there is additional nonjury  
25 factfinding that authorizes the judge to impose

1 consecutive sentences. So it's not entirely --

2 JUSTICE SCALIA: How many others? Do you  
3 know?

4 MS. WILLIAMS: It's difficult actually to  
5 come up with an exact count, and the numbers vary when  
6 you look at how other courts have sort of combined  
7 cases, perhaps as many as 13, but as different  
8 States have sort of changed their practice some of those  
9 have fallen away. But it's clear that there's at least  
10 a minority of States that have this kind of limitation  
11 on what is otherwise inherent or a discretionary  
12 authority of the judge to decide how to administer these  
13 multiple sentences.

14 The difference is that what this Court has  
15 been addressing in the Apprendi line of cases has always  
16 been a specific sentence imposed on a specific  
17 conviction. And what the Oregon Supreme Court did was  
18 to expand that to say that, in addition to the statutory  
19 maximum that this Court described in Blakely, there is  
20 in effect a second statutory maximum that you must  
21 consider when there are multiple sentences being imposed  
22 for multiple convictions, and that's the total period of  
23 incarceration that the defendant will serve with and  
24 without the additional factfinding.

25 JUSTICE SCALIA: You know, this fact can --

1 can turn out to be the most significant fact for the  
2 defendant. I mean, it could lengthen his sentence  
3 enormously. It's more important than many of the other  
4 facts that we leave to the jury.

5 MS. WILLIAMS: Yes, Your Honor, and in this  
6 case, for example, the additional factfinding extends  
7 the total duration of the -- of Mr. Ice's period of  
8 incarceration from 90 months to 340 months. But what is  
9 significant is that, as this Court said in *Blakely*, the  
10 Sixth Amendment is a reservation of jury power; it's not  
11 a limitation on judicial power. And I would submit it's  
12 not a limitation on legislative power, except to the  
13 extent that that exercise of power removed something  
14 from the province of the jury. Historically, it's  
15 undisputed that the judge made this decision about how  
16 multiple sentences would be administered.

17 JUSTICE SCALIA: But you could say the same  
18 about sentencing in general, and we held that the Sixth  
19 Amendment does impose a limitation upon judicial power  
20 where at least there is an entitlement by law to a  
21 certain lower sentence. And there we said you can't  
22 leave it to the judge to decide whether the facts that  
23 trigger that law exist or not.

24 MS. WILLIAMS: I think what's important is  
25 the foundation for that holding and the foundation for

1 the Apprendi rule. It wasn't simply that factfinding in  
2 general that exposes the defendant to a harsher  
3 punishment is something that should -- would be better  
4 served by having it done by the jury. It was that,  
5 because of the changes in sentencing practices, because  
6 States and Congress had been taking what traditionally  
7 had been elements of an offense and relabeling them as  
8 something else, as sentencing factors, that the jury was  
9 no longer finding what traditionally it would have found  
10 for each conviction. It was no longer finding what  
11 would have been each element of an offense.

12 So what the rule does is it provides a  
13 bright-line way of testing what is the functional  
14 equivalent of an element for a specific offense that  
15 would have been within the province of the jury and  
16 therefore that can't be removed without violating the  
17 Sixth Amendment.

18 JUSTICE STEVENS: The rule --

19 JUSTICE KENNEDY: The rule does bear on  
20 culpability, and culpability sounds like part of the  
21 definition of an offense or a more serious offense.

22 MS. WILLIAMS: Yes, Your Honor.

23 And I think the Oregon Supreme Court viewed  
24 this case as in terms of -- that it may have simply been  
25 happenstance that the Court was looking only at single

1 convictions and single sentences being imposed on those.  
2 But I think that takes away the analysis that the court  
3 used in reaching the conclusions that it reached.

4 JUSTICE KENNEDY: I don't understand why  
5 this happenstance is required to do it under the  
6 statute. I didn't quite understand that.

7 MS. WILLIAMS: Well --

8 JUSTICE KENNEDY: You said it's only  
9 happenstance. He has to do it under the statute if he  
10 makes the finding.

11 MS. WILLIAMS: No, what I'm trying to say is  
12 that I think the Oregon Supreme Court viewed the fact  
13 that so far in this Court's cases you had only been  
14 dealing with a single offense and a single sentence, as  
15 -- as not foreclosing the possibility that there would  
16 be a different statutory maximum when you have multiple  
17 sentences being imposed for multiple convictions. And  
18 so the supreme court, I think, treated it -- what I was  
19 saying was it simply is happenstance that that had been  
20 the -- the nature of the cases that this Court had  
21 decided, but then drew from this Court's opinions and  
22 from the discussion about punishment a broader meaning  
23 that somehow the jury must be involved in any factual  
24 determination that relates to the overall quantum of  
25 punishment for multiple sentences being imposed.

1 JUSTICE SOUTER: Well, didn't we furnish the  
2 premise for that broader reasoning? Because we pointed  
3 out that the traditional role of the jury was standing  
4 in effect as the buffer between the power of the State  
5 and the individual, and our concern in the Apprendi  
6 cases was that the concept of elements was being  
7 manipulated in such a way that the jury no longer stood  
8 in that -- in effect, that buffer position.

9 And I guess the question here would be, is  
10 there -- is there room for -- in effect, for  
11 manipulation by the law in the consecutive sentencing  
12 scheme or potential consecutive sentencing schemes,  
13 so that the jury in effect loses control over the  
14 length, the ultimate length of time that an individual  
15 is going to serve? What is your response to that?

16 MS. WILLIAMS: That the jury does not lose  
17 anything that the jury historically had within its --

18 JUSTICE SOUTER: No, but isn't the problem  
19 with that argument the problem that Justice Scalia  
20 raised a moment ago, where you could have made the same  
21 argument with respect to a mandatory State guideline,  
22 but nonetheless, the change in the law brought to bear  
23 on the new law an old concept. And this is a change in  
24 the law, to be sure. I agree with you, historically.  
25 The judges -- once consecutive sentencing came in at

1 all, they were free to, in effect, do what they wanted  
2 to, subject to some kind of a rule of reason.

3 But we've got to apply the Apprendi concept  
4 and the concern of the jury trial right to this new  
5 situation. So I don't think it's an answer to say,  
6 well, the judges never had such a -- such a power.

7 MS. WILLIAMS: But there's something  
8 different here in terms of looking back on history and  
9 what we have presently, compared to when you are looking  
10 at the offense-specific sentence associated with a  
11 specific conviction, because the changes in practice  
12 there had the effect of taking away the ability to find  
13 an element or something that was the equivalent of an  
14 element, of removing that from the jury. And,  
15 historically, that is clearly what the jury's job was:  
16 To stand in as a buffer between the defendant and the  
17 government.

18 JUSTICE SCALIA: So I gather from your  
19 argument that you would -- you would be taking the other  
20 side and you would be saying that it has to go to the  
21 jury if, instead of being a statute that applies to  
22 concurrent sentences from various crimes, there was  
23 added to a particular crime, if this crime was committed  
24 with the use of a gun, any sentence imposed shall not  
25 run concurrently but shall run consecutively with any

1 other sentence arising out of this same occurrence?

2 MS. WILLIAMS: I think --

3 JUSTICE SCALIA: There it's attached to a  
4 particular crime. Do you really think that we should  
5 have a different result in that case from this one?

6 MS. WILLIAMS: No, Your Honor, I don't,  
7 although I think that makes it a more difficult  
8 situation to try to analyze, because there it is -- it  
9 is focused on a specific sentence for a specific  
10 offense. But what is different is it still goes to not  
11 adding to the penalty for that sentence, but adding to  
12 how you are going to administer multiple sentences.

13 And the history here is very different.  
14 Because what we have is, even though there wasn't a  
15 statute when the Framers would have looked at this  
16 issue, the issue did exist. Judges did make the  
17 determination about how multiple sentences would be  
18 administered. And what they would have considered would  
19 have been a wide array of facts and without really  
20 limitation other than --

21 JUSTICE SCALIA: You could say the same  
22 thing about the length of the sentence, that it was up  
23 to them and they considered a wide array of facts. So  
24 what? We said in Apprendi, once you try to narrow it by  
25 law and say they can't do more than this, once you do

1 that, that fact has to be found by the jury. And that's  
2 what's going on here.

3 MS. WILLIAMS: But I think what's different  
4 is that the history at issue and underlying Apprendi  
5 actually wasn't that the judge could simply make nonjury  
6 factfinding and expand the sentence beyond what the  
7 sentence was that was associated with the jury's  
8 verdict; that, in fact, that was the problem. Because  
9 once there was additional factfinding that permitted the  
10 judge to add to the penalty, that that had changed by  
11 taking something away from what the jury's role was.

12 And so here we don't have that  
13 same sort of situation. I think that -- that that was  
14 exactly the argument this Court has rejected in those  
15 cases of -- of -- where States and others have attempted  
16 to suggest that historically judges were able to do this  
17 and so it shouldn't matter now as we have changes.  
18 But the Court rejected those arguments to say that, no,  
19 because the sentencing practices have taken something  
20 away from the jury, that is why we have the Sixth  
21 Amendment violation.

22 So if in this circumstance we -- we have  
23 constrained judicial power -- and clearly that's what  
24 this statute does, is it tells the judge that, instead  
25 of being able to make this determination based on this

1 wide array of factual considerations, the judge now is  
2 limited in what the judge must consider to -- to then  
3 exercise discretion in administering these sentences.  
4 But all of that is legislative restraint of judicial  
5 power without touching in any way on the jury's historic  
6 role in -- in how to deal with these multiple --

7 JUSTICE BREYER: Am I right in -- I just  
8 want to get the facts right. Am I right, you did this  
9 historical research, and if you start with Apprendi we  
10 can go all the way back to Nebuchadnezzar and you  
11 haven't found a single case ever where it was a jury  
12 rather than a judge that made this question of how you  
13 put together sentences for two separate crimes committed  
14 on the same occasion? Is that right, or is it an  
15 overstatement?

16 MS. WILLIAMS: It is an overstatement only  
17 in the sense that I did not go back as far as --

18 JUSTICE BREYER: I didn't say how far you  
19 went back. I said as far as you went back.

20 MS. WILLIAMS: As far as I went --

21 JUSTICE BREYER: I don't know what  
22 Nebuchadnezzar found, but I take it you did look to see  
23 what was true at the time of the writing of the  
24 Constitution.

25 MS. WILLIAMS: Yes, Your Honor.

1 JUSTICE BREYER: And at the time of the  
2 writing of the Constitution, which sometimes some of us  
3 feel is relevant, in that instance they did have the  
4 judge, not the jury, decide how to create a total  
5 sentence where the person had committed two crimes on  
6 the same occasion.

7 MS. WILLIAMS: Yes, exactly. And that  
8 difference in terms of the history of showing that this  
9 was a judicial determination, that -- and now that the  
10 factfinding --

11 JUSTICE SCALIA: But you could say the same  
12 in Apprendi. It was a judicial determination how much  
13 of a sentence you were going to get. From ten years to  
14 life. It wasn't up to the jury. It was up to the  
15 judge.

16 MS. WILLIAMS: But where --

17 JUSTICE SCALIA: And yet when you constrain  
18 the judge and you say, judge, you cannot give more than  
19 20 years unless the crime was committed with a -- with a  
20 gun, we said suddenly that that matter can no longer be  
21 left to the judge. It's a matter of law, and the fact  
22 must be found by the jury. And I don't see any  
23 difference here. I mean in both cases it was  
24 traditionally done by judges.

25 MS. WILLIAMS: But what this Court focused

1 on with the Apprendi rule is that, although judges made  
2 decisions about sentencing within a range of possible  
3 sentences, what judges could not do was to find  
4 additional facts that were the functional equivalent of  
5 an element of a greater offense. And that's what was  
6 happening with those new sentencing --

7 JUSTICE SOUTER: But we defined in effect  
8 what was the functional element of the greater offense  
9 in terms of the -- the power or the capacity of the  
10 judge to increase the sentence beyond the range that  
11 would have been -- that would have established the  
12 maximum in the absence of that factfinding, right?

13 MS. WILLIAMS: Correct.

14 JUSTICE SOUTER: All right. And aren't we  
15 in exactly the same position here? Because the  
16 defendant here can correctly say: I cannot be sentenced  
17 to the more onerous -- under a more onerous scheme of  
18 consecutive sentencing unless some fact is found which  
19 has not been found by the jury in coming to verdicts of  
20 guilty in any of these crimes; a further fact must be  
21 found to expose me to the heavier penalty.

22 And that is exactly the same as the  
23 situation in Apprendi with one possible exception; and  
24 that is, do you accept, as I thought you did, the  
25 proposition that consecutive sentencing is the heavier

1 penalty or is a more onerous sentencing alternative. If  
2 you accept that, I don't see how you would escape the  
3 analogy with Apprendi.

4 MS. WILLIAMS: Your Honor, I do not accept  
5 that it is a -- an enhanced penalty for any of the  
6 specific convictions.

7 JUSTICE SOUTER: Everybody agrees.

8 MS. WILLIAMS: And the --

9 JUSTICE SOUTER: If you had a choice between  
10 two concurrent sentences and two consecutive sentences,  
11 you know which one you are going to choose. So we -- we  
12 know what is the heavier sentence or the heavier  
13 sentencing option.

14 MS. WILLIAMS: It does have certainly a  
15 harsher effect on the defendant than serving each of the  
16 sentences beginning at the same time. But I think the  
17 same could be said in terms of mandatory minimum  
18 sentences and the factfinding required for those.

19 We obviously have cases where a defendant  
20 facing a mandatory minimum sentence is going to be  
21 confronted with a harsher sentence than he would face  
22 without that additional factor.

23 JUSTICE SOUTER: But the mandatory minimum  
24 is at least within the range of sentencing possibilities  
25 that the judge could impose anyway without any further

1 factfinding by the jury.

2 MS. WILLIAMS: And depending on how you view  
3 this in terms of if you are looking at it with an  
4 offense-specific frame, each sentence imposed for each  
5 of the six convictions is also within the range of what  
6 the judge can impose. This additional piece of when  
7 those sentences begin does not take away from the jury's  
8 role. It does limit what the judge could otherwise have  
9 done, and it does that limitation by requiring  
10 factfinding.

11 JUSTICE BREYER: What about the -- what  
12 about restitution, forfeiture, taking a child and having  
13 him tried as an adult? What about probation? What  
14 about alternative drug programs? What about diversion?  
15 I mean, I can think of five or six where there might be  
16 a factual finding necessary to proceed to a situation  
17 where the total amount of punishment is greater rather  
18 than less.

19 MS. WILLIAMS: Yes, Your Honor, and we are  
20 now litigating some of those very questions in light of  
21 the Oregon Supreme Court decision about what is the  
22 scope when you look beyond the specific sentence imposed  
23 for a specific conviction and look at this greater  
24 quantum of punishment --

25 JUSTICE SCALIA: It's a lot easier to limit

1 it to sentence than it is to limit it to sentence for a  
2 particular conviction as opposed to sentence for the  
3 whole ball of wax, all of the -- all of the horrors  
4 that Justice Breyer proposes would -- would be overcome  
5 if -- if you just adopted a rule that only applies to  
6 sentences.

7 MS. WILLIAMS: Although, Your Honor, some of  
8 these downstream decisions that are made again by  
9 nonjury factfinding do affect what the defendant's  
10 period of incarceration is going to be.

11 JUSTICE BREYER: And doesn't the sentencing  
12 -- doesn't the Federal law define a sentence to include  
13 restitution, to include what is the equivalent of  
14 probation? I mean, there is a broad definition of the  
15 word "sentence" in the law which includes some of the  
16 things that I mentioned, though not all.

17 MS. WILLIAMS: Yes, Your Honor, and the same  
18 is true for Oregon, that the sentence imposed and if you  
19 -- the -- the judgments are set out in the joint  
20 appendix in this case, that set out each of the  
21 sentences imposed for each of the six convictions, and  
22 you will see that there are a number of things in  
23 addition to the term of incarceration that are a part of  
24 that sentence being imposed.

25 JUSTICE STEVENS: May I ask you a question

1 that may seem totally irrelevant? Do you think our  
2 decision in McMillan v. Pennsylvania was correctly  
3 decided?

4 MS. WILLIAMS: I --

5 JUSTICE STEVENS: It seems to me under your  
6 reasoning in your case you might say that case was  
7 wrong. And I think it was wrong. I will be perfectly  
8 candid and say so. I think it was a very important  
9 decision.

10 MS. WILLIAMS: No, Your Honor, I don't think  
11 that it is necessary to say that that decision is wrong  
12 to be consistent with the position I am asserting here  
13 or the decision in Harris, because there the Court made  
14 a distinction between what the jury traditionally would  
15 have been -- been doing and determined that that jury  
16 role was limited to deciding facts that increased only  
17 the -- the maximum penalty that the defendant faced.  
18 And so factfinding tied to imposing a mandatory minimum  
19 sentence is different.

20 JUSTICE STEVENS: No, I understand. But it  
21 seems to me it is -- in the old common law tradition,  
22 following sort of the reasoning in the case you relied  
23 on, McMillan really should have come out the other way,  
24 because the jury normally would be finding the facts  
25 that would allow the minimum -- the maximum to go up or

1 the minimum. I forget which it was.

2 MS. WILLIAMS: And -- and what I have done  
3 is to start with the proposition that we have in place  
4 the Apprendi rule as it has been construed in McMillan  
5 and in Harris, but that this is a -- a very different  
6 extension of that rule beyond anything that this Court  
7 has addressed in these cases.

8 And it's an extension that doesn't have the  
9 same historic support that the Apprendi rule has. So I  
10 don't think that this Court needs to -- certainly this  
11 Court doesn't need to consider what impact this would  
12 have except for, I think, in accepting the Oregon  
13 Supreme Court holding. That to me does raise questions  
14 about the ongoing validity of McMillan and Harris. And  
15 -- and again, there are ways that you could certainly  
16 distinguish that and retain those. But what it does is  
17 to focus more on the jury as factfinder instead of  
18 focusing on what the jury's historic role was and the  
19 Sixth Amendment as a reservation of the power that the  
20 jury had, not somehow giving the jury additional power  
21 beyond what it has whenever factfinding is involved that  
22 is -- is related to a defendant's aggregate punishment.

23 JUSTICE STEVENS: And, of course, it's part  
24 of your position that historically sentences were always  
25 consecutive, if you go way back.

1 MS. WILLIAMS: But, Your Honor, in the older  
2 cases we actually do find that they were -- there was  
3 discretion for the judge to have the sentences be served  
4 concurrently. It was viewed as in some ways not giving  
5 full effect to the jury's verdict of finding the  
6 defendant guilty for multiple offenses, which  
7 consecutive sentencing did give full effect to that  
8 verdict.

9 And so it was in the nature really of a  
10 mitigation that the judge could do to lessen the  
11 severity of the punishment based on certain facts that  
12 the judge would consider and then in simply exercising  
13 the judge's discretion.

14 But what is important here, I think, is that  
15 it was clearly something for the judge to decide. Once  
16 there were the multiple convictions, the jury's role was  
17 at an end, and it was then up to the judge to make the  
18 determination about how to administer those multiple  
19 sentences. And so long as we are not changing the  
20 jury's role in establishing that sentence for each of  
21 the -- the six convictions in this case, then we have  
22 not removed from the jury anything that would have been  
23 incorporated within the Sixth Amendment.

24 JUSTICE STEVENS: What happens with  
25 sentences from multiple States? You commit the crime in

1 State A; you flee. You are then tried and found guilty  
2 of a second crime in State B. I -- I -- let's assume  
3 that the judge in State B has considerable discretion as  
4 to whether or not he intends to impose a sentence in B  
5 or send back to A, and that he knows that A is going to  
6 be concurrent.

7 Under the theory of the case that's  
8 advocated by the Respondents, do you think that a jury  
9 trial or some sort of finding would be required?

10 MS. WILLIAMS: I think that if the -- the  
11 law required that the sentences be concurrent unless  
12 additional factfindings were made, then under the -- the  
13 rule announced by the Oregon Supreme Court and advocated  
14 by Respondent that question would have to then go to the  
15 jury even if it arises in -- basically in separate  
16 proceedings.

17 So as you are sentencing in that separate,  
18 second proceeding, it would still be a jury question of  
19 whether those facts were -- were there that would allow  
20 the judge to impose a consecutive sentence.

21 The Oregon statute treats that a little bit  
22 differently. It appears to give the judge discretion  
23 when there is a previously imposed judgment. Other  
24 States do it differently, though, and do require  
25 factfinding even in those circumstances when there has

1       been a judgment imposed in an entirely separate  
2       proceeding. And if I could reserve the remainder of my  
3       time.

4                   CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.  
5                   Mr. Lannet.

6                   ORAL ARGUMENT OF ERNEST G. LANNET  
7                   ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

8                   MR. LANNET: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it  
9       please the Court:

10                   This case presents yet another application  
11       of the bright-line rule from Apprendi. Oregon law  
12       entitles a criminal defendant to a concurrent sentence  
13       for each offense unless certain facts are found. Here  
14       for three offenses a judge found those facts and imposed  
15       a greater penalty of a consecutive sentence. That  
16       violated defendant's -- or the Sixth Amendment's jury-  
17       trial guarantee that the judge's authority to impose  
18       criminal punishment must be limited by the facts solely  
19       found by the jury.

20                   JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Lannet, there --  
21       there is one significant difference, I think, between --  
22       the-- in Apprendi it doesn't matter whether the State  
23       labels something a "sentencing factor" or an "element."  
24       Every one of those questions that goes into determining  
25       the maximum length of a sentence has to go to a jury

1 under Apprendi.

2 But when it comes to consecutive versus  
3 concurrent, it's perfectly okay if a State says, our  
4 main rule is consecutive, but the judge, if there are  
5 certain mitigating factors, can make it concurrent. Or  
6 it leaves the total things to the discretion of the  
7 judge.

8 And if we are looking at it from the point  
9 of view of a defendant, the State says, well, we are not  
10 going to make it totally discretionary because we want  
11 to be more defendant-friendly; that is, we are putting  
12 certain restraints on the judge. So it seems -- what  
13 seems odd to me about this case is the Sixth Amendment  
14 is supposed to protect the defendant's right. And here  
15 the State is saying, we want to give the defendant more  
16 of a right. And he can say, that's unconstitutional,  
17 but if you give me less of a right, it would be  
18 perfectly constitutional.

19 It's that enigma that I think is very  
20 disturbing about this case.

21 MR. LANNET: Well, two points on that. One  
22 of them is that historically the jury trial -- the jury  
23 found the verdict of guilt. That, in itself, authorized  
24 the potential penalty of receiving a consecutive  
25 sentence.

1           Oregon has made a different policy choice  
2 here. And, to understand the full backdrop of it,  
3 perhaps the context, that before this Oregon -- before  
4 Oregon had this statutory system in place, it had very  
5 liberal rules regarding merger. This was part of a  
6 series of enactments in which antimerger provisions were  
7 enacted so the defendant's criminal history would  
8 represent more accurately the number of convictions the  
9 jury had found him guilty of.

10           Therefore, the defendants under -- in Oregon  
11 law -- must receive a separate sentence for  
12 each offense. So the increased number of sentences gave  
13 rise to the possibility of longer sentences through  
14 consecutive sentencing. Because in Oregon not only does  
15 an offense give rise to a discrete sentence, but whether  
16 the -- the sentence is concurrent or consecutive is an  
17 aspect of punishment for that offense.

18           JUSTICE BREYER: In Oregon traditionally if  
19 a burglar had broken into a house and while he was in  
20 the house commits a rape, traditionally in Oregon that  
21 would not be considered two crimes?

22           MR. LANNET: At a certain point in time  
23 there were judicial rules in place regarding merger that  
24 may have resulted in the entry of one --

25           JUSTICE BREYER: Can you cite me an Oregon

1 case which says a burglar who breaks in and commits rape  
2 is only guilty of one crime?

3 MR. LANNET: I would be happy to submit some  
4 in a memorandum. I would need another day to do so.

5 JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Lannet, in -- in  
6 connection with Justice Ginsburg's question, do you  
7 think that Apprendi would apply differently to a statute  
8 which, instead of imposing a higher penalty for a crime  
9 committed with a firearm, said that the penalty will be  
10 30 years for burglary unless the defendant did not  
11 commit the crime with a firearm, in which case it will  
12 be 15 years?

13 Do you think if the -- if the statute were  
14 framed in that way, that Apprendi would not apply and we  
15 would leave it to the judge whether a firearm had been  
16 used or not?

17 MR. LANNET: I certainly think it would  
18 raise an issue about whether -- a different statutory  
19 interpretation, of course, and if the State was merely  
20 shifting a burden on a fact to the defendant to  
21 disprove, I think that that would run into problems with  
22 this Court's due process -- case law.

23 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, regardless of who  
24 proved it, I mean, the issue is can it be left to the  
25 judge to decide whether the -- the -- the beneficent

1 determination that he did not use a firearm could be  
2 left to the judge instead of sending it to the jury?

3 MR. LANNET: I think it would be very likely  
4 if this Court looked at this State's interpretation of  
5 the statute and found that the -- that the judge had no  
6 authority to impose the greater sentence?

7 JUSTICE SCALIA: I don't see a dime's worth  
8 of difference between that and Apprendi.

9 JUSTICE BREYER: How are you going to prove  
10 these? I am always curious as to the defense policy as  
11 to why. Stricter and stricter rules here, and I have a  
12 hard time figuring out why. If you have an actual case  
13 and you have to go to trial, are you prepared to put on  
14 all the evidence that although you want to say that your  
15 client did neither of these things, that if he did do  
16 them, in fact they were just one thing and weren't  
17 separate things? I mean are you prepared to go into all  
18 that detail in front of the jury?

19 MR. LANNET: Well, again I think there would  
20 be a question about whether that would be proper, if  
21 that would be in fact shifting an element over to the  
22 defendant to disprove. I think that that would  
23 create --

24 JUSTICE BREYER: No, you are saying that the  
25 standard they use here for a separate sentencing, that

1 it has to be a separate crime and so forth, has to go to  
2 the jury.

3 MR. LANNET: Yes, sure.

4 JUSTICE BREYER: Okay. So I wonder if you  
5 are prepared to put all those facts before the jury,  
6 say, in a case where you want to say that it wasn't my  
7 defendant who did it.

8 MR. LANNET: Well, actually, Your Honor, a  
9 decision affirming the Oregon Supreme Court at this  
10 point would have little impact in Oregon. In response  
11 to Blakely, the Oregon legislature enacted a statutory  
12 scheme that gave facts that enhanced a sentence -- gave  
13 as a procedure by which they go to the jury, and it's  
14 either -- and in a bifurcated proceeding that's ---

15 JUSTICE BREYER: That way, you have to  
16 have two --

17 JUSTICE SCALIA: Booker/Fanfan as well, as  
18 adopted, right? I mean that was what the dissenters in  
19 Booker/Fanfan would have --

20 MR. LANNET: Yes. Correct.

21 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Are you saying there has  
22 to be a bifurcated proceeding?

23 MR. LANNET: In many instances, just based  
24 on the guideline sentences that are in place --

25 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Is there historic evidence

1 that bifurcated proceedings were required before  
2 Apprendi?

3 MR. LANNET: No, but I think that this is  
4 just a development of changing legislative choices in  
5 identifying facts. I think Apprendi articulated the  
6 functional path to determine the scope of a jury  
7 trial guarantee when the State attempts to relegate a  
8 fact to a judge rather than a jury.

9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Could I get back to  
10 the question Justice Scalia asked about Apprendi. Is it  
11 -- is it your position that if the offense, based on all  
12 facts found by a jury, carried a maximum sentence of  
13 30 years, but there was a provision that the judge could  
14 determine that if a firearm was not used in the offense,  
15 he would lower it to 10 years, would that pose a  
16 problem under Apprendi?

17 MR. LANNET: In Apprendi I am not sure  
18 that -- that -- I mean it's a question of whether all  
19 the facts have been found by the -- by the jury  
20 authorize the maximum punishment. So --

21 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Then it does. All  
22 the facts authorize a punishment of 30 years. And if  
23 there is going to be a reduction, that's for the judge.  
24 But I would suppose it's not the problem -- we didn't  
25 interpose a jury between the defendant and the State

1 with respect to every element, but only those elements  
2 that increase the punishment.

3 MR. LANNET: Well, the potential penalty the  
4 defendant faces -- and I think that if the penalty of  
5 whether a gun is present or whether a gun is not  
6 present, assuming that that would be enacted by a  
7 legislature, I think that as long as -- I mean the core  
8 question in Apprendi has been is the judge imposing a  
9 penalty within the range authorized by the jury verdict.

10 JUSTICE SCALIA: The core question is is the  
11 defendant entitled, entitled, to get no more than a  
12 certain penalty if a particular fact is found.

13 MR. LANNET: Yes, sir.

14 JUSTICE SCALIA: And the answer would be,  
15 yes, he is entitled if the fact is found that he didn't  
16 use a gun to get a lesser penalty. And once you bring  
17 in the legal entitlement, as I understand Apprendi, it  
18 means that it has to be found by the jury.

19 MR. LANNET: Yes, Your Honor.

20 JUSTICE BREYER: And in addition, it must be  
21 true too that the defendant is entitled not to pay  
22 restitution if the facts show that there was no money  
23 taken. And you needn't, by the way, convict the person.  
24 You can convict him without finding that.

25 So the same would be true of restitution.

1 We would have another jury to decide restitution,  
2 another thing that has never been done; is that right?

3 MR. LANNET: Well, if only because the  
4 legislative scheme in place doesn't give the court  
5 authority to impose restitutions based solely on the  
6 jury's verdict.

7 JUSTICE BREYER: No, couldn't impose  
8 restitution without making a finding as to how much  
9 money was taken. So I don't -- I don't -- I can't  
10 imagine the legislature --

11 MR. LANNET: The Oregon appellate courts  
12 have decided otherwise --

13 JUSTICE BREYER: All right. The Federal  
14 courts have not and I guess the same rule would apply.  
15 Or what about forfeiture of a car used in the drug --  
16 again, forfeiture, I guess, would take place with  
17 another jury being impanelled to try the question of  
18 whether there was a car; is that right?

19 MR. LANNET: If -- if it was a fact that was  
20 necessary for the punishment, I think that follows  
21 within the rule of Apprendi.

22 JUSTICE BREYER: It's a punishment.

23 MR. LANNET: Although in Apprendi there was  
24 a concern about elements being shifted from --

25 JUSTICE BREYER: Maybe not. Maybe it would

1 just be an in rem proceeding. What about the -- what  
2 about the proceeding -- what about the determination  
3 that a person who is going to trial goes to an adult  
4 court rather than a juvenile court, the difference being  
5 the extent of the punishment? You are not entitled  
6 to -- a complete defense to the punishments that they  
7 could impose. Do you see where I am going?

8 MR. LANNET: I believe --

9 JUSTICE BREYER: I'm not sure which of these  
10 things would actual follow from your rule and which  
11 wouldn't.

12 MR. LANNET: I think legislatively that the  
13 general statutes would set the maximum penalty as being  
14 punished as an adult and the juvenile system would be a  
15 different type of system.

16 JUSTICE BREYER: But they will say no one  
17 can get this lower punishment for the juvenile system  
18 unless the person is indeed a juvenile. Who makes that  
19 factual finding?

20 MR. LANNET: Well, Your Honor, the bright-  
21 line rule of Apprendi as it applies to sentencing in  
22 this case is a question of what the judge can impose in  
23 a proceeding that was initiated --

24 JUSTICE BREYER: If we are going to depart  
25 from what the Framers did in fact foresee in this kind

1 of case and we do accept Apprendi as something different  
2 from what they did apply, does that require us to depart  
3 as well in all these other cases which have the kinds of  
4 differences that you have listed?

5 MR. LANNET: I believe that this Court  
6 already has. For instance, in Greene, under common  
7 law a defendant who committed a capital offense was  
8 subject to the death penalty and it was only upon -- and  
9 the trial court would get to exercise discretion whether  
10 to impose it. The Arizona legislature identified those  
11 facts and said, we are not trying to shift elements to  
12 the jury, these were never questions for the jury, but  
13 rather we are only merely trying to guide the court's  
14 discretion.

15 JUSTICE STEVENS: May I ask you a rather  
16 broad question?

17 MR. LANNET: Yes, sir.

18 JUSTICE STEVENS: In Apprendi the opinions  
19 were rather lengthy and discussed precedents at great  
20 length. Justice Thomas's opinion was quite scholarly  
21 and I discussed a lot of old cases. If this case that  
22 we have today had arisen before Apprendi was decided,  
23 what case would you have supporting your position?

24 MR. LANNET: I believe I would have Jones v.  
25 the United States and I think that it would be --

1 JUSTICE STEVENS: I didn't hear that.

2 MR. LANNET: Jones, where the --

3 JUSTICE STEVENS: Jones --

4 MR. LANNET: Jones v. the United States,  
5 where this Court interpreted this as a matter of  
6 constitutional doubt.

7 JUSTICE STEVENS: What if it had arisen  
8 before Jones?

9 MR. LANNET: Then I think that it would --  
10 that this Court, if it engaged in the historical  
11 analysis it did and see that, yes --

12 JUSTICE STEVENS: And then the historical  
13 analysis would include citation to what cases?

14 MR. LANNET: I believe the cases that were  
15 cited -- I don't think --

16 JUSTICE STEVENS: All the cases in Apprendi  
17 dealt with elements of the crime and that sort of thing.

18 MR. LANNET: Yes. But this Court looked at  
19 that practice and decided that what was not at issue was  
20 the legislative identified elements as being found by  
21 the jury, rather the underlying concern, the core  
22 concern, the tradition that this Court thought that the  
23 framers wanted to enshrine in the Sixth Amendment is  
24 that the judge's authority to punish is both created and  
25 limited by the factual findings of a jury.

1                   CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:  What if under the  
2                   law the judge upon sentencing is supposed to make a  
3                   determination of where the defendant should be sent,  
4                   which facility, based on determination of which one has  
5                   the most room.  Is that a determination that has to be  
6                   made by the jury?

7                   MR. LANNET:  I believe that that -- that can  
8                   be distinguished, because it would be a  
9                   determination not based on punishment and not to impose  
10                  a punishment on defendant.  However, if --

11                  CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:  Even if one was, you  
12                  know, the most horrendous prison in history and the  
13                  other was one of -- a country club?

14                  MR. LANNET:  No, I believe this Court has  
15                  repeatedly stated in -- in downstream like decisions  
16                  after convictions that whenever someone was convicted of  
17                  an offense and sentenced to incarceration by executive  
18                  agency, you are subject to the policies of that agency  
19                  and there may be certain due process protections.

20                  CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:  Yes, but here in my  
21                  hypothetical it's something that a judge puts in the  
22                  sentence.  It's just like you've got to, you know, make  
23                  restitution, you are not eligible for parole, you are  
24                  going to this place rather than that place.

25                  MR. LANNET:  Well, this Court has identified

1 a bright-line rule that it's not the particular of the  
2 fact whether it would be something that would be  
3 historically found by the jury, but rather if the fact  
4 functions to increase punishment. I think I have  
5 trouble with the hypothetical saying that the  
6 different -- the different classification is sent to a  
7 different institution is intended as a punishment and  
8 not within the operations of the -- of the incarceration  
9 institution overall.

10 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Lannet, if we agree  
11 with your position and let's say you are engaged by the  
12 Oregon legislature and they say to you: We don't want  
13 to make this just leave the judge's discretion alone,  
14 what can we do to achieve constitutionally what we were  
15 trying to achieve, that is to say encourage as the main  
16 rule but -- that is, if we have to leave it to the  
17 judge's discretion but we want to rein in that  
18 discretion so that you don't have arbitrary differences  
19 going from one judge to another?

20 They want -- they want to say, yeah, we  
21 wanted this to be discretionary with the judge, but we  
22 want to install certain controls so that the trial  
23 judges will be operating more or less uniformly. How  
24 could they do that constitutionally?

25 MR. LANNET: I think they could do as they

1 are doing since Oregon v. ICE was decided, and that is  
2 that juries are finding those facts, and that a trial  
3 court does not have to impose a consecutive sentence.  
4 Rather --

5 JUSTICE GINSBURG: The juries are find --  
6 that's what is going on now, the juries are as part of  
7 the trial of guilt?

8 MR. LANNET: Or in a bifurcated  
9 proceeding much the way the aggravating factors under  
10 Oregon's guidelines assumes they are being handled in  
11 the wake of --

12 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Which is it? Do they do  
13 it in the guilt trial or is that up to the judge?

14 MR. LANNET: It falls into the division of  
15 what is defined as offense-related or offender-related  
16 factors. I think that these would come in as offense  
17 related and probably be in the main trial.

18 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Where -- where a defense  
19 attorney might not want all of that stuff to come out.

20 MR. LANNET: Well, this Court has observed  
21 repeatedly that -- that the right to a jury trial is one  
22 that can be waived, and so the defendants have the  
23 opportunity to not exercise those rights. This is just  
24 that -- it's a right for the defendant but it's also the  
25 constitutional role that this Court has identified as

1 being the jury role in our system. It -- it both  
2 authorizes, creates the authority to impose  
3 punishment and also sets the maximum.

4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What if the -- what  
5 if the rule were that all sentences should be concurrent  
6 unless the defendant has been convicted of a prior  
7 federal offense and then the sentence runs consecutively  
8 to the federal sentence?

9 MR. LANNET: Well, if that was -- if the  
10 Almendarez-Torres prior conviction exception is a Sixth  
11 Amendment issue, which the Court has stated that it is,  
12 then I believe that there would not be required a jury  
13 finding, much like if the legislature identified facts  
14 that would be reflected in the jury's verdict, or  
15 reverted back to the common law rule which gave the  
16 trial court authority to impose a consecutive sentence  
17 merely on the basis that there was a conviction. I  
18 think that the facts identified by the Oregon  
19 legislature here are quite different than what would  
20 qualify as the Almendarez-Torres exception. That  
21 exception -- the basis that it has if we rationalize  
22 consistent with the rule is that a fact of a prior  
23 conviction has already been established in accordance  
24 with the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. These are  
25 facts about the offense for which a consecutive sentence

1 is contemplated. So, these are facts about the offense  
2 that is being litigated at that moment. And the Oregon  
3 legislature has predicated the greater penalty of a  
4 consecutive sentence on those facts, and Apprendi  
5 instructs that when the legislature does so, the  
6 defendant has a right to have a jury find that fact  
7 beyond a unreasonable doubt before the State can rely it  
8 on to impose that greater penalty.

9 JUSTICE SOUTER: Mr. Lannet, one of the --  
10 or perhaps the driving force behind Apprendi was the  
11 fear of abuse by a combination of the charging power and  
12 the sentencing power. What abuse do you see if -- if  
13 you lose this case? What potential abuse?

14 MR. LANNET: Well, I think that it would  
15 send a message to legislatures that they can enact  
16 statutory schemes that have -- that allow for many  
17 instances where consecutive sentences are authorized  
18 based on the facts and that those facts do not implicate  
19 a Apprendi role, and therefore is a --

20 JUSTICE SOUTER: That it would --

21 MR. LANNET: Yes. I'm sorry.

22 JUSTICE SOUTER: No, I didn't mean to  
23 interrupt.

24 MR. LANNET: To set maximum punishment based  
25 on consecutiveness rather than, as they were doing under

1 the guideline system, by allowing a range and requiring  
2 facts to exceed that range.

3 JUSTICE SOUTER: They -- they would do by  
4 consecutive sentencing the same sort of thing that they  
5 were trying to do or some legislatures, Congress was  
6 trying to do by the sentencing factors?

7 MR. LANNET: I believe that at least it  
8 raises the possibility of that, yes.

9 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Is there any room for  
10 harmless error here? I mean, it seems to me patently  
11 obvious that both of the statutory conditions were fully  
12 satisfied. It was within -- put it within the  
13 discretion of the judge.

14 MR. LANNET: Well, I think this Court should  
15 not find those errors harmless beyond a reasonable doubt  
16 for several reasons: First, the State has the burden of  
17 proof that it's harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and  
18 has not attempted to do before the Oregon courts, the  
19 appellate courts; it has not done so before this Court.  
20 I think the Oregon Supreme Court necessarily concluded  
21 that this --

22 JUSTICE STEVENS: I mean, is there any doubt  
23 that he wanted to commit an offense twice?

24 MR. LANNET: I think that raises an issue  
25 of statutory interpretation. I think that that is one

1 of the issues --

2 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But statutory  
3 interpretation questions aren't for the jury.

4 MR. LANNET: You are right, Your Honor, but  
5 they are the ones for the Oregon Supreme Court in this  
6 instance, and the Oregon Supreme Court narrowly  
7 concluded that the findings of the jury found -- did not  
8 establish the factual predicate to impose consecutive  
9 sentences; however, they did not go into a comprehensive  
10 analysis of what precisely those facts are, and in fact  
11 the State -- the Petitioner here is actively litigating  
12 the meaning of the statutory provisions at this point.  
13 So it really is unclear what precisely are the facts  
14 meant by this -- by the statutory terms.

15 I think it would put this Court in a  
16 position to interpret the State statute in the first  
17 instance, and disagree with the Oregon Supreme Court's  
18 implicit conclusion, because it's under a State  
19 constitutional requirement and also this Court's  
20 requirement that it cannot reverse a lower court unless  
21 it concludes that an error is harmless beyond a  
22 reasonable doubt.

23 JUSTICE GINSBURG: It held as far as the  
24 State constitution went, this is fine. It's only the  
25 Federal Constitution that stopped the legislature from

1 doing this.

2 MR. LANNET: Yes, I would acknowledge that  
3 there is no analysis in the written decision, and that  
4 is part of the problem because it didn't identify the  
5 particular facts and conduct a harmless error analysis  
6 for the benefit of this Court.

7 However, the court heard this case with a --  
8 in a consolidated argument with State v. Gray, in which  
9 it did address the State's harmless error argument and  
10 recognized that, in Washington v. Recuenco, this Court  
11 had said that Apprendi is subject to harmless error  
12 analysis.

13 So, I think necessary in the Oregon Supreme  
14 Court reversing the lower court's decision is its  
15 conclusion that this error was not harmless beyond a  
16 reasonable doubt. And subsequent to this case, the  
17 Oregon Supreme Court decided State versus Hagburn -- and  
18 I have a citation for that, if you like. It's -- and  
19 that is identified -- it addresses the State's harmless  
20 error question. The citation is 345 Or. 161, and that's  
21 regional reporter 190 P.3d 1209. And in that case we  
22 had sexual offenses arising out of the same general  
23 factual scenario, where a young victim testified that  
24 she was abused in two different rooms on two different  
25 days, and the Oregon Supreme Court said there is no

1 factual default in our consecutive sentencing system  
2 that let -- the jury was not decided that this occurred  
3 during the same criminal episode or during a separate  
4 criminal episode. And in light of the vague testimony  
5 by the victim, they could not conclude that a jury would  
6 have found that.

7 So I believe that the -- that to the extent  
8 that the Oregon Supreme Court has analyzed the statute,  
9 that I think that it would -- it backs up the conclusion  
10 that it found this not to be harmless beyond a  
11 reasonable doubt.

12 JUSTICE GINSBURG: One way of -- if you are  
13 right about the application of Apprendi -- the Oregon  
14 legislature could say as a main rule is we leave it to  
15 the judge's discretion. However, before the judge makes  
16 a sentence consecutive, the judge should take account of  
17 the following factors. That would be okay?

18 MR. LANNET: I believe so, if that kind of  
19 statutory provision was interpreted like you are  
20 suggesting, that the court has authority based solely on  
21 the jury's verdict and is merely exercising its  
22 discretion and there is no requisite factfinding or the  
23 -- even the requirement to find a fact to impose a  
24 consecutive sentence, then I think it wouldn't praise an  
25 Apprendi issue.

1 JUSTICE SCALIA: No entitlement to a lesser  
2 sentence?

3 MR. LANNET: No entitlement to a lesser  
4 sentence, Your Honor. Thank you.

5 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Even if it's subject  
6 to judicial review for abuse of discretion?

7 MR. LANNET: I believe so. I think that  
8 this Court has --

9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: That doesn't give  
10 you an entitlement to that, to the exercise of  
11 discretion that isn't abused?

12 MR. LANNET: Not an entitlement that is  
13 based solely on the facts found by the jury's verdict.  
14 I don't believe it would.

15 Ultimately, this case was just an  
16 application of the Apprendi rule. The State asked this  
17 Court to replace that bright-line functional rule with  
18 some yet unidentified criteria for identifying  
19 constitutionally protected elements. It hasn't really  
20 offered this Court with any suggestion of what those  
21 constitutionally protected elements are except to say  
22 that the facts at issue in this statute are not those.  
23 At a minimum the State asks for an exception to the  
24 Apprendi rule based on historical reasoning about an  
25 allegation that this was only meant to control the

1 discretion of the sentencing court and it didn't shift  
2 any elements. And that kind of argument was explicitly  
3 rejected in Blakely, Booker, and Cunningham. The Oregon  
4 Legislature authorized consecutive sentence as greater  
5 penalty only for offenses committed under certain  
6 factual circumstances. Those facts, not the jury -- not  
7 found by the jury -- increase the defendant's penalty  
8 from 7-1/2 years to over 28 years.

9 Affirming the decision below would adhere  
10 the bright-line rule in Apprendi and it would preserve  
11 the jury's role in finding each fact that authorizes the  
12 maximum punishment. Thank you.

13 JUSTICE BREYER: Counsel, don't -- well, the  
14 case that I mentioned on my account. I'm thinking about  
15 it -- it's not going to make any difference.

16 MR. LANNET: Thank you very much.

17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Ms. Williams. You  
18 have four minutes.

19 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF MARY H. WILLIAMS

20 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

21 MS. WILLIAMS: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.

22 What the State is advocating for here is not  
23 an abandonment or a modification of the Apprendi rule,  
24 but a limitation of the Apprendi rule to the cases in  
25 which this -- the circumstances in which this Court has

1 applied it so far. The Apprendi rule has been applied  
2 as a bright-line test for deciding when a sentence for a  
3 specific conviction satisfies the Sixth Amendment.  
4 And the way it operates is the rule itself tells us what  
5 are the necessary facts that the jury must find, and so  
6 there doesn't need to be any new rule to determine what  
7 are those constitutionally protected facts. The  
8 Apprendi rule does that for us by saying that any fact  
9 that exposes a defendant in a particular conviction and  
10 sentence to a greater penalty based on -- that -- based  
11 on a fact that the jury has not found, is the functional  
12 equivalent of an element if we had looked historically  
13 at what the jury's role was. And so, therefore, that  
14 additional factfinding, if it exposes the defendant to a  
15 -- a longer penalty, a greater penalty for a specific  
16 conviction, it must be found by the jury. And that is  
17 how the Court has applied the rule to this point.

18 So all we are asking is that the Court  
19 clarify that that is the full scope of the Apprendi  
20 rule. And the reason for that is again, going back to  
21 what this Court said in Blakely, that the Sixth  
22 Amendment is only a reservation of jury power. And here  
23 what we have here is something that is entirely a  
24 judicial determination -- that historically has always  
25 been a judicial determination -- and the only overlay we

1 now have is a legislative effort to regulate that  
2 judicial authority through the mechanism of requiring  
3 factfinding.

4 It's something that the legislature often  
5 does, is to try to regulate judicial discretion by  
6 requiring factfinding and by limiting the kinds of facts  
7 the judge may consider. And that's what is being done  
8 in this case without removing anything from the purview  
9 of the jury. And so we would ask that this Court  
10 reverse the Oregon Supreme Court. Thank you.

11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.  
12 The case is submitted.

13 (Whereupon, at 1:53 p.m., the case in the  
14 above-entitled matter was submitted.)

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<b>A</b>				
<b>abandonment</b> 45:23	<b>adopted</b> 18:5 28:18	30:14	34:7	<b>based</b> 3:17 12:25 21:11
<b>ability</b> 4:5 10:12	<b>adult</b> 17:13 32:3 32:14	<b>antimerger</b> 25:6	<b>arises</b> 22:15	28:23 29:11
<b>able</b> 12:16,25	<b>advocated</b> 22:8 22:13	<b>anyway</b> 16:25	<b>arising</b> 11:1 42:22	31:5 35:4,9
<b>above-entitled</b> 1:11 47:14	<b>advocating</b> 45:22	<b>APPEARAN...</b> 1:14	<b>Arizona</b> 33:10	39:18,24 43:20
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