

1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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3 LORENZO PRADO NAVARETTE :

4 AND JOSE PRADO NAVARETTE, :

5 Petitioners : No. 12-9490

6 v. :

7 CALIFORNIA :

8 - - - - - x

9 Washington, D.C.

10 Tuesday, January 21, 2014

11

12 The above-entitled matter came on for oral  
13 argument before the Supreme Court of the United States  
14 at 1:00 p.m.

15 APPEARANCES:

16 PAUL R. KLEVEN, ESQ., Berkeley, California; on behalf of  
17 Petitioners, appointed by this Court.

18 JEFFREY M. K. LAURENCE, ESQ., Supervising Deputy  
19 Attorney General, San Francisco, California; on  
20 behalf of Respondents.

21 RACHEL P. KOVNER, ESQ., Assistant to the Solicitor  
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23 United States, as amicus curiae, supporting  
24 Respondents.

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1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 (1:00 p.m.)

3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear argument  
4 in Case 12-9490, Navarette v. California.

5 Mr. Kleven.

6 ORAL ARGUMENT OF PAUL R. KLEVEN,

7 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS,

8 APPOINTED BY THIS COURT

9 MR. KLEVEN: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it  
10 please the Court:

11 In this case, the Court should hold that  
12 officers acting on anonymous tips must corroborate the  
13 tips' assertions of illegal conduct, as well as the  
14 identifying details before making a stop, whether that  
15 tip involves erratic driving, illegal gun possession, or  
16 any other allegation of misconduct.

17 Now, the State proposes that the reasonable  
18 suspicion rule in-- established in Terry v. Ohio, which  
19 courts and law enforcement officials have been applying  
20 now for more than 40 years, should be altered so that,  
21 now, it applies as a sliding scale where the level of  
22 suspicion varies depending on the nature of the crime  
23 that an anonymous tipster claims someone has committed.

24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So if the tip -- so  
25 if the tip is, is this car is driving by and throwing

1 bombs out the window, okay, every -- you know, whatever,  
2 500 yards, the police find the car, they have to wait  
3 until they see the person actually throw a bomb out the  
4 window themselves, before pulling them over?

5 MR. KLEVEN: Well, Your Honor, in terms of  
6 the reasonable suspicion, yes. If there -- if all they  
7 have is an anonymous tip and there is no -- they have no  
8 way of corroborating any of the -- any of the innocent  
9 details, except that they can identify the car, then,  
10 yes, under --

11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So your answer is  
12 yes, the car is going there, and he's throwing a bomb  
13 out, and it goes off, but he has to wait till he sees  
14 them throw out another bomb?

15 MR. KLEVEN: Your Honor, under the  
16 Florida-J.L., the Court has said that when they are  
17 looking -- when all that they are able to corroborate  
18 are obvious reasonably observable details, such as that,  
19 then there is no basis for the Court to go beyond  
20 that -- and

21 JUSTICE GINSBURG: I thought that -- that  
22 J.L. gave an example of an exception that the report is  
23 somebody is carrying a bomb?

24 MR. KLEVEN: Well, there is that exception,  
25 Your Honor. And in Florida-J.L, it said that it was

1 not -- the Court said that it was not required on the  
2 facts of that case to speculate about a situation where  
3 such a serious danger --

4 JUSTICE SCALIA: Throwing bombs doesn't  
5 count, but carrying a bomb does, is that it? Were they  
6 throwing bombs that they weren't carrying?

7 MR. KLEVEN: Your Honor, that would not make  
8 a difference. However, in this case, in terms of  
9 adjusting the reasonable suspicion standard, the Court  
10 should not address that. The Court has never said --

11 JUSTICE ALITO: Excuse me. I'm sorry.  
12 Could I ask you what you mean by an "anonymous tip"?  
13 Suppose somebody calls up 911 and gives a name? Does  
14 that make it not an anonymous tip?

15 MR. KLEVEN: Your Honor, technically, it  
16 would not be, but in the circumstances here, I think it  
17 should be treated as an anonymous tip because, again,  
18 the name could be false when the tip first comes in. If  
19 it's corroborated in some way, then --

20 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, how would you  
21 corroborate it? Let's say the person calls up and gives  
22 a name and gives an address? So what would be  
23 necessary? What would the police have to do then before  
24 they could stop the vehicle, other than observing the  
25 vehicle do something illegal?

Official

1           MR. KLEVEN:           Well again, if all they have is an  
2   assertion by the -- by the tipster that this is the name  
3   and the address, and if the officers can somehow, again,  
4   by caller identification or some other method verify  
5   that, in fact, that is the person so that, somewhere  
6   down the line, that person will be -- will be held  
7   accountable for a false tip, then it can be treated  
8   differently.

9           CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:           Well, what if you  
10   have caller ID. I mean, you have one of these anonymous  
11   flip phones, right? You can buy them, it's prepaid.  
12   You call up and say, I'm -- you know, John Smith, I've  
13   seen this, and they look, there's the caller, there's  
14   the number.

15           Then they can do it.

16           MR. KLEVEN:           No, Your Honor. That would not-- If all they  
17   have is a number, then they are not going to be able to  
18   use that as a basis for --

19           CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:           Well, isn't that all  
20   caller ID gives you?

21           MR. KLEVEN:           Well, with caller ID, if they  
22   are somehow able to verify, not just that this is coming  
23   from this phone, but that, in fact, there's a particular  
24   person there, if they can identify the location, that  
25   sort of thing. As the -- as the tip gets more and more

1 like the known informant in the Adams case, then the court--  
2 officers can take more solace in the fact that that  
3 person is going to be able to be held responsible.

4 In Adams, of course, there's a situation  
5 where there is a known informant who can be arrested  
6 immediately if, in fact, the tip turns out to be false.  
7 The problem with so many of these cases, with the 911  
8 tape -- 911 caller, is that even if -- is that there's  
9 not going to be any sort of accountability even if they  
10 do manage to identify the person in terms of showing the  
11 tip is false where the allegation, for example, is  
12 weaving.

13 There's no way to prove that that --

14 JUSTICE ALITO: If we transport the standard  
15 that applies outside of the vehicle context to this  
16 context, what would happen in this situation? A person  
17 calls up and says, this is my name, this is my address  
18 and it's -- it's not blocked by caller ID, so the 911  
19 operator can see that that's the name, that's the  
20 address.

21 The person says, this guy ran me off the  
22 road. The police find the vehicle. They drive behind  
23 the vehicle for a while. They don't -- they don't see  
24 any -- they don't see any violation. So then they  
25 think, well, this guy must have lied.

1           So are they going to prosecute the guy for  
2 calling -- calling that in?

3           MR. KLEVEN:           No, Your Honor, because still  
4 they wouldn't be able to prosecute them because the fact  
5 that the vehicle is now not weaving doesn't show that  
6 they were -- that it was or was not weaving --

7           JUSTICE ALITO:        I mean, your argument goes  
8 well beyond. You're saying this has to do with  
9 anonymous tips, but it really goes well beyond anonymous  
10 tips. It covers tips where you know exactly who called  
11 in, and what you're saying is that they really can never  
12 stop a vehicle no matter what kind of a tip they get,  
13 unless they see the vehicle committing an illegal act.  
14 That's the argument.

15          MR. KLEVEN:           No, Your Honor. I'm sorry.  
16 No, I don't think it goes that far, Your Honor. I think  
17 as the tip becomes -- as the tip contains more detail  
18 and as the tipster becomes more accountable for a false  
19 tip, again, getting more over toward the Adams v.  
20 Kennedy, then, at some point, the anonymous tip would be  
21 or that the tip --

22          JUSTICE ALITO:        Well, give me an example of a  
23 situation in which the police can pull somebody over  
24 after receiving a tip without actually seeing the  
25 vehicle commit an illegal act?



1           MR. KLEVEN:           I think, Your Honor, in a  
2 situation where the caller calls in, says I'm -- I've  
3 been -- this car is driving erratically. The caller  
4 then says, I'm following the car. Now, we're at  
5 such-and-such a location. The vehicle has just done  
6 something else that's wrong.

7           And they continue to follow up to the point  
8 where, okay, I can now see the -- the patrol car coming  
9 up, again, where the tipster is putting his or her  
10 credibility on the line and becomes more and more  
11 accountable towards the Adams v. Kennedy known  
12 informant, then if you add that together under the  
13 totality of the circumstances, then you will have a  
14 situation probably to do it.

15           I think it's going to be rare, and I think  
16 it should be rare because it is so easy -- as the Court  
17 has indicated, the Court has shown skepticism for  
18 anonymous tips because the tipsters are able to harass  
19 other people without running any risk of being held  
20 accountable.

21           And it should be particularly skeptical in  
22 the case of anonymous tips about erratic driving  
23 because, with the ubiquitous cell phones, it's so easy  
24 for somebody who's on the road, who's been annoyed by  
25 somebody else, to just pull out the cell phone and call

1 in a false tip.

2 And so --

3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Do we have any  
4 indication that this is a serious problem? The false  
5 tips?

6 MR. KLEVEN: Well, there's no empirical  
7 evidence in the record. However, it was the same  
8 concern that led the Court, in J.L., to refuse to adopt  
9 the firearm exception, the concern that making it so  
10 easy for people to subject others to the harassment of  
11 a -- of a stop and -- and potential -- potential search  
12 concerned the Court enough that it denied -- it refused  
13 to adopt the firearm exception.

14 And in this case, we have a firearm  
15 exception -- we have an exception that's being requested  
16 that's doctrinally the same as a firearm exception.  
17 There is-- there is no indication in the record that drunk  
18 driving on its own, in totality, presents a more serious  
19 threat to public safety than -- than firearms do.

20 In fact, it --

21 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, is that -- is  
22 that true? I mean, how many people die from drunk  
23 driving versus how many people dry--die from firearms?

24 MR. KLEVEN: The most recent -- the most  
25 recent statistics show a little more, about 11,000

1 people die from homicides by firearms, and it's usually  
2 under 10,000 now that are driving -- dying by drunk  
3 driving.

4 And in terms of public safety, approximately  
5 two-thirds of the people who die as a result of drunk  
6 driving are the drunk drivers themselves. So, in fact,  
7 the overall threat to public safety is not as great when  
8 you're talking about drunk driving as -- as with  
9 firearms.

10 And the Court indicated, in J.L., that it  
11 was specifically concerned about the serious threat that  
12 armed criminals pose to public safety, and, despite that  
13 serious threat, they denied -- the Court denied the  
14 firearms exception.

15 Now, what the -- excuse me.

16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I was just going to  
17 say, we have held that the -- the standards are loosened  
18 in the vehicle context because your expectation of  
19 privacy is diminished when you're out on the road  
20 driving along in -- in a vehicle. Does that have any  
21 pertinence?

22 MR. KLEVEN: I don't think so in this case,  
23 Your Honor, because even though it's diminished as  
24 opposed to, for example, in the home, it's -- in J.L.,  
25 of course, the person was on a public sidewalk; the

1 person was not in the home.

2 And in -- in Prouse, the Court talked about  
3 the fact that, in modern day times, people -- a lot of  
4 people will feel more of a sense of security, they'll  
5 feel more privacy in a vehicle than they would out on  
6 the street.

7 JUSTICE KAGAN: But in the context in which  
8 we've approved sobriety checkpoints, why should we get  
9 bent out of shape over this?

10 MR. KLEVEN: Well, Your Honor, in the  
11 sobriety checkpoint case, the Court has looked at the  
12 intrusion and found that to be at the very rock bottom  
13 in terms of intrusion, the fact that somebody is --  
14 along with a number of other people, that they have to  
15 submit to a brief stop, it has put that on the lowest --  
16 on the lowest level.

17 And so it's a -- the Court has not approved  
18 any situation where individual vehicles, as in this  
19 case, are pulled over without reasonable suspicion that,  
20 in fact, somebody in that vehicle is engaged in -- in  
21 criminal activity.

22 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, but why is that an  
23 important line? Why should we be more concerned when an  
24 individual automobile is pulled over?

25 MR. KLEVEN: Well, because the -- the

1 intrusion is greater, Your Honor. And the  
2 Martinez-Fuentes case and the Brignoni-Ponce case, the  
3 Court talked about the very minimal intrusion of the  
4 checkpoints, as opposed to -- and Prouse talks about  
5 this also, that there is a serious intrusion when  
6 somebody is pulled over.

7         You have the activation of the emergency  
8 lights, you have a siren, you're pulled over, possibly,  
9 in a neighborhood where -- where you're known and people  
10 see it, possibly out in the middle of a road in the  
11 middle of the night as in the -- the Wells case. And in  
12 either circumstance, it is a serious intrusion and one  
13 that people are not going to take that lightly. So  
14 it's -- it's a different situation.

15         And the Court, again, if they're going to be  
16 pulling over individual cars, signaling them out for --  
17 for stops which could, under the Court's rules, again,  
18 the driver, all the passengers can be ordered out of the  
19 car if -- if the Terry standards are met.

20         They can --

21         JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR:             White suggested that we  
22 don't have an absolute rule with respect to requiring  
23 independent corroboration of the actual illegal conduct.  
24 In White, the -- the tipster gave future predictive  
25 information, but all of it was innocent, somebody

1 driving a car and going to a particular place.

2 Now, you're asking us to import that  
3 wholesale. Why don't we just stick to our general  
4 standard, which is the totality of the circumstances,  
5 and look at what failure there is in the logic of the  
6 California court below. It -- it looked at the quality  
7 of the information regarding the vehicle, which is a  
8 legitimate tipster will tell you what the vehicle looks  
9 like and its license plate or enough information so it  
10 can be identified.

11 It looked at the caller actually witnessing  
12 the event and giving you enough detail to know that it's  
13 not a legal conclusion, but an actual event that  
14 suggests recklessness, and a corroboration of the -- of  
15 the details given by the tipster.

16 Isn't that the application of our  
17 traditional test?

18 MR. KLEVEN: No, Your Honor. And that's  
19 exactly what the court was looking at in Florida J.L.--v. J.L.

20 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, that's just not  
21 true in Florida v. J.L. because the individual didn't  
22 match the description completely, and there were two or  
23 three individuals there, not just one, and so -- and  
24 there was no predictive or no other detail, other than  
25 someone in this general area.

1 MR. KLEVEN: Well, there was no predictive  
2 detail, but in J.L., the tip was young black male in a  
3 plaid shirt at a bus stop. Those details were  
4 confirmed.

5 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Correct me if -- if I'm  
6 wrong. I might be missing something. The tip in J.L.  
7 was not a -- did not assert that a crime was being  
8 committed, so there was something suspicious. There was  
9 no crime in possession of the gun. Or correct me if I'm  
10 wrong.

11 MR. KLEVEN: Well, it was -- it was  
12 Possession of the gun --

13 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But -- but here -- here,  
14 there was -- the report was a crime. Or is that not a  
15 correct distinction?

16 MR. KLEVEN: Well, in -- in J.L., they  
17 didn't say illegal gun possession, but presumably, the  
18 tipster thought it was an illegal gun possession, and  
19 the officer must have thought it was illegal gun  
20 possession.

21 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well --

22 JUSTICE SCALIA: And it was illegal.

23 MR. KLEVEN: What?

24 JUSTICE SCALIA: It was illegal.

25 MR. KLEVEN: Oh, it was because he turned

1 out to be under 21.

2 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But -- but the tip, in and  
3 of itself, did not indicate that a crime was being  
4 committed, which is different from this case.

5 MR. KLEVEN: I'll agree that the tipster  
6 didn't say it, but I think the assumption --

7 JUSTICE KENNEDY: No, I'm talking about an  
8 interpretation of what the tip said.

9 MR. KLEVEN: Well -- unless -- unless  
10 the -- the implication is that the gun possession is  
11 illegal, then there's no reason for the officer to --

12 JUSTICE KENNEDY: No, a Terry stop.

13 MR. KLEVEN: Hmm?

14 JUSTICE KENNEDY: You might have had grounds  
15 for a Terry stop.

16 MR. KLEVEN: But if -- if the tip calls --  
17 if the tips says, I'm looking at a case of gun  
18 possession that, as far as I know, is perfectly legal,  
19 it's like, in this case, if the tip came in and said,  
20 I've just been passed by a car whose -- which was driven  
21 very skillfully, there's no point in -- in pursuing the  
22 tip in J.L., unless there's some -- some element of  
23 illegality.

24 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, I -- I think there's  
25 a difference, but I think, for our purposes, we can



Official

1 assume that the cases are comparable in that respect --

2 MR. KLEVEN: Okay.

3 JUSTICE KENNEDY: -- but not comparable,  
4 perhaps, in others.

5 MR. KLEVEN: Okay.

6 Justice Sotomayor, going back to -- to  
7 your concern, so in Florida v. J.L., those elements  
8 were -- were confirmed and -- but the Court found that  
9 the fact that those elements which could be observable  
10 by anybody who was looking at the situation and probably  
11 even more clearly an observation where the plaid shirt  
12 was identified, that that didn't give any reason to  
13 believe that the person was also being truthful in  
14 talking about concealment.

15 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: No reason to believe the  
16 caller had personal knowledge.

17 MR. KLEVEN: Pardon me?

18 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: No reason to believe the  
19 person had personal knowledge.

20 MR. KLEVEN: Well, but personal knowledge --

21 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: He didn't say that the  
22 gun was pulled on him or that -- or how he saw it or how  
23 he knew.

24 MR. KLEVEN: Right. There was no indication  
25 as to how the person knew about the gun.

1 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So you don't think  
2 there's something significant about calling up and  
3 saying, someone forced me off the road?

4 MR. KLEVEN: Well, there is something  
5 significant, Your Honor. But, by itself, that just  
6 gives the officers some reason to go check and see  
7 whether, in fact, there's a chance to corroborate.

8 In the case of an inebriated driver, the  
9 fact that the driver is inebriated is concealed in the  
10 same way that J.L.'s gun was, unless there's some sort  
11 of erratic driving going on.

12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What if there's no  
13 way for the officer to corroborate the allegation? You  
14 know, you see -- see somebody on the street grab a young  
15 child, throw her in the trunk of the car, and then take  
16 off.

17 And somebody calls with an anonymous tip  
18 saying, this fellow -- you know, in this car, has got a  
19 child in the trunk. The police can follow the person --  
20 you know, for hours and they're not going to see any  
21 corroborating evidence.

22 Can they pull that car over?

23 MR. KLEVEN: Well, Your Honor, if -- if  
24 that's all they have to go on, then, under Florida v.  
25 J.L., they would not --

1 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So just -- your  
2 answer in that case is that the police cannot pull that  
3 car over?

4 MR. KLEVEN: If -- in terms of -- obviously,  
5 it's a more serious situation, but the Court has not  
6 held that the seriousness --

7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, let's expand  
8 it a little bit. It's a -- it's a one-lane -- two-lane  
9 road going down, but it merges into -- you know, an  
10 eight-lane expressway. You have one police car. It's  
11 going to be hard for that police car to maintain  
12 surveillance. And you say they've just got to let them  
13 go.

14 MR. KLEVEN: Well, Your Honor, if you're  
15 talking in terms of just the seriousness and you're  
16 looking in terms of the Florida v. J.L. exception, the  
17 Court seemed to be indicating, in that case, that there  
18 would be a danger that was so extreme where the Court  
19 would find a search or a stop justified without any  
20 showing of --

21 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, just in terms  
22 of your position, do you think they could pull the car  
23 over?

24 MR. KLEVEN: No, Your Honor. I don't think  
25 it would change.

1 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Really? Okay.

2 MR. KLEVEN: Because, again, it's just  
3 the -- the seriousness of the claim should not affect  
4 whether there is, in fact, reasonable suspicion.

5 JUSTICE KENNEDY: You get an A for  
6 consistency. I'm -- I'm not sure about common sense.

7 (Laughter.)

8 JUSTICE SCALIA: I'm -- I'm not sure he gets  
9 an A for consistency. I thought -- I thought you said  
10 you acknowledged or didn't repudiate the statement in --  
11 in our opinion in J.L., that, if there was a bomb in the  
12 car, that would be something else.

13 What -- what if there's in the car -- the  
14 tip is this person has an atomic bomb given him by Al  
15 Qaeda; he is driving it into the center of Los Angeles  
16 to -- to eradicate the entire city, okay?

17 Let it go?

18 MR. KLEVEN: Your Honor, I believe --

19 JUSTICE SCALIA: He tells you the license  
20 number, where the car is. You can't stop the car?

21 MR. KLEVEN: I believe, consistent with what  
22 the court said in Florida v. J.L., that may be a  
23 situation, again, where the Court decides that -- that  
24 the risk is so great --

25 JUSTICE SCALIA: So you see, he's not

1 consistent. I mean --

2 MR. KLEVEN: No, but it would not be -- it  
3 should not change -- it should not be in terms of the  
4 level of suspicion required under -- under Terry. The  
5 reasonable suspicion standard should not change on that.  
6 The Court seemed to be indicating, in Florida v. J.L.,  
7 that at some point, the level of danger becomes so great  
8 that, in fact, there was --

9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So the -- the atomic  
10 bomb, the level of danger is great enough, but the young  
11 girl in the trunk, the level of danger is not great  
12 enough?

13 MR. KLEVEN: Your Honor, what I'm saying, in  
14 either of those situations, the Court may want to  
15 consider some sort of exception to the reasonable  
16 suspicion standard and that seems to be --

17 JUSTICE KENNEDY: What is your position what  
18 you would do if you were on this Court, with those  
19 hypotheticals? What is your position that should happen  
20 in those two hypotheticals?

21 MR. KLEVEN: Well, Your Honor, I think that  
22 the Court may well want to -- to craft some --

23 JUSTICE KENNEDY: What is your position as  
24 to what the Court should do in those cases?

25 MR. KLEVEN: Well, let me start off by

1 saying, if I could, that I don't think the Court needs  
2 to reach that question in this case, just as it did not  
3 need to reach that question in J.L.

4 JUSTICE KENNEDY: I understand it, but we're  
5 interested in a hypothetical.

6 MR. KLEVEN: Right. Your Honor, I believe  
7 that, again, I don't know what particular doctrine the  
8 Court would -- would choose, but I think that probably  
9 the Court could find some -- some doctrine that would  
10 allow it, in that circumstance, to find it.

11 But it shouldn't be -- it shouldn't be  
12 moving toward the sliding scale element in -- that --  
13 that we're talking about.

14 JUSTICE BREYER: What about this: In J.L.,  
15 the Court made quite a point of saying, "An accurate  
16 description of a subject's readily observable location  
17 is reliable in a limited -- limited sense, namely,  
18 identifying the person. Such a tip, however, does not  
19 show that the tipster has knowledge of concealed  
20 criminal activity."

21 MR. KLEVEN: That's right.

22 JUSTICE BREYER: All right. Not concealed  
23 here.

24 MR. KLEVEN: I mean --

25 JUSTICE BREYER: So that's an obvious

1 difference. I mean, one case, it was concealed; this  
2 case, it isn't concealed. What do you say?

3 MR. KLEVEN: Oh, but, except, Your Honor, that, in  
4 fact, when we're talking about drunk driving, whether  
5 the person is inebriated or not --

6 JUSTICE BREYER: Didn't -- didn't the tip  
7 here have something to do with his driving around in a  
8 wild way -- or at least an unusual way? I'm not sure I  
9 would have followed him, if it had been me. Anyway, you  
10 see the point.

11 MR. KLEVEN: Right. But the question is,  
12 Your Honor, is the person inebriated or not, to take  
13 the -- the State's best example. And that -- that  
14 issue, that is a concealed element of criminal behavior,  
15 unless the person is actually driving erratically.

16 If the person is driving erratically when  
17 the officers appear, then there's no Fourth Amendment  
18 issue, and it's clear that they have either reasonable  
19 suspicion or probable cause to pull over the vehicle.

20 JUSTICE SCALIA: It seems to me you're  
21 willing to accept our allowing -- or allowing the police  
22 to stop the car with the atom bomb and even allowing the  
23 police to stop the car with the kidnapped girl in the  
24 trunk.

25 Once -- you know, once you give away those,

1 we're just arguing about details, where you draw the  
2 line. Does -- does drunken driving fall on one side or  
3 the other of the line, and some of us may think drunken  
4 driving is -- is pretty serious and probably -- you  
5 know, as serious as having a kidnapped girl in the  
6 trunk.

7 MR. KLEVEN: And, Your Honor, I didn't mean  
8 to concede that the Court should -- should reduce the  
9 level of suspicion for reasonable suspicion in order to  
10 do that --

11 JUSTICE SCALIA: Okay. More than that, I  
12 want you to say the Court shouldn't. Let the car go.  
13 Bye-bye, Los Angeles.

14 JUSTICE KENNEDY: In this case, your -- your  
15 grade for consistency depends on this answer.

16 (Laughter.)

17 MR. KLEVEN: Excuse me?

18 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Your grade for consistency  
19 depends on this answer.

20 MR. KLEVEN: What I'm saying, Your Honors,  
21 is the State is arguing for a sliding scale that changes  
22 things. The Court postulated, in Florida v. J.L., a  
23 situation that was so extreme, that was so unique, that  
24 the Court might decide to address it without even  
25 getting into reasonable suspicion.



1 JUSTICE BREYER: But -- that's why I asked  
2 you, and I pressed the point a little bit, because in  
3 the beginning of your brief, it says that the anonymous  
4 tip, what did you say, indicated that a Ford F-150  
5 pickup truck had run someone off the road.

6 MR. KLEVEN: That's right.

7 JUSTICE BREYER: Now, maybe you do have to be  
8 known specially whether the person's drunk or not, but  
9 you don't have to have some special knowledge of  
10 anything concealed to know if somebody has run somebody  
11 off the road.

12 MR. KLEVEN: But, Your Honor, the -- the  
13 idea of running off the road is concealed --

14 JUSTICE BREYER: Even if the person weren't  
15 drunk, I think it's illegal to run someone else off the  
16 road.

17 (Laughter.)

18 MR. KLEVEN: I'm not disagreeing with Your  
19 Honor.

20 JUSTICE BREYER: No.

21 MR. KLEVEN: What I'm saying is that, unless  
22 the person is still driving erratically by the time that  
23 the officers arrive, then that activity is concealed in  
24 the same way that the question of whether J.L. had a gun  
25 or not was concealed. You can't -- the officers can't

1 see it, and, therefore, there's no reason to treat this  
2 case any differently than the case in J.L.

3 They have to be able to see something like  
4 erratic driving or something else, in order to be able  
5 to corroborate that.

6 JUSTICE SCALIA: And I assume you would --  
7 you would also say, to tie it into Justice Breyer's  
8 question, you would also say that that tip, "Somebody  
9 ran me off the road," would not justify the court -- the  
10 police in stopping the car, just to make sure that this  
11 car was not the one that drove the guy off the road,  
12 right?

13 MR. KLEVEN: That's right, Your Honor.

14 JUSTICE SCALIA: Never mind drunkenness.  
15 The tip doesn't say anything about drunkenness. It just  
16 said, this car drove me off the road. You'd say the  
17 police could not follow that car, pull him over, and --  
18 and ask did you -- did you drive somebody off the road?

19 MR. KLEVEN: Your Honor, absolutely, the  
20 police can follow that car, and that's what they should  
21 do. And, in fact, that's what they did here. In this  
22 case, there was a --

23 JUSTICE SCALIA: Following the car is going  
24 to do them no good as to whether he drove -- drove  
25 somebody off the road. They're not looking for a drunk.

1 They're looking for somebody who drove somebody off the  
2 road, right?

3 MR. KLEVEN: Right. If they can't see any  
4 erratic driving still going on, then where is it going  
5 to go? They're not going to prosecute for the reckless  
6 driving that allegedly took place 19 miles away, and  
7 they have followed that car for an additional --

8 JUSTICE SCALIA: They could if the guy  
9 admitted it, you know.

10 MR. KLEVEN: Other than that, Your Honor --

11 JUSTICE SCALIA: They could play Mutt and  
12 Jeff with him and he -- oh, yeah, I did, yes.

13 MR. KLEVEN: But, Your Honor, the -- the  
14 person who's making the claim is -- is nowhere to be  
15 found. She's gone. There's -- there's nowhere there.  
16 So there's no additional investigation --

17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, but you --  
18 what if -- what if the person said, okay, my name is  
19 this -- you know, my phone number is this; this guy  
20 drove me off the road. They can't corroborate that  
21 until they stop the guy. Or you're saying they have to?  
22 They have to wait, they have to make the call, see if  
23 the guy is there. Are you the guy that just called? So  
24 that guy's got to talk on his cell phone while he's  
25 driving.

1 MR. KLEVEN: Well, what I'm saying is, yes,  
2 they have to verify in some way so that they have some  
3 reason to believe that, in fact, the person that's  
4 telling them this is actually the person that is  
5 being -- so I'd like to reserve the remainder of my  
6 time.

7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.  
8 Mr. Laurence.

9 ORAL ARGUMENT OF JEFFREY M.K. LAURENCE  
10 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

11 MR. LAURENCE: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it  
12 please the Court:

13 A police officer may act on an anonymous tip  
14 that reports reckless or drunk driving by immediately  
15 stopping the vehicle, without waiting to personally  
16 observe dangerous driving that could threaten others.

17 An officer can reasonably rely on such a tip  
18 because the importance of the governmental interest in  
19 protecting the public from the ongoing and immediate  
20 threat of drunk driving outweighs the minimal intrusion  
21 of a traffic stop.

22 Now, Petitioners argue that -- -

23 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Is every reckless  
24 driving drunk driving?

25 MR. LAURENCE: I'm sorry?

1 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Is every reckless  
2 driving drunk driving?

3 MR. LAURENCE: Not every reckless driving is  
4 drunk driving. But a report of reckless driving gives  
5 reasonable suspicion that the person may be drunk, and  
6 that's sufficient for the stop in this case.

7 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: How about if somebody  
8 just calls and says, X vehicle is driving recklessly,  
9 says no more, doesn't describe how, doesn't give you any  
10 details as to how they know it. Is that enough for  
11 reasonable suspicion?

12 MR. LAURENCE: I would say that the term  
13 "reckless" is. And the reason I say that is because  
14 driving is something that's intimately familiar to the  
15 average citizen. And when a citizen is going to call in  
16 and make a report, when they use the language  
17 "reckless," that has meaning. That describes a behavior  
18 that poses an ongoing threat to the public.

19 JUSTICE SCALIA: But not necessarily  
20 drunkenness. I think there -- there are a lot of people  
21 that get tickets for reckless driving who have not  
22 served jail terms for driving drunk. The two are far  
23 from synonymous.

24 MR. LAURENCE: Well, I wouldn't say they're  
25 synonymous, but I would say that one is the indicator of

1 the other because while you can --

2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Why? How about  
3 speeding? There's plenty of people who speed regularly.

4 MR. LAURENCE: I would say a report of  
5 speeding is not sufficient to have reasonable suspicion.

6 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Isn't that reckless  
7 behavior? So how do you know someone who calls -- my  
8 mother, who can't drive above 50, thinks that, when I go  
9 51, that I'm speeding and reckless.

10 MR. LAURENCE: I would say that, once again,  
11 the public has lots of familiarity with driving, and  
12 they can recognize the difference between poor driving  
13 and reckless driving, or something, or drunk driving.  
14 And when people are going to pick up the phone and make  
15 that call to 911, they're doing so because they perceive  
16 a danger on the roadway.

17 And I think while the statistics are sparse  
18 on this, the footnote 2 in the government's brief is  
19 particularly helpful in this regard, in that they note  
20 that for calls that are made to 911 centers for -- that  
21 are tracked by the States, between 25 and 50 percent of  
22 those calls result in arrests. And what that shows is  
23 that the public knows what they see when they make these  
24 calls.

25 This is a far --

1 JUSTICE SCALIA: And -- and between the,  
2 what, 50 and 75 percent, they've stopped people without  
3 just cause.

4 MR. LAURENCE: Yes, but we are talking about  
5 reasonable suspicion. So it doesn't require certainty  
6 or probability.

7 JUSTICE SCALIA: Or they've -- they've  
8 troubled people who shouldn't have been troubled.

9 MR. LAURENCE: That is correct. And that is  
10 always a possibility in the reasonable suspicion  
11 context.

12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What -- what if the  
13 call is -- you know, I'm driving, this guy just drove by  
14 me, I looked over, he didn't have his seatbelt on. I  
15 mean, can the police pull that guy over?

16 MR. LAURENCE: No, I don't believe that  
17 would be sufficient to pull him over because you don't  
18 have any governmental -- you don't have a threat to  
19 public safety in that context.

20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well yeah, there are laws  
21 against driving without a seatbelt because that protects  
22 people's lives.

23 MR. LAURENCE: Certainly, there are laws,  
24 and the officer, I guess, would have reasonable  
25 suspicion that there is a traffic violation, but I don't

1 know that it would rise to the level of implicating  
2 public safety in this context.

3 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, reckless driving  
4 always does, whether it -- whether it's the consequence  
5 of inebritation or not.

6 MR. LAURENCE: Yes.

7 JUSTICE SCALIA: So a simple call saying,  
8 boy, this guy -- you know, he cut in, in front of me.  
9 He's changing lanes too frequently --

10 MR. LAURENCE: Yes.

11 JUSTICE SCALIA: -- that -- that enables the  
12 policeman, without observing any of that reckless  
13 driving, to stop the car further down the road.

14 MR. LAURENCE: Yes. And provided, of  
15 course, that you have the additional details of the  
16 description of the car, the location, that you can --

17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I've never  
18 understood -- what good do those -- you know, let's say  
19 that I'm at a party, I don't like somebody there. I see  
20 they have a couple of drinks. I know what kind of car  
21 he drives. I know the -- I can look at the license  
22 plate.

23 I call -- you know, ten minutes later. I  
24 know where he goes driving home. There's this car.  
25 It's a white whatever. It's got this license plate.



1 It's swerving all over the road.

2 MR. LAURENCE: Well --

3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Whether he is or  
4 not, the police go up, they pull him over and find out,  
5 yeah -- you know, he fails the breathalyzer, and I  
6 get my revenge.

7 MR. LAURENCE: The importance of those  
8 details is that they allow the officers to confirm that  
9 this is a personal observation, which is an important  
10 fact that's noted in Gates, that when you have a report  
11 of personal observation of illegal conduct, we can take  
12 that report more seriously.

13 It's entitled to more credibility than just  
14 a bare --

15 JUSTICE BREYER: My question --

16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I was just going to  
17 say my point is it need not necessarily be a personal  
18 observation of the person operating the car. It may be  
19 prior knowledge. And I gather one of the issues we're  
20 concerned about is people using this to -- you know,  
21 exact revenge or -- or do something else having nothing  
22 to do with whether or not the person is violating the  
23 law on the highway.

24 MR. LAURENCE: Yes, that is true. But if  
25 the personal knowledge -- if the officer can use that

1 personal knowledge to confirm, okay, he was correct  
2 about the report of the car, report of the location,  
3 report of the direction where it's supposed to be going,  
4 then you have some indication that the personal  
5 knowledge is accurate, as opposed to a bare tip when  
6 you're talking about hidden conduct, then you have to  
7 look to predicted details.

8 And that takes us into the J.L. context or  
9 the --

10 JUSTICE KAGAN: If I understand you  
11 correctly, as long as you can identify the car, you need  
12 no specificity as to what the car has actually done. In  
13 other words -- you know, just saying the driver was  
14 reckless is enough. Is that -- is that correct?

15 MR. LAURENCE: Well, I would say that  
16 recklessness carries information that is -- has some  
17 specificity.

18 JUSTICE KAGAN: What would fail your test?

19 MR. LAURENCE: Well, if a caller calls in  
20 and says, I saw him in a bar, he had one drink, he came  
21 out and got on the road and went away. One drink is not  
22 going to rise to the level --

23 JUSTICE BREYER: Yes. But you're just  
24 saying -- I mean, but his basic point is, on the other  
25 side, is these are all variations of the famous white

1 horse defense. You don't know the -- the white horse  
2 defense? Your Honor, my client was innocent because, at  
3 the time of the crime, he was in Yugoslavia wearing a  
4 white horse -- riding a white horse.

5 And to prove it, I have the horse here in  
6 court. You see? I mean, you can't -- it's  
7 bootstrapping to put it more succinctly. All you know  
8 is that somebody came in and quoted -- and said there  
9 was a crime. And that's all you know. And now -- now  
10 when -- when are instances where no more than the report  
11 that it's a crime, that's reasonable suspicion.

12 That's -- give me some other instances where  
13 the courts have upheld, well, that's enough.

14 MR. LAURENCE: Well, if a caller says --

15 JUSTICE BREYER: I'm not saying common  
16 sense. I'm saying what the courts have held. Sorry.

17 (Laughter.)

18 MR. LAURENCE: Where the courts have upheld  
19 based on just a bare tip or --

20 JUSTICE BREYER: Not a bare--, a  
21 description that a crime is occurring, where has --  
22 that's all, I mean, and -- and then we have a question  
23 of, well, is it in the one category or the other?  
24 Because what we have here, someone phones in and says, a  
25 crime is occurring.

1           And -- and we know, we've corroborated the  
2 following. If a crime was occurring, he was in a  
3 position to know because he can define -- he can talk  
4 about the white horse, or he can talk about the car.

5           MR. LAURENCE:           The closest case I can think  
6 of is Hensley, where an officer was relying on an arrest  
7 bulletin from another jurisdiction. And in that case,  
8 United States v. Hensley, in that case, the court did  
9 consider, for purposes of whether a prior crime had been  
10 committed, whether the officer had reasonable suspicion  
11 to stop that individual, it took into account the nature  
12 of the offense and whether there's a current threat to  
13 public safety.

14          JUSTICE KENNEDY:           Well, correct me if I'm  
15 wrong, but my recollection of Hensley is, you're right,  
16 the police department 1 notifies police department 2.  
17 But a premise of the case, I had thought, was that  
18 police department 1 had reasonable suspicion.

19          MR. LAURENCE:           Well, there were two parts to  
20 the -- to the case. The second -- the first part was  
21 whether you could make a detention based on a prior  
22 crime, as opposed to current -- an immediate occurring  
23 crime.

24          JUSTICE KENNEDY:           I understand that.

25          MR. LAURENCE:           And so it looked to the

1 nature of the crime and whether there was threat to  
2 public safety is a validation consideration in  
3 authorizing a stop for a prior offense.

4 The second part of that was the -- allowing  
5 the officer to rely on another jurisdiction  
6 is reasonable --

7 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Hensley's victim wasn't  
8 a victim; meaning there was -- it was an anonymous tip?

9 MR. LAURENCE: No, it was from another  
10 police jurisdiction.

11 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Yeah, that's what I'm  
12 saying. So it wasn't an anonymous tip?

13 MR. LAURENCE: No, it was not an anonymous  
14 tip.

15 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: It wasn't public safety.  
16 It was the report of a crime by a known person.

17 MR. LAURENCE: Yes, it was. And in that  
18 case, the Court said that you could arrest for prior --  
19 for a prior offense, if it was a felony. It reserved  
20 the question of whether you could do so for a  
21 misdemeanor. So it's already looking at the nature of  
22 the offense and the threat to public safety.

23 JUSTICE KAGAN: And, Mr. Laurence, do I  
24 understand what you're saying? You're saying that in  
25 every case when we have to decide whether the threshold

1 level of reasonable suspicion has been met or whether  
2 the level of probable cause has been met, that courts  
3 can take into account the seriousness of the offense,  
4 and what would not count as probable cause for one crime  
5 will count as probable cause for another? Is that what  
6 you're saying?

7 MR. LAURENCE: What I'm saying is that, in  
8 terms of when we can deem a tip reliable -- White  
9 identified two components to the inquiry. One is the  
10 indicia of reliability, and the other was the content of  
11 the tip. And so we have to take the seriousness of the  
12 offense and the threat to public safety into account, in  
13 determining when the officer can rely on that  
14 information.

15 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, I don't understand how  
16 what you're saying is different from what I just said,  
17 and that would seem to me to work quite a substantial  
18 change in -- in Fourth Amendment law, that when we  
19 decide whether reasonable suspicion exists, when --  
20 whether probable cause exists, that we get to take into  
21 account how serious the offense is.

22 MR. LAURENCE: Well, I think, since the  
23 inception of the doctrine, this Court identified in  
24 Terry that reasonable suspicion results from a balancing  
25 of the governmental interest --

1           JUSTICE KAGAN:           The balancing occurs  
2 categorically. We decide that there's a reasonable  
3 suspicion standard by balancing interests. What we  
4 don't do is say -- you know, depending on how serious we  
5 think this crime is, more or less will meet that  
6 reasonable suspicion standard.

7           That would be a very substantial reworking  
8 of Fourth Amendment law -- or so it seems to me. Maybe  
9 I'm wrong.

10          MR. LAURENCE:           Well, I believe that was  
11 something that was indicated in Hensley. This Court  
12 looked to the nature of the offense in deciding whether  
13 or not the officer had reasonable suspicion at the  
14 inception in making that stop for a crime that had  
15 occurred two weeks earlier.

16          And it didn't -- it declined to consider  
17 whether or not that would be sufficient for a  
18 misdemeanor. But in taking the seriousness of the crime  
19 into account, in determining whether or not they could  
20 make that stop, that's a recognition that balancing does  
21 play some role.

22          And in *White*, this Court recognized that the  
23 reliability component is variable. There's a difference  
24 between probable cause and reasonable suspicion. And in  
25 *J.L.*, this Court left open the question of at what point

1 do we need no reliability because of the seriousness of  
2 the government --

3 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Could you explain to me  
4 one more time why it's relevant that there were these  
5 details that it was a particular kind of crime, that it  
6 was silver, the license plate, that's this case.  
7 Suppose in another case, a car just ran me off the road,  
8 and it's the only -- the only car that's on Highway 1  
9 between Fort Bragg and the state park.

10 MR. LAURENCE: Well, I think it helps  
11 twofold. There's particularity, so you know who you're  
12 stopping. And it goes to the totality of the  
13 circumstances in helping confirm that the person  
14 actually observed what they're saying.

15 So that you have -- it goes to the  
16 reliability of the personal observation. So it  
17 builds -- it adds an additional layer of -- of the  
18 indices reliability so the officer can rely on it  
19 sooner.

20 JUSTICE KENNEDY: And incidentally -- it  
21 doesn't have much to do with the case -- is this a  
22 two -- a two-lane road?

23 MR. LAURENCE: Yes, it is, Your Honor.

24 JUSTICE KENNEDY: That's what I thought.

25 MR. LAURENCE: Two-lane coastal highway,



1 which, obviously, when someone runs somebody off the  
2 road, poses a grave threat to public safety in that  
3 context.

4 JUSTICE GINSBURG: There's a tip that  
5 someone is carrying a concealed weapon, and we have held  
6 that that has to be corroborated -- corroborated. You  
7 can take out a concealed weapon in an instant and fire  
8 it and kill lots of people. In fact, it was pointed out  
9 that there are more deaths caused by guns than there are  
10 from drunk driving.

11 So what's the difference? The -- the  
12 argument on the drunk driving is very, very dangerous,  
13 but so is having a gun in one's pocket.

14 MR. LAURENCE: Well, I think there's a  
15 significant difference between having a gun in your  
16 pocket and actually brandishing it or firing it. I  
17 think, if the J.L. case involved somebody threatening  
18 other people with a gun or firing the gun, it would have  
19 involved a different calculus.

20 And so --

21 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But if you -- once --  
22 once you brandish it, it's too late. The damage will be  
23 caused.

24 MR. LAURENCE: That is -- that is correct.  
25 But once you're driving drunk down the road, it's -- you

1 have -- the threat is now posed to everybody on the  
2 highway because of the potential for that person to lose  
3 control because --

4 JUSTICE SCALIA: Of course, this call didn't  
5 say, I think the guy was drunk. It just said, somebody  
6 drove -- you know, drove me off the road.

7 MR. LAURENCE: Yes.

8 JUSTICE SCALIA: Right? So this isn't -- it  
9 isn't a call that says there's a drunken driver. It's  
10 just a call that says somebody drove irresponsibly,  
11 right? And that's enough to stop them.

12 MR. LAURENCE: Well, I would say -- I would  
13 say that, in this case, it is enough. But I would say  
14 it's more than just driving irresponsibly. Running  
15 somebody off the road reflects that they're incapable of  
16 driving their car in a way that's -- without posing a  
17 safety threat to other people, and when you're dealing  
18 with reasonable suspicion --

19 JUSTICE SCALIA: Okay. Really  
20 irresponsibly, okay?

21 MR. LAURENCE: Okay.

22 JUSTICE SCALIA: Really irresponsibly.

23 MR. LAURENCE: Very irresponsibly.

24 JUSTICE KAGAN: So do you think,  
25 Mr. Laurence, if the police had followed this man for

1 half an hour and seen no other signs of erratic  
2 driving and nobody can drunk drive -- can drive drunk  
3 for half an hour without swerving, without doing  
4 something else.

5 So they could still have stopped the car?

6 MR. LAURENCE: I think there may be a point  
7 where the threat to public safety would suggest that the  
8 reasonable suspicion is dissipated in that context. And  
9 so after -- after 50 miles --

10 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, I thought you were  
11 saying as long as somebody had -- had given an account  
12 that, some time ago, he had driven another driver off --  
13 he had run another driver off the road, doesn't matter  
14 whether you're drunk, doesn't matter anything, there was  
15 an account of an illegal act taking place, and that was  
16 enough to stop him. It doesn't matter what he's doing  
17 now.

18 MR. LAURENCE: Well, I believe that the  
19 threat to public safety plays a role in the balance.  
20 And so if that's dissipated, then at that point, you  
21 have -- the -- the reliability of the tip that you're  
22 relying on is not as significant. Put it this way:  
23 When you have the threat to public safety balanced in  
24 the totality for purposes of reliability, if that  
25 dissipates, then you have to go back to the tip itself,

1 whether it is internally reliable or whether it has  
2 enough to satisfy J.L.

3 I think that, when you have an immediate  
4 threat and you have a report of drunk driving, the  
5 officer shouldn't have to wait to see that 50 miles, to  
6 see if they can pass or fail.

7 JUSTICE SCALIA: It wasn't a report of drunk  
8 driving.

9 MR. LAURENCE: I'm sorry. Yes. A report  
10 that someone ran him off the road.

11 JUSTICE SCALIA: Somebody ran me off the  
12 road. Somebody was driving really irresponsibly.

13 MR. LAURENCE: Yes. Yes.

14 JUSTICE SCALIA: That's enough to stop him  
15 down the road.

16 MR. LAURENCE: It is, it is, because this is  
17 how drunk drivers display their actions. And when  
18 you're dealing with reasonable suspicion --

19 JUSTICE SCALIA: What about cutting me off  
20 too quickly, you know?

21 MR. LAURENCE: I think that --

22 JUSTICE SCALIA: Cuts right in front of me.  
23 Really ticks me off.

24 (Laughter.)

25 MR. LAURENCE: That would present a

1 different set of circumstances. If you have an  
2 instant -- a recognizable instant of bad driving as  
3 opposed to something that reflects recklessness or  
4 drunkenness, then you analyze the tip differently. And  
5 I think that --

6 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, how would somebody --  
7 how would somebody ever be able -- who observes another  
8 car driving ever be able to say that person was drunk?  
9 All they could -- all they could observe is what they  
10 see. They don't know whether the person -- what is  
11 causing that kind of behavior.

12 MR. LAURENCE: I agree. And that's because  
13 what we do -- we look to the nature of their driving,  
14 draw reasonable inferences from that. And that's all  
15 officers can ever do. When they observe something, they  
16 draw reasonable inferences and determine whether it  
17 gives them suspicion.

18 One thing I would point out, that the CHP  
19 dispatchers, the testimony in this case reflects that  
20 they asked. They asked the driver, well, what did you  
21 see? So that they can get that information and pass it  
22 along to give the officers as much as possible--

23 JUSTICE SCALIA: I think it's an entirely  
24 different case if the tip -- if the tip here was -- you  
25 know, I was at a party, this guy got in his car, he

1 should not have turned the key on in that car, this guy  
2 is really drunk, you should stop that car on the road.

3 I think that's totally different from  
4 somebody just saying, this guy swerved, or this guy  
5 drove me off the road. You're -- you're just making the  
6 assumption that -- that every -- every one of those  
7 incidents demonstrates a drunk behind the wheel, and I  
8 just don't think that's true.

9 MR. LAURENCE: Well, again, I would say it's  
10 not about demonstrating. It's not about certainty or  
11 probabilities. It's suspicion. And that behavior  
12 allows the officer to suspect drunk driving.

13 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, why is it limited to  
14 drunk driving? I don't understand that. I've been --  
15 I've been on an expressway, and I've had people go by  
16 me at -- they went by in a blur. They must have been  
17 going well over a hundred miles an hour.

18 Now, if the police catch up with that  
19 person, of course, the person's going to slow down while  
20 the police follow the person. And then when the police  
21 decide to stop, they're going to go back to engaging in  
22 this intentional, extremely dangerous conduct.

23 So I don't understand why there's a  
24 distinction between reporting that somebody necessarily  
25 is driving erratically, so the person may be impaired,

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1 and somebody who is -- where you have extremely reckless  
2 driving that's intentional.

3 MR. LAURENCE: Well, I wouldn't draw that  
4 distinction. I think reckless driving, in and of  
5 itself, can pose a threat to public safety that also  
6 mandates an immediate stop. If someone's playing  
7 chicken with another car on the road, if someone  
8 is -- you know, trying-- testing out their new Ferrari, is going  
9 a hundred miles an hour, weaving in and out of lanes,  
10 those all represent threats to public safety.

11 All those circumstances --

12 JUSTICE KAGAN: But all crime represents a  
13 threat to public safety, and yet, we have these  
14 standards.

15 MR. LAURENCE: Yes, we do have standards.  
16 But that -- the threat to public safety is part of the  
17 totality of circumstances. It's not something you  
18 invoke that wipes away all other inquiries. What we  
19 have here is we have a tip that, if it was given by a  
20 known person, I think would undoubtedly allow the  
21 officer to pull that car over immediately.

22 The question is because it was anonymous --

23 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Why? Why -- the -- we  
24 have the case of the trusted informer. The informer  
25 several times has given the police tips and it turned

1 out to be right. And then we have another side, the  
2 anonymous person. Then there's somebody who calls,  
3 gives a correct name and address, but no record at all  
4 of reliability.

5 Why should the fact that the name is  
6 known -- the name of the informant is known, if the  
7 police have no reason to believe one way or another that  
8 this informer is reliable?

9 MR. LAURENCE: Well, I believe that, when  
10 you're looking at -- at what point it's reasonable for  
11 the officer to rely on the content of that tip or to  
12 rely on -- on that tip coming in and act on it, that  
13 when somebody gives their name, that adds a layer of  
14 reliability to it, even without verification.

15 And I think one thing that Gates says in the  
16 context of somebody who reports a -- a personal  
17 observation of a crime is that even if we doubt their  
18 veracity, even if we have some question as to their  
19 motives, the fact that they are giving a personal  
20 observation, they note that it's a personal observation,  
21 and giving a detailed account of what occurs, that  
22 report is entitled to a greater degree of reliability  
23 than --

24 JUSTICE SCALIA: You don't think that a  
25 teenager standing on a street corner with a couple of



1 other teenagers with a gun in his belt represents a  
2 threat to public safety?

3 MR. LAURENCE: Not the same threat as in  
4 this case, Your Honor.

5 JUSTICE SCALIA: No? All right.

6 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.

7 No, no. We're going to hear from Ms. Kovner  
8 first.

9 Ms. Kovner.

10 ORAL ARGUMENT OF RACHEL P. KOVNER

11 FOR UNITED STATES, AS AMICUS CURIAE,

12 SUPPORTING THE RESPONDENTS

13 MS. KOVNER: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it  
14 please the Court:

15 Brief car stops based on anonymous tips of  
16 reckless or drunken driving are reasonable under the  
17 Fourth Amendment because they serve a critical  
18 government interest in removing drunk drivers from the  
19 roadway --

20 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: All right. Please  
21 define for me what behavior would give police officers  
22 or what descriptors would be adequate for the police to  
23 think someone's drunk. Swerving, I know, has been  
24 mentioned. But reckless driving, there's been a lot of  
25 discussion that there could be a wide variety of

1 reckless driving.

2 MS. KOVNER: So --

3 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: What -- what other  
4 things would a -- would a caller have to say?

5 MS. KOVNER: So, Your Honor, I think -- I  
6 agree with the observation that there are some behaviors  
7 that pose an ongoing threat to others on the roadway,  
8 and some driving violations that don't. NHTSA, the  
9 National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration and  
10 other organizations, do keep track of what kinds of  
11 behavior are associated with drunkenness.

12 And the Court, in this case, of course,  
13 looked at the particular behavior and said, is this  
14 really a reckless driving behavior, the kind of behavior  
15 that poses this imminent danger? So there is a line  
16 that courts would need to draw, but the courts that are  
17 engaging in this kind of analysis do draw that.

18 And of course --

19 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, what -- what goes on  
20 the other side of the line? I mean, why -- why is this  
21 on one side? And then tell me what's on the other.

22 MS. KOVNER: Sure. So examples of behavior  
23 on the other might be a seatbelt violation, and they  
24 also might be behaviors that it's a real judgment call  
25 whether a violation occurred or not.

1           So for instance, that person didn't fully  
2 stop at a stop sign. We might have doubts about whether  
3 an informant, who we don't know anything about, can  
4 accurately perceive that. But when we're talking about  
5 behavior like --

6           JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR:           I think what you're  
7 saying to me, am I correct, that almost any moving  
8 violation counts? Changing a lane without a signal,  
9 which seems to be endemic in Washington, but --

10           (Laughter.)

11           MS. KOVNER:           I think that would be a harder  
12 case. I'm not sure that it's correlated with -- with  
13 intoxication or impairment. As you say, it's very  
14 common, but I think the behavior that we're talking  
15 about here, driving somebody else off the road, is the  
16 kind of behavior that shows this person is a --

17           JUSTICE KAGAN:           How about somebody cutting  
18 someone off in their lane?

19           MS. KOVNER:           I think that's close to the  
20 line, Your Honor. I'm not sure that it's always  
21 illegal, and it's something where we may have doubts  
22 about whether the informant can accurately separate this  
23 person was breaking the law from this person wasn't. I  
24 think the courts are going to have to answer the  
25 question of whether this is the -- you know, kind of

1 behavior that poses --

2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, where does  
3 that -- I think this is the question Justice Kagan asked  
4 earlier -- how does the nature of the offense affect the  
5 reasonableness of the suspicion?

6 MS. KOVNER: So --

7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I mean, in either  
8 case, you have -- let's say the seatbelt and the  
9 swerving driver. It's the same witness. He said,  
10 still, it's a white Ford. The reasonableness of the  
11 suspicion would seem, to me, to be totally divorced from  
12 what it's about.

13 MS. KOVNER: I think that's true, Your  
14 Honor, and we actually think and -- you know, we argued  
15 in our brief that there is reasonable suspicion here.  
16 When an informant gives a basis for knowledge, you have  
17 reason to think they are an eyewitness.

18 But the Court has also recognized that there  
19 are certain dangers on the roadway that allow  
20 intrusions, even when we might not otherwise allow them.  
21 So, for instance, in the Sitz case, the Court said drunk  
22 that drunk driving is such a great danger that we're  
23 going to allow even random stops of vehicles to detect  
24 drunk drivers. So I think the court has indicated there  
25 are certain driving behaviors that are so dangerous

1 we'll allow even suspicionless stops.

2           And here, of course, we're not dealing with  
3 suspicionless stops. The questions from the Court have  
4 indicated some of the reasons why that's the case.  
5 Here, we have a caller who has demonstrated their basis  
6 for knowledge, and officers have been able to confirm  
7 that. So we're talking about tips where the person  
8 relays the kind of details you can really only have if  
9 you are an eyewitness to this person's driving on the  
10 road.

11           CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:           Well, that's just  
12 not true. It's -- it's an acquaintance, I know what  
13 kind of car he drives, I know where he's going. I  
14 didn't see anything on the road, but I call the police  
15 and say, oh, there's this -- you know, white Ford  
16 swerving all over the road.

17           MS. KOVNER:           So, Your Honor, I think this  
18 class of people who are going to have the relevant  
19 knowledge is almost exclusively eyewitnesses. You may  
20 also have a few people who have seen the person's car  
21 and happen to know what direction they're headed in, but  
22 for the most part, we're talking about a very narrow  
23 class of individuals that are largely going to be  
24 eyewitnesses to this person's driving on the road.

25           CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:           No, I'm talking

1 about the concern that you want to have the police pull  
2 over people that you don't like, where you know  
3 somebody's got something bad in the car, and you don't  
4 like it, and so you're going to take advantage of the  
5 fact that the police don't have to observe anything, and  
6 yet, you can still get them to pull over this person.

7 MS. KOVNER: So somebody who's malicious,  
8 who's a prankster, is still going to have this kind of  
9 specialized knowledge, and that's not something a  
10 malicious prankster is necessarily going to have. I --

11 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Why is that different  
12 from the knowledge in J.L., that they were three young  
13 men, and they were described, and the caller said, "The  
14 one with the gun is the one with the plaid shirt." All  
15 of that was corroborated by the police, and yet, we held  
16 that that was no indication that a crime had been  
17 committed.

18 MS. KOVNER: Your Honor, I think the  
19 critical thing that's present here that wasn't present  
20 in J.L. is the basis for knowledge. So as the passage  
21 that Justice Breyer read signals, we're talking there  
22 about concealed criminal activity, and the Court pointed  
23 out in that case there's nothing in the tip that signals  
24 how the informant knows this person had a gun.

25 Here, in contrast, the person is telling you

1 "I'm an eyewitness. This person just ran me off the  
2 road."

3 JUSTICE KAGAN: But then you think J.L.  
4 would have come out differently if the tipster had said,  
5 "I just saw these guys and I saw -- you know, one of  
6 them had a gun"?

7 MS. KOVNER: I think this case comes out  
8 differently for two reasons. One is, yes, the tip would  
9 be stronger than the tip in J.L., if the person related  
10 eyewitness basis. But the second has to do with the  
11 imminent danger here that's posed by a car that's moving  
12 down the roadway and that's being operated by a  
13 potentially drunk driver, and the reduced expectations  
14 of privacy you have when you're talking about a vehicle  
15 stop.

16 And those were front and center in Sitz,  
17 where the Court said that even suspicionless stops can  
18 be justified by that particular danger.

19 JUSTICE SCALIA: Yeah, but that -- but that  
20 second danger -- you may have a drunken driver on the  
21 road; that danger can be eliminated by following the  
22 car. You don't have to stop the car right away. You  
23 can follow it and if, indeed, the driver seems to be  
24 driving erratically, then you can stop. You'd have  
25 probable cause.

1 I don't think you have to automatically  
2 allow a stop in order to prevent all of the horrors  
3 that are going to arise from drunk driving. Follow the  
4 car. If he's behaving like a drunk driver, then stop  
5 him.

6 MS. KOVNER: Your Honor, officers could  
7 follow the car, and if they do, they may witness a  
8 subsequent dangerous behavior that could justify pulling  
9 over the car. The problem is that the subsequent  
10 dangerous behavior they may observe may be the car  
11 swerving into another lane and hitting another vehicle.

12 JUSTICE SCALIA: That is so remote. I mean,  
13 it seems to me you're asking us to adopt a broad rule  
14 that is contrary to what we normally do for searches and  
15 seizures because, now and then, it would seem, to me,  
16 very rarely, before the police can stop the drunk  
17 driver, he kills somebody.

18 I mean, I suppose that could happen now and  
19 then but it's pretty fanciful.

20 MS. KOVNER: Your Honor, I don't think it's  
21 a remote harm at all. Now, this is a harm that causes  
22 one-third of all traffic accidents, that takes tens of  
23 thousands of lives a year, and it's a harm that this  
24 Court has always said is a harm of the first order that  
25 justifies the kind of intrusions that we might not



1 otherwise allow in --

2 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But here, we have the  
3 police did follow the vehicle for about 5 miles and saw  
4 nothing erratic about the driving. So perhaps, if the  
5 police had immediately stopped the person or -- but  
6 don't -- don't we have to take account that there was no  
7 corroboration? When the police get there. Even if they  
8 could stop him instantly, when they have no  
9 corroboration, then that doesn't amount to reasonable  
10 suspicion.

11 MS. KOVNER: Your Honor, I agree that police  
12 might follow a car for such a long period of time that  
13 the reasonable suspicion would dissipate. On the facts  
14 of this case, Your Honor, the record indicates there  
15 were five minutes between when the officers first saw  
16 the car and when they pulled it over.

17 They weren't five minutes of uninterrupted  
18 observation. They were five minutes in which the  
19 officers were turning their cars around because they  
20 were headed in the opposite direction, were catching up  
21 to a car along the freeway. So the California Supreme  
22 Court analyzed that delay and found the fact that they  
23 didn't observe additional --

24 JUSTICE BREYER: I don't know if we have to  
25 get into the drunk driving. It's 3 miles south of the

1 Humboldt County border on -- do you know the answer to  
2 this? Is it in the record? I mean, on many sections of  
3 that road, in Mendocino County, you drive someone off  
4 the road, they are dead.

5 I mean, there are sheer drops, and so I just  
6 wonder, if I look that up here, what's the situation  
7 where this supposedly took place?

8 MS. KOVNER: The only thing I can point to  
9 about that, Your Honor, is the way that the California  
10 Supreme Court treated this, which is that, because they  
11 pointed to the fact that this is a two-lane highway and  
12 that it's particularly dangerous on this particular road  
13 to engage in this behavior.

14 But I don't know about -- you know, whether  
15 there are cliffs on the side of the road.

16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What about the  
17 danger from the police side? In other words, they  
18 know -- or they suspect that the guy driving the white  
19 car has a lot of marijuana in the trunk. They have no  
20 basis for pulling him over. And they say, well, guess  
21 what, we got an anonymous tip that he was driving  
22 erratically, so we pulled him over.

23 MS. KOVNER: Your Honor --

24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What protection is  
25 there against that?

1 MS. KOVNER: Your Honor, if police are  
2 willing to lie about what they saw or -- you know, in  
3 the cases of some rogue officers, they may exist, but  
4 this rule isn't going to prevent -- no rule is going to  
5 prevent that. Officers could just as easily lie about  
6 what they saw.

7 Thank you.

8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.

9 Mr. Kleven, you have 3 minutes remaining.

10 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF PAUL R. KLEVEN,

11 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS,

12 APPOINTED BY THIS COURT

13 MR. KLEVEN: In this case, we're talking  
14 about a single uncorroborated tip of reckless driving.  
15 After that single incident, the car -- the truck went  
16 for approximately 19 miles with no indication of any  
17 other problem and then was followed for up to 5 miles by  
18 the police officers, again, with no indication of any  
19 erratic driving or any other violation that would have  
20 been a reason for pulling him over immediately.

21 There's no reason to believe that the driver  
22 of this truck presented any kind of danger about being  
23 about to lose control, which is the argument that the  
24 State is relying on, and the Federal government, and  
25 neither one of them came up with any anecdote, even,

1 where that actually occurred, much less any statistics  
2 that show that that is a serious problem, of people  
3 losing control while they're being under surveillance by  
4 the police officers.

5 This case is even farther away from the bomb  
6 situation than J.L. was. In J.L., you had a person who  
7 was armed, who could have pulled out a gun and started  
8 firing at any moment. Here, you have something where  
9 there's no indication of any ongoing risk to the public.  
10 I don't think -- I don't know that there's a good answer  
11 to the bomb question.

12 I read through the transcript from the oral  
13 argument in J.L. I didn't see any -- you know, there  
14 didn't seem to be any good arguments -- any good  
15 discussions there, either, as to which way the Court  
16 could go.

17 But this case -- in J.L., the Court said,  
18 there's no reason for us to resolve that. We don't have  
19 to speculate about a situation where that would happen.  
20 In this case, I submit, there's even less reason for the  
21 Court to speculate about the bomb situation or even the  
22 kidnapping situation.

23 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, I find that  
24 unsatisfactory because if you -- unless you're willing  
25 to say, it doesn't matter whether it's a bomb, an atomic

1 bomb, a little bomb, then there -- there must be -- if  
2 you're going to draw the line someplace, then you're  
3 going to have to distinguish between those reports of  
4 crimes that are serious enough to be on one side of the  
5 line and those reports of a crime that are not serious  
6 enough to be on that side of the line.

7 You either have to go all the way, or you  
8 have to draw a line, and if you're going to draw a line,  
9 I would like to know where the line is.

10 MR. KLEVEN: Well, Your Honor, except I  
11 don't think -- I don't think you can draw the line in  
12 terms of reasonable suspicion because, then, you're  
13 going to have this --

14 JUSTICE ALITO: All right. Forget about  
15 reasonable suspicion. Just can it be done?

16 MR. KLEVEN: Well, certainly, Your Honor --

17 JUSTICE ALITO: You can say it can never  
18 done, even if it's an atomic bomb, even if it's some  
19 other type of bomb. You can say that. Or you can say,  
20 no, there's a line someplace. If you're going to say  
21 there's a line someplace, then, really, I think you need  
22 to tell us where the line is.

23 MR. KLEVEN: Your Honor, I think the line is  
24 certainly, when we get into the bomb situation, but not  
25 in terms of reasonable suspicion. The severity of the

1 crime does not affect it, but the Court could fashion a  
2 rule that would say there's an exception in this case  
3 that would apply --

4 JUSTICE ALITO: For a bomb. For any kind of  
5 a bomb?

6 MR. KLEVEN: Well, I don't think -- I think  
7 if -- if there's a call in that --

8 JUSTICE ALITO: It has to be a big bomb.

9 MR. KLEVEN: -- that says a white -- a white  
10 Prius has a bomb -- you know, that doesn't seem to be  
11 the sort of case under the -- under the established  
12 circumstances where this Court would find a reasonable  
13 suspicion --

14 JUSTICE SCALIA: What about drawing the line  
15 at intentional conduct? The guy who has a bomb is going  
16 to use it. He's intentionally going to use it.

17 MR. KLEVEN: Well --

18 JUSTICE SCALIA: Or maybe intentionally  
19 doing an action that is going to harm more than one  
20 person, as opposed to, hmm, maybe this person might  
21 accidentally, because he's inub-- inebriated, hurt somebody?

22 It seems to me there's a clear line between  
23 somebody who's -- who's bent on an intentional crime and  
24 somebody who might harm somebody because of his conduct.  
25 You like that one?

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1 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Yes, I have another  
2 one, too.

3 MR. KLEVEN: Yes, Your Honor, I think  
4 those -- those are two significant distinctions,  
5 certainly, between the -- the bomb analogy and the  
6 situation, even in the drunken driving situation, where  
7 you don't have anybody who is intentionally trying to  
8 harm anyone and the magnitude of the risk is -- is much  
9 greater. The --

10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So somebody has five  
11 drinks and goes and gets in the car, that's not  
12 intentionally trying to harm someone? Or recklessly  
13 trying to harm --

14 MR. KLEVEN: Well, in terms of their --  
15 their decision to get drunk, there's intent there, in  
16 terms of -- by the time the officer becomes aware of it,  
17 there's no indication that that drunk driver is going  
18 down the road trying to harm somebody.

19 There is an indication that they may be  
20 too -- too inebriated to be driving properly, and police  
21 officers are pulling people over for that situation  
22 since the car was invented, and they're really good at  
23 it.

24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.

25 MR. KLEVEN: Thank you.

1 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Counsel.

2 The case is submitted.

3 (Whereupon, at 2:01 p.m., the case in the  
4 above-entitled matter was submitted.)

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